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Causes
- Paragraph 1
- It developed because of the worsening relations between the USA and the USSR and their sense of vulnerability:
- The USSR felt vulnerable after the USA used an A-bomb in 1945, especially in the context of the new US attitude to the USSR displayed by the Truman administration (iron fist approach) - and so began the development of their own atomic weapons. The USA's sense of vulnerability increased after the USSR successfully tested an A-bomb in September 1949 because they had taken away the USA's nuclear monopoly, and their fears of Communist expansion were confirmed after the victory of the CCP the following month and the North Korean invasion of South Korea 8 months later - so they began the development of the H-bomb and the start of the thermonuclear arms race and superpower rivalry. January 1950, Truman announced that the USA would build a hydrogen bomb. The decision was prompted by: the speech which the USSR had ended the USA's nuclear monopoly (they had estimated they would do it by mid 1953), the Berlin Blockade of 1948-9, the established of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the discovery of a Soviet nuclear spy ring, the assumption that the USSR would build such a weapon anyway.
- This in turn fuelled the USSR's development of an H-bomb. Both sides then had H bombs by 1953.
- Eisenhower's administration then began to use the rhetoric of 'massive retaliation', which fuelled Soviet fears and contributed to their development of bomber planes and missiles. Massive retaliation was a nuclear doctrine, which emphasised retaliation by any means against threats to US vital interests, and was deliberately vague about the exact circumstances that would trigger a US nuclear response. This strategy was a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and involved the use of brinkmanship (going to the brink of nuclear war) to force an enemy to back down. The strategy was also partly designed to reduce conventional arms spending. (Eisenhower rejected the NSC-98 which emphasised the build up of conventional and nuclear arms, but he didn't want the living standards of American citizens to suffer for this).
- Khrushchev's support of Chinese shelling of Quemoy and Matsu and rhetoric about the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union then fuelled US fears and put pressure on Eisenhower's Government to increase their own bomber plane and missile programme. 1957 the Soviet Union successfully tested the world's first ICBM, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. 1957 Ussr launched Sputnik, the first space satellite and later put Sputnik II into orbit with a dog Laika. The USSR's lead in rocket technology was confirmed in April 1961 when Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. The success of Sputnik prompted the USA to stablish NASA in 1958. The USSR's successes led to US fears that the Soviets had more advanced military technology. The CIA findings of the Gaither report 1957 and the failure of the first US Vanguard satellite launch reinforced the idea of a 'missile gap' in the Soviet's favour. However, the USSR's achievements were actually less than they appeared.
- Successful Soviet tests of ICBMs in 1957, and sending Sputnik into space, fuelled US concerns of a missile gap, and led to US developments of ICBMs and SLBMs, especially in the context of Soviet belligerence over Berlin. USA launched its own satellite Explorer in 1958. USA developed its own ICBMs, culminating in the Minuteman, which was far superior to Soviet missiles. USA deployed IRBMs in Britain, Italy and Turkey. 1960 USA deployed Polaris, the world's first submarine-launched ballistic missile which was more advanced than similar Soviet weapons.
- Paragraph 2
- It also developed as a consequence of both superpowers' desire to prove the supremacy of their political-economic-social system, and because of domestic pressures in both countries:
- The USSR felt the need to match, and exceed the developments of the USA in order to demonstrate their superiority - hence the development of ICBMs and the 'Tsar Bomb' of 1961. This showed they could create a powerful nuclear bomb, however they could not mass produce these bombs. Throughout the entire Eisenhower administration, the Soviet Union's total arsenal of functional ICBMs would consist of four unprotected and highly visible Semyorkas. The rest were imaginary, and it would take a while for the Americans to discover that. In the meantime, Khrushchev's rhetorical rockets produced an enormous impact in the US.
- The USA were not prepared to seem inferior to the USSR, so developed H bombs in response to the USSR's A-bombs, then their own ICBMs and SLBMs in response to the USSR's.
- The arms race also reflected the personalities of the leaders of the superpowers; especially Khrushchev's desire to make the USSR appear superior to the US. Success in the arms race was also important to both sides to prove the superiority of their systems to allies. Potemkinism, building up just enough of a capability to create the illusion that much more lay behind it. "I exaggerated a little. I said that we had the capability of shooting a fly out of space with our missiles." Khrushchev had reasserted authority in Hungary, halted the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, and humiliated the Americans, who despite their overwhelming military superiority had done nothing to stop him. He had accomplished all this from a militarily inferior position for which he had compensated with loud talk. He tried to derive maximum political advantage from the fact that they were the first to launch their rockets into space, so the US would start treating them better.
