K & R

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What is the sceptical argument? (SA)
1: If I know I have hands, then I know I am not BIV 2. I do not know that I am not BIV 3. Therefore, I don't know that I have hands
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What is attributer contextualism?
Whether or not S knows that p partly depends on something in the context of the attributer
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What is Lewis' (1996) definition of contextualism?
'S knows that p' is true in a context C iff S's evidence eliminates every not-p possibility relevant in C
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What is Lewis' Rule of Attention?
A possibility not ignored at all is ipso facto not properly ignored
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What is Schaffer's (2015) of Lewis' contextualism?
Framework of possibility not sufficiently fine-grained enough for hypertensional topic like epistemology e.g. Fermat example
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What is the cheap knowledge criticism of Lewis' contextualism?
Knowledge that arises in contexts where relevant alternatives are eliminated too easily e.g. David Lewis goalkeeper example
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What is a more general criticism of contextualism?
Sosa (2000): Contextualism is a meta-linguistic thesis. It has a limited significance for scepticism: from the fact that, in non-scep contexts we can use 'S knows that P' to express propositions which are true, nothing follows ab what we do know
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What is a response to this general criticism?
DeRose (1995): point of contextualism is not to show that we know but to reconcile the presumed truth of these claims with the apparent truth of the premises of SA
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What is the process reliabilist response to SA?
The question of whether one is epistemically justified in holding a belief is an empirical question ab the reliability of the cognitive processes used to form that belief. Reliable process = not BIV
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What is BonJour's (1980) criticism of p. reliabilism?
Reliable process = not sufficient for justification, example of Norman the clairvoyant
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What is the internalist response to SA?
Pryor (2000): when you have an experience of p, you have immediate, prima facie justification for believing p. You can be immediately justified in perceptual experience even if you have no antecedent justification that you are not BIV
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What is a criticism of the internalist response?
Seems to be too weak a condition for justification; LSD example
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What is a possible world?
PW= Maximally possible situations. A situation is maximal iff for any proposition p, either it is the case that p is true in situation or it is the case that p is not true
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Why are PW useful?
When modal claims are translated into language of PW, we eliminate modal operators in favour of quantifier expressions whose variables range over PW = advantage from logical pov, well understood system - helps us understand relations b/w modal claims
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What is the deflationary view of PW?
Talk of PW is nothing more than a convenient way of rephrasing modal claims and PW should not be invested with any ontological significance
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What is a criticism of the deflationary view?
If sentences in PW language are true (must be if they merely paraphrase modal claims) then PW must exist since PW statements explicitly state that there are PW
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What is modal fictionalism?
View that PW does express the concept of a certain kind of entity but not with any real instances. 'It is possible that p'= 'According to...'
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What is an advantage of modal fictionalism?
It exploits to its advantage certain features of realist possible worlds without incurring the ontological commitments
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What is a disadvantage of modal fictionalism?
'According to..' warrants further explanation. Best understanding of what it means in this context is 'if the possible world theory were true' = still modal notion
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What is extreme realist conception of PW?
Lewis (1986): PW are not abstract entities but are as concrete as the actual world we inhabit. PW = spatiotemporally + causally isolated from others
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What is transworld identity?
The idea that one cannot speak of one and the same concrete object existing in different PW
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What is a counterpart?
Objects which are similar enough to the object in question in certain especially significant ways
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What is a problem with counterpart theory?
Odd that modal statements ab objects existing in other worlds should have anything to do with objects in our world. Counterpart relation = similarity, not identity, so how is it about me at all?
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What is a criticism of concrete PW?
PW are causally isolated from us and so it would make no difference is none of the other worlds exist. Would still talk in modal terms. So, existence of PW is irrelevant to the very area of discourse which PW talk is meant to illuminate
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What is the incredulous stare?
Concrete PW = so odd; would involve a huge change to our ontology
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What is Lewis' response to the incredulous stare?
'It is reasonable to postulate the entities over which one's best overall theory quantifies'. Parallels to Quine's argument for sets
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What are A-properties?
'Being two days future', 'one day past' and 'being present'
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What are B-relations?
Two place relations e.g. 'two days earlier than'
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What is the A-theory of time?
There are genuine A-properties and times and events are constantly changing with respect to their A-properties
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What is the B-theory of time?
There are no unanalysable A-properties that cannot be reduced to B-relations. 'Now' is indexical like here; the present has no special ontological status
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What is presentism?
The theory that necessarily, it is always true that only present objects exist. Tense operators are primitive and reflect a feature of our world
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What is an advantage of presentism?
Fits with our commonsense idea that there is genuine change and that time flows
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What is the criticism of presentism regarding cross-temporal relations?
Bigelow (1996): 1. In order for a relation to hold b/w two things, both of these things have to exist 2. There are some relations which hold b/w a present thing and a non-present thing 3. Some things exist which are not present
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What is Markosian's solution to the problem of cross-temporal relations?
