JOHNSON 1963-1969

• man of his time
• intensely partriotic, proud of US prowess
• defeat= unconceivable 'damn little pissant country'
• abhorred idea of appeasing enemy
• US should fight 'aggressors' in SE- Asia whatever cost
• Domino Theory
• national honour Us continue committment
• no great understanding of foreigners- Thailand hand shake incident

• 1961- said Diem fight & reform own war
• China & USSR benefit US 'bogged down chasing guerrillas'
• KENNEDY'S LEGACY
• J= guilt feelings stand by K & those who helped him 'I swore to myself that I would carry on' 'I often felt as if president Kennedy were sitting there... looking at me'
• tragic circumstances= little debate/ questioning
• emotionally & constitutionally had to carry on policies
• K's war, increase US involvement
• J= 'no real popular mandate' forced carry on K's work
• couldn't abandon K's officials
• retention K's advisers ensure continued involvement

• J thought he the boss
• 'tell me it smells like roses' loyalty
• wanted all assistances' '****** in my pocket'
• Judge Abe Fortas= friend, official tell Karnow most influential adviser: he knows nothing about Vietnam, but knows Lyndon
• J= POORLY ADVISED

• Rusk & McNamara= no fresh ideas on Viet
• Rusk= obsessive continue struggle in SE- Asia, withdrawal= loss of faith in US committment to oppose communist aggression lead to a 3WW
• McNamara= influential, some say 'McNamara's War' memoirs 1995, lamenated the administrations lack of historical knowledge & understanding

• 1963- Democratic Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield= United & neturalised Vietnam. J reject this idea, lead to communisation of Viet
• J, Rusk & Mc- assure South Viet gov= political, social & economic reform policies win over people, NO major US involvement
• no K men admit past errors, no one want a real debate

• Chief of Air Force- Curtis LeMay- 'bomb Vietnam back into the stone age'
• J= scared
• 'duty-bound' listen
• only war Generals had- want intensify it & win

• did not want to be 1st US president lose war especially to communists
• REPEATED THIS

• Dec 1963 Hanoi sent increase numbers of People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) into SV strenghethening VC
• Diem successor Minh retreat home & deposed of
• strategic hamlets= failure
• VC= strong- USSR & China send more weaponry
• estimated half south controlled by VC
• Maxwell and Mc visit= 'very disturbing'
• Prime Min Kahn beg for aid

• Taylor & Mc= direct action
• LeMay= bomb Viet
• J= war won quick before Congress demand withdrawal

• April 20th J publically declae as long as SV want support US would remain involved
• doubts- May 1964 convos 'I don't think we can get out', 'biggest damned mess'

• July 1964= 200 men died Viet, J add 2500 men to US forces
• war going poorly
• debate in Washington on how to help Saigon win, NOT how to get out
• Rusk & Mc= urge escalation even to strike in NV

• for past decade CIA send south vietnam teams on sabotage missions NV
• J approve covert operations
• Maddox= espionage missions 

• J claim NV attack unprovoked, 2 navy ships
• Maddox & Turner Joy in Gulf of tonkin 4th August 1964
• ask for Congressional support

• June 1964 administration create resolution aim= rise Saigon's morale
• Hesitant to show Congress
• G.O.T incident= perfect opportunity get it passed
• Congress believe innocent US navy lives were jepordised, willingly pass
• gave J power to wage war
• 'like Grandma's night shirt... It covered everything'
• 'all necessary steps... including use of armed forceto assist'
• expire when president decide safe in SE- Asia, or when congress terminate
• Senate- 2/3 empty won 88 to 2
• some senators= unconvinved: 'all vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy'
• No one listenened

• Congress
• Rusk & Mc not open about covert raids, implementations etc
• did administration create incident to get resolution passed?- many doubts surounding 'attacks'
• Summer 1964- Bobby Goldwater accuse J- 'soft on communism'
• did J exploit events to intensify Us involve to win election?

• vitally important
• have nation behind him
• war could be taken North, bombed NV for 1st time
• J looked tough
• public approval ratin increase 42% to 72% win election
• sugest nation united behind president in Vietnam policy

• voters ask about viet
• Repbublican cand Bobby Goldwater= use all US strength, trigger-happy hawk
• reccomend use of atomic weapons in Hanoi
• J= peace candidate 
• left-wingers= J too war-monger
• right-wingers= J  too soft on communism
• told left no rash, no majoy war intentions 'we are going to send American boys to do what Asian boy's ought to be doing themselves'
• RIGHT= 'America keeps her word'
• xmas 1963 to JCS: just let me get elected and you can have your war
• gained votes due to G.O.T
• J hope Saigon win own war
• during campaign J & advisers didn't know what to do in Viet
• most reluctantly agree escalation only answer
• won elections, J won popular mandate to do as he saw fit

• combative personality, macho Texas background, aggressive man sseek military solutions
• over-confident and arrogant 'you tell those press bastards that I'll see them when I want to and not before'

HOWEVER

• private doubts, frequently admit didn't know what to do
• more often than not responded due to pressure of events