- Pressure from domestic populations was also a factor in the development of the arms race - in the USA, politicians were under pressure from the media and their own people to keep ahead of the USSR, especially in the early 1950s 'Red Scare'. Khrushchev's rhetorical rockets produced an enormous impact in the US. The editors of Life set the tone, claiming that the Soviets had "burst upon the world as the infinitely sinister front runners in the sophisticated and perilous science of space."
- Arms manufacturers in both the USA and USSR also contributed to the development of the arms race, by developing new delivery systems and increasingly powerful warheads that it was difficult for Governments to resist.
- Similarly, the military establishments in both countries were a factor in the development of the arms race, by pressurising politicians to increase and update the arsenals of each country.
- Part
of the wider ideological competition. (‘Peaceful Co-existence with a
competitive edge’) – it became a matter of national pride – US needing to
impress other areas of the world (eg Asia – US formed SEATO; Third World – US
covert activity in Iran, Guatemala, Bay of Pigs / Middle East – US formed CENTO
– US gave aid to Egypt); USSR tightening grip of Eastern Bloc e.g. Hungary;
boosted popularity and prestige of leaders eg Sputnik; Khrushchev boasted that
he was in the missile lead which was a lie (to boost personal prestige).
Eisenhower New Look policy was based on massive retaliation and brinkmanship;
US felt constant fear of a missile gap (U2 spy plane incident) which encouraged
greater spending to placate the public – reacted to Sputnik by creating NASA;
Kennedy felt vulnerable to Soviet manipulation and by 1962 military spending
reached $50 billion – use of nuclear threats in Berlin crisis and Kennedy’s
quarantine in Cuban Missile Crisis – linked to national prestige (US – secret
removal of missiles in Turkey reflects need to retain prestige).
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Effects
- The consequence, paradoxically, was to in some ways stabilise superpower relations:
- With the advent of atomic and then hydrogen weapons both sides became increasingly fearful of the consequences of armed conflict and prevented direct US-Soviet confrontation.
- For example, Truman conducted the Korean War as a limited conflict after the failed invasion of North Korea.
- The USA also decided against intervention in Eastern Europe when the USSR crushed uprisings in East Germany and Hungary in 1953 and 1956 respectively for fear of the possible nuclear consequences and because they respected each other's spheres of influence.
- Both sides having H-bombs was the reason Stalin's successors talked of 'peaceful coexistence' with the USA and summit diplomacy returned after a 10-year absence.
- Both sides had to co-operate to regulate the nuclear threat, such as the removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba and Turkey (1962-1963), Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), Washington-Moscow 'hotline' 1963.
- Both leaders were aware of living in the nuclear age and acting responsibly, for example Khrushchev withdrew the offer of help in the nuclear programme from Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong.
- However the consequence was also to make the world less stable and more dangerous:
- In order nuclear weapons to act as a threat and deterrent, both sides had to demonstrate their willingness to use weapons, and develop systems designed to deal with an incoming missile threat - which in turn could increase the confidence of either side to use weapons.
- For example, Khrushchev acted belligerently over Berlin in the crises of 1958-1961, and the USA's U2 programme risked seriously destabilising relations when it was discovered by the Soviets in 1960.
- The clearest example of the dangerous consequences of the arms race was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when Khrushchev decided to address the imbalance of NATO weapons stationed in Turkey within striking distance of the USSR by placing MRBMs in Cuba, which when discovered by the USA led to the USA seriously considering a nuclear strike on Cuba which would likely have led to a wider nuclear exchange.
- Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb (1949) precipitated a spiralling arms race. Both sides competed to develop more and more powerful and sophisticated weapons such as the hydrogen bomb (1952), ICBMs (1957) and SLBMs (1960).
- The culture of secrecy surrounding the development of nuclear weapons led to superpower fears that the other side had military superiority.
- Nuclear weapons encouraged superpower brinkmanship, which could have resulted in total devastation, for example the US doctrine of massive retaliation (1954) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
- The cost of nuclear weapons imposed huge financial strains on both sides. This had a destabilising effect on superpower relations in two ways: Khrushchev compensated for the USSRs relative weakness by adopting an antagonistic approach to negotiations with the West, and his decision to station Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba was due to the fact that basing short range missiles in Cuba was cheaper than basing long range weapons in the USSR.
- Nuclear weapons did not stop other forms of superpower competition for influence in the 1950s and early 1960s. For example, Soviet economic and military aid to developing countries such as Egypt; US support for anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan.
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