Sports in East Germany 1945-1990

Sport became a vehicle for identity politics as the East Germans turned sporting success into a means for gaining diplomatic recognition. 

• East German elite athletes were turned into "diplomats in training suits" and the two Germanys became involved in a "Cold War on the dirt track" 
• This quest for athletic domination resulted in the creation of a highly sophisticated dominance utilising the latest advancements in exercise and training physiology 
• East Germany was that successful as outstanding performances forced international sports authorities to finally recognise the GDR. 
• It was not until 1972 that the International Olympic Committee allowed the GDR to compete in the Munich Games as a sovereign state, defeating the West German team on its home grounds. 

Sports has been used by many regimes, socialist or otherwise, to cultivate national identities and to inculcate desirable attitudes - either collective or individual. E.g. Third Reich and the 1936 Olympic Games; the Soviet Union dominating the Olympics from 1954 onwards

• Not just dictatorships - the US and "social technology" - shared loyalties to overcome race, gender and ethnic divides. 
• Ulbricht adopted a strategy widely employed by fascist, socialist and democratic states throughout the 20th century to demonstrate their national and ideological superiority
• Sports offered the GDR a uniquely objective and quantifiable means to compare national strength 
• It also paved a path to East Germany's legitimacy being internationally recognised:
  • 1955 - SED promulgated the Hallstein Doctrine
  • Tried to obtain and sought recognition of statehood through sports, where it had failed in diplomatic channels.
  • Athlete invitations were welcomed to compete with foreign countries - the host countries, in recognising East German athletes rather than Germany, also recognised East Germany as a de-facto state. 

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) required the two Germanys to compete as one team in 1956, 1960 and 1964, under the same flag and same national anthem. 

• It was only in 1972 at the Munich Games that East Germany was allowed to compete as an autonomous country with its own flag and national anthem 
• Union Cycliste International (UCI) recognised "Friedensfahart" as early as the official event in 1953. This helped to legitimise East Germany's claim to an autonomous state
  • Cyclists competed  as representatives of the East German state - represented individual nations, not professional, multi-national corporate-sponsored teams, found in the Tour de France 
  • Recognised the competition not only in the context of the Socialist Bloc but a way of paving teams from other countries to compete. 

Ultimately, the Friedensfahart and other sporting competitions in East Germany gave the regime a way of strengthening the East German's identity. 

Sports being used as a vehicle for identity politics can be used alongside East Germany football

• The GDR exploited sport to achieve international recognition for an independent state - weak legitimacy through world-class performances. 
• The SED seized the opportunity with the country's most popular sport - football - in order to strengthen East German's identification with the political and social system, overturning the political isolation imposed by the GDR by West Germany, the US and other western states. 
• First football game against an English game 1963; 1969 - GDR played a World Cup qualifier against Wales in Cardiff 
• The German Football Association had the highest membership among the associations 
• Teams in 1st division attracted large crowds of around 11-12,000
• Radio, daily newspapers and specialist papers all catered for the avid interest of the game 
• TV courage increased during the 1970's 
• The SED recognised all of these popular factors of football and capitalised upon them, aiming to consolidate the position of 1968, where GDR ranked 3rd and above the FGR in the Olympics, in football. 

The SED made it the focus of their campaigns to mobilise East Germans by promoting participatory spectatorship

• Citizens would actively prepare and support the race. Socialist ideology saw all human activity as integral to the socialist pursuit of all-rounded personal development 
• Friedensfahart enabled the government to encourage a form of spectatorship that would promote socialism, community and national identity - enabled via East German citizens to identify with victorious athletes, such as Schur. 
• It took on 2 forms of development:
  • Persuaded as many people as possible to turn out and cheer cyclists - achieving collective identification 
  • Enabled workers, children and others to participate in preparations. 
• Both of these forms heightened identification with socialist collectivities and to strengthen East German patriotism, not just German patriotism. 
• Involvement of workers and children covered the overall goal of reaching entrenched socialism by enhancing productivity and shop floor camaraderie 

Gustav-Adolf Schur - victories and upbringing made him a socialist role model 

• Individual victories in 1958, 1959, a bronze model in 1956 Olympics and silver medal in 1960.
• His achievements were propagated as products of East German socialism rather than individual brilliance 
• SED needed to find role models that were not tainted by militarism, capitalism or national socialism. 
• Schur was used as socialist "advertisements for socialist ideology." 
• He won people's trust - trust them, then in turn trust the socialist ideology 
• SED undertook well conceptualised and concrete promotional activity to popularise ideological exemplary promotional behaviour 
  • Pictures of Schur of him visiting schools, factories, in the company of unpopular Ulbricht
• His upbringing - working class born in 1930's - embraced a collective ethos. People sympathised with him racing against a bus for stamina 
• 1960 race - allowed his partner to win the race for the collective good of the East German team - interpreted as a collective achievement 

Censorship of the East German Media results in only being able to analyse the official presentation of sports in the GDR, not the reception. 

• Although there was an extensive programme to mobilise citizens to physically spectate, many East Germans watched the race/listened to it on the radio with friends and family, rather wide the wider public. 
• Personal letters failed to convey anything about a socialist society 
• Did not necessarily spill over to embrace socialism. 
• However, there was no need for the SED to drag East Germans to spectate against their will.
• Personal letters, not written as a collective, were due to Schur's handsome, charming and successful achievements as a sportsman, not to his popularity generated for political and ideological reasons. 

The SED failed to exploit football to the same extent as was used for other sports found in East Germany. This was because of:

• The level of contestation between actors, institutions and organisations appears to have impacted on the game's performance to a greater extent than on that of other sports. 
  • The SED attempted to instruct reform and new structure on football that led to riots and disagreements with local officials and regional ministers. 
  • The SED’s regional secretaries, the regional councils, government ministers, heads of large enterprises or general directors of the economic conglomerates were the main rivals for influence over the running of football in East Germany. 
• The inability of the state to exercise the same level of control over football as it had for elite sport more widely allowed the individuals, institutions and organisations the chance to wield their influence over the game, its development and even its regional followers
• Such interference was compounded by the nature of the sport itself, which did not lend itself so readily to the scientifically driven training and doping regime carried out successfully in so many other sports.