Mao's China Key Topic 2: Agriculture and industry, 1949-65

  • Condensed notes from pages 232-249 of the Edexcel A-Level History Communist States in the Twentieth Century textbook.
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Early changes; Attacks on landlords and redistribu

  • In Mao's unorthodox Marxist view, it would be the peasant class rather than the smaller worker class that would be the driving force of the revolution.
  • Agrarian Reform Law introduced in June 1950 to destroy the "gentry landlord" class who were the traditional rural elite.
  • Landlords who exploited peasants and rented their land out would have their property seized. Many were sentenced to death and their land was redistributed "to the tiller"
  • However, there were problems with introducing a nation-wide policy:Work teams consisting of Party members and young people were sent to the countryside to organise land reform and subject landlords to struggle meetings where they were forced to admit to their crimes and were often sentenced to death.
    • land reform had already begun in the north and only 10-15% rented land so landlords weren't really a problem.
    • peasants already owned the land in some areas,a nd had hoped the Communists would bring peace and stability rather than reform.
    • the Communist influence was weaker in the south, where the KMT retained control for longer.
    • land was often owned by clans with family ties, so class struggle wasn't a big problem in these areas.
  • Mao wasn't clear on how much violence to use, so struggle meetings sometimes escalated.
  • Landlords made an easy targets to generate a sense of classs-consciousness and conflict so the Communists whipped up anger against them.
  • By summer 1952 the "land to the tiller" movement was mostly completed. Around 88% of households took part, with 43% of the land being redistributed to 60% of the population.
  • Rural production increased - 15% p.a. in 1950-52. The landlord class was destroyed, resulting in 1-2 million executions.
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Early changes; Agricultural co-operation

  • The peasants saw land reform as a chance to own their own land, but the CCP saw it as the first step of a long process towards full collectivisation in line with Marxist ideology.
  • Richer peasants still had more capital than poorer peasants, so Voluntary Mutual Aid Teams (MATs) were created for peasants to pool their tools, ploughs, labour, etc. in
  • This made sense as richer households with more land than could be worked could pool with poorer ones which wanted more land.
  • MATs were small scale - around 5-10 households. Richer peasants were excluded. By 1952 around 40% of households were part of an MAT.
  • Voluntary Agricultural Producers Co-operatives (APCs) set up in 1953 to remove capitalist ideas of buying and selling land and services.
  • All land was a single shared unit and peasants were compensated with a points system according to value of contributions. They received their share of grain as payment.
  • Comprised of around 3-5 MATs joined together. They were less popular than MATs and only 14% joined and by 1955 only 16.9m households were in them out of total 110m. The development pace of APCs also varied.
  • Gradualists in Party like Zhou Enlai and Lio Shaoqi said China wasn't ready for large-scale farming due to tech lack. Mao disagreed and demanded an increase in reform pace towards collectivisation in 1955. APC membership increased to 96% by December 1956.
  • Party cadres enthusiastically increased pace of reform, some for ideological reasons, some to further their careers.
  • By December 1955 4% of the APCs were high-level APCs, with 200-300 households.
  • As a result of the enthusiasm, Mao believed that China need not wait for increased mechanisation and stated that "socialism will be realised in 1959".
  • By Jan 1956, 80.3% of households were in APCs, with 30.7% of those being high-level.
  • Private ownership was completely abolished and members were only compensated for labour as land and tools were now state-owned.
  • Membership became compulsory and by the end of 1956 nearly 88% of peasants were in high-level APCs.
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The communes: abolition of private farming

  • Mao judged that early period of collective farming had been accomplished. ALl private famring was to be abolished.
  • Politburo in August 1958: the communes were "the basic social units of communist society".
  • First commmune in Henan province in July 1958 named "Sputnik Commune".
  • By the end of the year 740,000 co-operatives had been converted into 26,000 communes.
  • Party claimed 99% of peasants lived in communes - around half a billion people.
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The communes: organisation

  • Average size around 5500 households.
  • Communes organised both agricultural and industrial production as well as healthcare and education.
  • Private ownership of land and livestock abolished and amrkets were banned.
  • Mao believed that mass mobilisation of the people would enable agriculture and industry to be developed together.
  • Each commune was to produce its own food as well as its own industrial goods, such as tools and machinery.
  • Pooling of resources in the commune was to be highly efficient.
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The communes: The vision

  • it was believed the communes would transofrm life to be closer to perfect communist ideology.
  • Mess halls enabled communal eating as sharing meals would help develop revolutionary fervour.
  • Women would be able to escape domestic chores and help men in fields and factories. Celebrated by propaganda as "iron women".
  • Around 90% of women worked in agriculture in 1958-59.
  • Grandparents wouldn't have to help grandchildren, could spend time in "happiness homes".
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The communes: The reality

