Failure 2
- Created by: autumnitalia_
- Created on: 21-05-19 18:29
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- Failure 2
- Problems with examining failure and interviews
- Interviews are not the most robust data-gathering technique - qualitative research but are nevertheless, essential
- difficult to contact fomer members of terrorist groups due to fear for their lives
- could be trying to rationalise their actions, they could be scared and trying to rationalise their actions or just be dishonest
- reliability issues
- how many interviews would you need to conduct and how big are the group sizes
- reliability issues
- Altier Et Al 2017 used 'semi structured interviews'and interviews
- Interviews are not the most robust data-gathering technique - qualitative research but are nevertheless, essential
- Colombia and Demobilisation
- govt kept a database of 15000 transcripts
- people exited voluntarily and are expected to discuss their activities while in the group and where, why and how they left
- part of a programme to reintegrate former militants into Colombian society
- can help us understand other groups.
- Motivations for leaving Colombian groups
- motivations (number)
- Demoralised about the armed struggle (628)
- Absence from family (768)
- Pressure from military operations(2089)
- Mistreatment (3993)
- desire for change of life (5002)
- motivations (number)
- govt kept a database of 15000 transcripts
- AL-GAMA'AAL-ISLAMIYYA, EGYPT
- Active during the 1990s
- it was splitting between those who wanted to negotiate with the govt and those who didn't.
- in 1997 it attacked Luxor killing 62 (mostly tourists) one child died and there was a beheading
- Brutality caused disgust and the pop mobilised against terrorism
- Wright 2006, says that five years before islamist groups had killed 1200 ppl after than the attacks stopped
- Brutality caused disgust and the pop mobilised against terrorism
- in 1997 it attacked Luxor killing 62 (mostly tourists) one child died and there was a beheading
- it was splitting between those who wanted to negotiate with the govt and those who didn't.
- Active during the 1990s
- what can states learn from all this
- terrorist groups are difficult to keep together and can rarely afford many mistakes
- can deal with them by highlighting their errors, operational errors may be the most effective way of damaging them
- internal violence can be encouraged to pull a group apart.
- not all groups rely on mass support but they need some S base to survive otherwise they're more violent
- essential to understand how groups fail to find the best way ro nudge them toward failure
- Problems with examining failure and interviews
- FARC (12,126)
- Groups (number)
- AUC (695)
- ELN (2,203)
- OTHER (284)
- Motivations for leaving Colombian groups
- motivations (number)
- Demoralised about the armed struggle (628)
- Absence from family (768)
- Pressure from military operations(2089)
- Mistreatment (3993)
- desire for change of life (5002)
- motivations (number)
- Groups (number)
- FAILURE IN HISTORY: RED ARMY FACTION GERMANY
- emerged in the late 60s due to student un rest, frustration of Vietnam war and anger at US military and west German state
- Failure 2
- Problems with examining failure and interviews
- Interviews are not the most robust data-gathering technique - qualitative research but are nevertheless, essential
- difficult to contact fomer members of terrorist groups due to fear for their lives
- could be trying to rationalise their actions, they could be scared and trying to rationalise their actions or just be dishonest
- reliability issues
- how many interviews would you need to conduct and how big are the group sizes
- reliability issues
- Altier Et Al 2017 used 'semi structured interviews'and interviews
- Interviews are not the most robust data-gathering technique - qualitative research but are nevertheless, essential
- Colombia and Demobilisation
- govt kept a database of 15000 transcripts
- people exited voluntarily and are expected to discuss their activities while in the group and where, why and how they left
- part of a programme to reintegrate former militants into Colombian society
- can help us understand other groups.
- govt kept a database of 15000 transcripts
- AL-GAMA'AAL-ISLAMIYYA, EGYPT
- Active during the 1990s
- it was splitting between those who wanted to negotiate with the govt and those who didn't.
- in 1997 it attacked Luxor killing 62 (mostly tourists) one child died and there was a beheading
- Brutality caused disgust and the pop mobilised against terrorism
- Wright 2006, says that five years before islamist groups had killed 1200 ppl after than the attacks stopped
- Brutality caused disgust and the pop mobilised against terrorism
- in 1997 it attacked Luxor killing 62 (mostly tourists) one child died and there was a beheading
- it was splitting between those who wanted to negotiate with the govt and those who didn't.
- Active during the 1990s
- what can states learn from all this
- terrorist groups are difficult to keep together and can rarely afford many mistakes
- can deal with them by highlighting their errors, operational errors may be the most effective way of damaging them
- internal violence can be encouraged to pull a group apart.
- not all groups rely on mass support but they need some S base to survive otherwise they're more violent
- essential to understand how groups fail to find the best way ro nudge them toward failure
- Problems with examining failure and interviews
- decline due to lower appeal and irrelevancewith the end of the cold war
- generational transfer too
- announced the dissolutionin 1998
- 17 November(17N), Greece
- group lost touch with reality never mind its constituency (Cronin 2009)
- wrapped up by police in 2004 by this time it had no known support base, ideology was no longer popular and it had repulsed the populace.
- WHY 17N MEMBERS GAVE UP (KASSIMERIS, 2011)
- group lost touch with reality never mind its constituency (Cronin 2009)
- Ultra-leftist group resulting to polytechnic uprising in Athens 1973
- active btw 1975 - mid 2000s as a reaction to the military junta that ruled Greece between 67-74
- 17 November(17N), Greece
- group lost touch with reality never mind its constituency (Cronin 2009)
- wrapped up by police in 2004 by this time it had no known support base, ideology was no longer popular and it had repulsed the populace.
- WHY 17N MEMBERS GAVE UP (KASSIMERIS, 2011)
- group lost touch with reality never mind its constituency (Cronin 2009)
- He examined two former members to look for causes for disengagement, disassociation and repentance
- Tselentis - left due to ideologicalreasons, tactical disagreements, moral considerations and doubts about the future of the struggle.
- He marginalised himself over time by showing less interest
- Kondylis was facinated by social upheaval and violence but ended up disassociating himself from the group and violence and urged others not to be violent
- Tselentis - left due to ideologicalreasons, tactical disagreements, moral considerations and doubts about the future of the struggle.
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