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I. Perception
A. Direct Realism; (Naïve Realism)
Immediate objects of perception are mind independent objects and their properties ; Direct
realism or naïve realism is the common sense of view of how perception (what we are directly
aware of) works. Physical objects composed of matter have independent existence in space,…

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same time. So the conclusion therefore is that it must appear to be hot and cold.
Temperature is therefore not a real property of physical objects but instead an
Hume and
Russell extend this line of reasoning to shape and size of objects. Russell
points out his table when…

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at all, Macbeth's vision proceeds from his `heat-oppressed brain', not from light entering his eyes
reflecting the surface of any real dagger, therefore there is no reason to suppose veridical
perception should involve the same kind of immediate perception as we are aware of when
hallucinating . An objection to…

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what I actually sense is a collection of sense data, the way the banana seems to me, including a
distinctive smell. A crescent shaped yellow expanse, a certain texture and taste. According to
sense data theorists, we make judgements about the nature of the physical world on the basis

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Lack of choice over our experiences (Locke) ­ Sensory experiences cannot be
controlled in the way remembered experiences can, I can conjure the image of a
banana in my head however I cannot choose not to taste a banana while it's in my
mouth. The fact that I cannot control…

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objects in time and space and various types of similarity e.g. colour, correspond to
relations between sense datum in these same respects.
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke) ­ Physical
objects have certain primary qualities which are shape, motion, size, position and
number which we are able to…

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Berkeley argued that if an object can only be conceived with both primary and
secondary qualities then our ideas of secondary qualities are inseparable from the
primary . So if we accept our perceptions of secondary as in the mind then our
perceptions of primary must be in the mind…

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It cannot secure objective space and time. ­ According to the idealists, if I put my
banana in a drawer where nobody is perceiving it then it ceases to exist and when I
open it again then it miraculously returns to existence . Similarly the banana has no
smell or…

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incoherent concept, and yet there is nothing contradictory in the idea that minds can
have perceptions, it follows that mind must be the basis of all that exists . As far as
Berkley is concerned, God doesn't enter his theory to save it but rather is whole
arguments amounts to…

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to do things without necessarily being able to articulate our knowledge. However
some forms of know-how do depend on the ability to know that .. x, y and z and so on
like knowing how to use the offside trap in football requires the need to know (`that')
the offside…




Finding it hard to navigate through what the textbook is saying sometimes and these notes are saving my life- thank you!



Seriously thank you so much for this.



Thank you sooooooooooooooo much

[email protected]


can I ask what resources you used to compile these notes?

Bezaleel Adeosun


The blue textbook - Can't remember the authors but it's not Lacewing



What grade did you get in the AS and A2 if you carried it on? And how would you recommend revising? Did you just read your notes? 



this is actually amazing, a miracle

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