  • People were easy to target with propaganda as forced into one location.
  • All able men aged 15-50 worked in commune militia to act as police force - prevented people from taking too much food and punished those who didn't work hard enough.
  • Family life ruined as parents lost influence over children, grandparents were isolated, and families ate surrounded by strangers. Food was poor quality in mess halls.
  • Rather than liberate women, they had to carry out hard physical labour which was even harder.
  • Despite this, production didn't rise enough. Mao decided that this was because sparrows were eating the grain.
  • Four Pests Campaign launched in 1958 to rid China of sparrows, rats, flies, and mosquitos.
  • Cadres encouraged people to follow sparrows and prevent them from landing so they would die of exhaustion. Rewards were paid for bodies of the birds. 
  • Crops lay rotting in the fields as villagers spent their time looking for vermin instead.
  • Made worse as this increased the caterpillar population, which devoured the harvest anyway.
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The communes: Lysenkoism

  • Effects of FPC made worse by following ideas of Soviet scientist Trofim Lysenko.
  • He manipulated his research in USSR to gain political influence and purge any scientists who discredited him.
  • He advocated planting seeds close together and giving them a lot of moisture and low temperatures. 
  • Lysenkoism named official agricultural doctrine by Mao in 1958.
  • Cadres didn't report on failures of Lysenkoism for fear of being dismissed.
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1st FYP, 1952-56

  • Announced in 1952, followed Soviet model of industrialisation - focused on centralisation of heavy industry.
  • Clear production targets would be set and monitored by the Party.
  • USSR was China's only major ally as the West had imposed a trade embargo on China after involvement in Korean War, so relied on economic help from USSR.
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1st FYP, 1952-56: USSR Support

  • In Sino-Soviet Mutual Assisstance Treaty of February 1950, USSR agreed to economically help China.
  • After Korean armistice signed in July 1953, USSR began to support Chinese FYP.
  • Soviet support included:
    • construcion/reconstruction of 156 industrial enterprises - including 7 iron and steel plants, 24 electric power stations, and 63 machinery plants.Some plants made in USSR and sent to China.
    • industrial experts to supply technical knowledge and experience - 11,000 experts sent to China.
    • 28,000 Chinese technicians went to Russia to study.
    • $300m loan over next 5 years.
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1st FYP, 1952-56: Plan's targets

  • According to CCP stastistics, industrial output in 1949 was just 10-20% of pre-WW2 peak, under 50% in coal, 75% electricity, 70-90% consumer goods.
  • Plan aimed to achieve:
    • higher growth rate, especially in heavy industry
    • technological advancement
    • self-sufficiency
    • high level of grain procurement at fixed prices to fund industrialisation. State procurement target in 1953 was 22 million tons.
    • stimulate transformation towards socialism.
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1st FYP, 1952-56: Successes

  • Annual growth rate avg. 16%. Industrial output grew 15.5%/year - target was 14.7%.
  • Heavy industrial output almost x3 - e.g. production in Manchuria much higher than pre-Civil War peak.
  • Railway freight volume more than x2 so resources and the PLA could be moved efficiently wherever they needed to be.
  • Oil, uranium and minerals discovered in Xinjiang.
  • Industrial working class grew from 6m - 10m. Investment more focused on big industrial projects - e.g. new steel centre in Anshan attracted 35,000 new workers and was producing 2/3 of China's steel by 1957. 
  • State began to convert private firms into joint state-private firms in 1953. By 1956 private industry abolished Large firms came under state ownderhsip and smaller businesses were converted into co-operatives.
  • Industrial worker standard of living improved - greater job security. Shanghai living conditions particularly improved.
  • CCP increased influence over people due to more urbanisation. Industrial plans organised into socialist lines and worker committees had a say in running of factory. Workers organised into Danwei work units to control welfare support. In return for the security, the people were completely controlled by the Party.
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1st FYP, 1952-56: Failures

  • Dependent on high-interest loans from USSR. Farmers often had to sell all crops at low prices so PRC could meet repayment schedules. The grain was needed to feed the growing industrial workforce and to sell for currency to repay loans. Food prices kept low, but peasantry severely suffered.
  • Agricultural output value only grew avg. 2.1%/year, declining from 14.1% in 1949-52. Not enough food imported to cities to feed workers.
  • Consumer goods supply low. Helped the Plan as people saved money and bought government bonds, which gave the government money to repay the USSR.
  • Chinese still lacked organisational and management experience. Bottlenecks in production due to lack of co-operation between central planners and local producers.
  • Little investment in healthcare and education. Standard of living still low, especially in peasantry. E.g. huge shortage of trained doctors.
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2nd FYP, 1958-62: Why did he launch it?