'Being formally real is analogous to being possibly real'. 'I admire Sherlock' = I admire properties associated with name Sherlock
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What is the criticism of presentism regarding STR?
STR = no such thing as absolute simultaneity; whether 2 spatially separated events occur at the same time is not absolute but depends on observers' reference frame. Therefore, no objective present
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What is Markosian's response?
Posit weaker version of STR that doesn't have enough 'philosophical baggage' built in to literally contain or entail the proposition that there is no absolute simultaneity
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What is externalism?
Objects from past and future exist just as much as present objects
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What is an objection to externalism?
John Lucas: it 'fails to account for the passage of time, the pre-eminence of the present, the directedness of time and the difference between the future and the past'
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What is the growing universe theory?
Only objects and events that are past or present exist but not objects that are future. The universe is always increasing in size as more and more things are added to the front end
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What is a criticism of growing universe theory?
Braddon-Mitchell (2004): Not poss to see whether one is located in objected present or past. Brief moment when I am correct in saying that I am in the present and infinite number of locations in objective past. Probability = I am in the past
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What is the causation theory about the asymmetry of time?
Lowe (2002): Causation = asymmetrical relation: if an event e1 is the cause of another event e2, it is not the case that e2 is also the cause of e1. So earlier to later direction of time is direction of causation
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What is the laws of thermodynamics theory of the asymmetry of time?
The forward direction of time is the just the direction in which entropy generally increases
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What is Lowe's criticism about the thermodynamic theory?
1) Nothing to prevent universe from entering a phase in which entropy decreases = forward events seem to happen in reverse. Fact that the laws do not prevent this demonstrates predictive limitations 2) Entropy increasing = contingent fact - Big Bang
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What is the problem of change?
1) Single object cannot have incompatible properties 2) Passage of time always involves change to an objects properties 3) Therefore there is no single object that persists through time
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What is the relational view? (endurantist view)
a is F at time t = a is F-at-t: what is ascribed to the object is not the simply property of bentness but the relational property of being bent-at-1pm. Qualitative change = possible bc straightness-yesterday and bentness-today = compatible
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What is the 'no-change' objection to the relational view?
Doesn't explain how qualitative change is possible but instead denies such change ever occurs bc denies that the objects concerned possess the intrinsic qualities that such change is meant to involve
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What is is the 'no intrinsic property' objection to relational view?
Object can only possess relational properties if it can stand in various relations to other objects + yet unless it possess at least some intrinsic properties that characterises it independently from its relations to anything else - how can it exist?
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What is the temporal parts view? (perdurance theory)
a is F at t = a-at-t is F: ascribes intrinsic quality of bentness to temporal part rather than to the whole = consistent to say that candle is bent now and was straight a moment ago bc these qualities are being ascribed to two numerically distinct ob
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What is problem with temporal parts view?
Preserves view that colour + shape are intrinsic qualities but suggests that the things which have intrinsic qualities are only part of the persisting object rather than persisting object. Temporal parts = not capable of qualitative change; shifts pr
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What is perdurance?
Temporally extended composites; object persists by perduring iff it has a part at t1 and a part at a distinct time t2
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What is endurance?
Wholly present; an object persists by enduring iff it is wholly present at t1 and at a distinct time t2
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What is the Gettier problem? (1963)
Knowledge isn't justified true belief
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What is the 'no false lemmas' solution to the Gettier problem? (Clark, 1963)
JTB + S's belief that p is fully grounded. Fully grounded = not inferred from any falsehood
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What is an objection to 'no false lemmas'?
Analysis = too strong, rules out cases where it seems like there is knowledge e.g. detective
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What is the 'relevant causal relations' solution to the Gettier problem? (Goldman, 1967)
S knows that p iff the fact that p is causally connected in an appropriate way. Causal connection = belief was directly caused by fact. Appropriate = perception, memory
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What is an objection to 'relevant causal relations'?
Henry and Fake Barn County
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What is 'truth-tracking' solution to the Gettier problem? (Nozick, 1981)
TB + sensitivity condition (if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p) + safety condition (if p were true, S would believe that p)
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What is an initial objection to truth-tracking solution?
Some knowledge doesn't meet sensitivity requirements e.g. Grandma case
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How does Nozick amend the truth-tracking theory?
S's belief needs to be such that: if p were false + S were to arrive at a belief whether or not p with the method she actually used for forming her belief that p, she wouldn't believe that p
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What is a further objection to truth-tracking theory?
Incompatible with closure principle: Abominable conjunctions (DeRose, 1995) 'I know that the animal is a zebra and I know that zebras are not mules but I don't know that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule'
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What is attributer contextualism?

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Whether or not S knows that p partly depends on something in the context of the attributer

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What is Lewis' (1996) definition of contextualism?

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Card 4

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What is Lewis' Rule of Attention?

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What is Schaffer's (2015) of Lewis' contextualism?

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