• Saigon regime= failing
• gens squabbling annoy US Ambassador General Maxwell Taylor 
• (Lodge had enough lte 1964- only suggest US to run Viet)
• Mexwell Taylor= impecible military presitge & formidable intellect but poor choice
• J picked him to please JCS, but situation needed a real diplomat, not impatient soldier
• Taylor treat Saigon Gens like cadets, 1964 summon them to US embassy 'do you all undersand English? 'tired of coups' 'wasted words'
• Rusk tired SV 'we must change the pace at which these people move' 'can only be done with a persuasuasive intrusion of Americans'
• Nov 1964: 100 VC dressed as peasants attack US airbase near Saigon
• JCS demand retaliance
• VC attacks encourage J administration escalate- safety of US in Viet

• J order WG, Def Dept, State Dept, CIA & JCS study Viet policy, develop suggestions

WG SAID:

• independent, anti-communist Vietnam vital for US 
• 'national prestige, credibility and honour' at stake
• emphasise escalation necessary, Saigon gov= weak 'close to a standstill' 'plagued by confusion... and poor morale'
• suggest heavier bombing to be halted when Hanoi would negotiate
• J= commander in chief and his mil & civillian experts urge escalation

Halberstam notes 'the best and the brightest' were behind J's escalation

Congress & public= supportive

• regret insignificant little Vietnam become so significant
• Geroge Ball- concentrate on containing  in Europe, more involved US become harder to get out, US public not support war for long
• no need to bomb jungle for VC 'needles in a haystack'
• US soldiers= ineffective, US presence not good substitute for poor Saigon gov
• he and Mansfieldfear Chinese involvement

• early 1965
• concern security US bomber bases
• VC move freely in SV
• xmas eve 1964- VC plant bomb in bar where US chill
• feb 1965- VC attack huge US camp Pleiku 8= US dead, 100=wounded
• J 'I've had enough of this'
• J order air attacks NV
• limited air war
• intensify march 'Rolling Thunder' 67% americans approved
• bomb routes 'Ho Chi Minh trail' secure position US in SV
• decrease infiltration from North
• demoralise Hanoi
• neutralise Saigon
• feb 1965 J not delcare war, fear China intervene

• Spring 1965- 2nd escalation step
• large numbers US ground troops

WHY?

• request from Gen Westmoreland
• commanded 16,000 MAs since 1964
• Spring request US marined protect US bomber base Danang
• TRIGGER EVENT

• Maxwell Taylor- once committed need more sent in to protect
• White Us fight no better than French, US unable distinguish VC and friendly vietnamese
• US look like colonists & conquerors

• J ignore Taylor
• 3500 marines land Danang 28th March 1965
• April 6th 1965- J approve 18,000 & support forces sent in more marines

• was it J's undeclared war?
• Congress grant $700 million for mil operations in Viet
• May 1965 House of Representatives vote 408-7, Senate 88-3
• US journalists= hawks, pro-war
• J had support from Congress & journalists

• speech April 1965
• Us need fight to live securely and freely
• NV= aggressive, attack SV need opposing
• NV= puppet expansionist for expansionist comm powers USSR & China conquer all Asia
• E & K built & defend Viet, dishonourable abandon COMMITMENT TRAP
• abadon allies= question US credibility
• appeasement= WW3

• June 1965 civillian gov of Phan Huy Quant overthrown by military
• Thieu became head of state= small landowner, ambitious, prominent Viet catholic fam, convert given training USA, decisive, cunning, stubborn & corrupt
• Ky became prime minister- gambled & womaniser, said Viet need men like hitler, flamboyant
• 'bottom of barrel individuals'
• Siagon gov control less of SV and less effectively
• Ky & Thieu= corrupt, incompetent, unpopular

• 1965 Ky's gov losing control & territory to VC
• Thieu 75% countryside= VC
• more US troops poured in less ARVN want fight
• Westmoreland demand more troops- prevent SV collapse & protect US troops already in
• Cabinet meetings July show how J doubt usefullness increase troops
• 28th July 1965: TV J (noon less people) increase more troops request Westmoreland
• 75,000 already there, increased to 125,000
• congressional leaders gave assent day before

1965 Polls & White House mail:

• 70% nation behind J
• 80% believe Dom theory
• 80% increase troops would stop US failing
• 47% more troops sent

• majority US support J
• end 1965 200,000 US troops
• Oct 1965 beat comm soldiers battle Ia Drang

• protests @ unis March 1965
• Vice P Hubert Humphrey- why risk Chinese intervention  why support unstable country
• US plane shot down, J cried 'Where are we going?'
• Dec 1965 bombing halt fail persuade Hanoi negotiate
• cabinet meeting show consensus in J admin 
• Cia& Maxwell Taylor= oppose send more troops
• Mc= mil victory unlikely
• JCS divided over tactics
• J uncertain US win
• NO ONE COULD AGREE

• WestM, Mc & JCS agree increase troops 2nd half 1965
• Mc= 'stave off short term defeat'

end 1966- 385,000

early 1968- 535,000

war of attrition= FAIL