  • 1st FYP successful for industry but agriculture lagging behind. Mao determined to increase both simultaneously to compete with the West.
  • Wanted China to be the largest communist economy in Asia. Wanted to overtake Britain in "fifteen or more years".
  • Was optimistic as industrial production had risen 18.3% during 1st FYP.
  • Also appeared that communists were winning Cold War. Communist technology seemed to be superior after the launching of the Sputnik in 1957.
  • Mao declared in a 1957 speech "The East wind is prevailing over the West wind".
  • "Walking on Two Legs" - improve both industry and agriculture.
  • Believed sheer force of will could overcome technological issues. Control of economy loosened and decentralised - instead of centralised targets, local people would have more control over what they produced.
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2nd FYP, 1958-62: Successes

  • Land more fertile due to massive irrigation terracing.
  • Better construction changed Chinese cities.
  • People in communes lived more closely to a communist model than before.
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2nd FYP, 1958-62: Failures

  • Plan targets were absurd - Mao created competition between regions as officials wanted to further their careers to please him, which they did by setting unrealistic targets - e.g. Ministry of Metallurgy claimed it would produce 20m tonnes of steel by 1962, and 100m by 1977.
  • Mao was convinced mobilisation of the people could overcome anything. He became overconfident and people were afraid to challenge him after the purges of his enemies in the 1950s. 
  • No intellectuals and economists left after ARC.
  • Families encouraged to set up backyard furnaces to boost steel production. The cadres and propaganda spurred the people further, so families smelted all their metal items and used most of their wooden items as fuel. The steel was poor quality and most was buried. People worked furnaces instead of field, so crops lay rotting.
  • Many factories closed or reduced production due to raw material shortage. Great Famine also meant that workers died of starvation. By 1962 production had decreased by 40% of 1958-59 level.
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2nd FYP, 1958-62: Great Famine, 1958-62

  • Agricultural production announced at 375m tonnes in 1958 - gross exaggeration. Revied down to 215m tonnes. 
  • Pressured cadres vastly exaggerated their reports, leading to higher officials demanding even greater results based on inflated figures. 
  • Higher quotas of grain also extracted from peasants as officials thought there was a surplus. 1/3 Of grain ordered to be left in field as officials thought there was no storage space. Grain also sent to other communist countries as a free gift.
  • Greatest famine in human history - 28.68/1000 people death rate by 1960. 8m deaths in Anhui, 7.8m in Henan, 9m in Sichuan.
  • Starving peasants launched attacks on grain reserves and were tortured and killed by the police as a result. People scavenged for tree bark and small vermin. Many died due to disease or malnutrition. Cannibalism took place as children were abducted, boiled, and eaten. Many women went into prostitution.
  • Between 30-50 million people died as a result.
  • Typhoons in South China exacerbated the situation. Over 60% of cultivated land was affected by either flooding or droughts.
  • Khrushchev recalled Soviet advisers from China in 1960 - 1400 Soviet scientists.
  • Cadres weren't truthful about the awful situations, so many reserves which could've been sent to worst-hit areas remained.
  • No one dared to question or oppose the GLF after the ARC.
  • Many Party bosses unaffected - Henan Party boss built 7 villas as the people starved. 
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2nd FYP, 1958-62: Lushan Conference, 1959

  • Minister of EDefence Peng Dehuai voiced doubts about the grain harvest report (375m tonnes) after he travelled to his home town and saw the extent of the Famine.
  • He thought his high status would protect him, especially as he had been a hero of the Korean War.
  • Despite this Mao felt betrayed and accused Peng of forming a "right opportunist clique".
  • Mao accused Peng of passing negative reports to Khrushchev during his time in the USSR.
  • Mao denounced Peng and stripped him of his ministerial post and kicked him from the Politburo. 
  • Peng was forced to live in a poor area of Beijing and was attacked by Red Guards during CR.
  • Lin Biao replaced him as Defence Minister and Leader of the PLA. Mao threatened to rally the peasants to overthrow the government if criticism continued.
  • However, he did take responsibility for failures of GLF but encouraged others to also take the blame.
  • Hurt by the criticism, Mao retired from day-to-day politics, but never gave up his position as Party Chairman.
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Liu, Deng and economic reform, 1962-65 (1)

  • Liu Shaoiqi became new Head of State and Deng Xiaoping became General Secretary of the Party. They replaced fanaticism and utopianism with rationality and pragmatism.
  • Central control and planning reinstated.
  • Liu admitted in a 1962 speech to 7000 cadres that the problems of GLF were 30% due to natural disasters and 70% due to man-made disasters.
  • Following reforms introduced to make agriculture the "foundation of the economy", even if that meant reduced industry growth:
    • Communes scaled back & more freedom for peasants to have small private plots. Still had to meet quotas.
    • Peasants allowed to trade on free market.
    • Unused land could be claimed and cultivated.
    • Emergency aid sent form factories in cities to countryside - inc. fertiliser, tools, etc.
    • Profitability more emphasised in industry.
    • Industrial production changed to support agriculture more - inc. steel, bamboo, etc.
    • Role of low-level local cadres was downgraded and Urban cadres sent to rural areas to replace Maoist cadres.
    • Those with technical knowledge were promoted.
    • Many of those imprisoned during ARC were returned to influence.
    • Managers given more control over state-owned enterprises.
    • Laogai prisoners made cooking utensils to replace smelted ones.
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Liu, Deng and economic reform, 1962-65 (2)

  • Reforms were successful:
    • Agricultural production back to 1957 level by 1965.
    • Private plots provided an incentive to work hard, by mid-60s private production provided 1/3 of peasant income.
    • Availability of tools, carts restored to pre-commune levels by end of 1962.
    • Light industry grew at rate of 27%/year and heavy industry at 17%/year.
    • Consumer goods production x2 of 1957 level.
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