Kripke vs Frege-Russell Hypothesis

Kripke takes it that Frege's position is that the sense of a name is that of an associated definite description. i.e. the sense of a name is the mode of presentation of the referent.

Kripke's Objections

1. Contingent truths come out as necessary. e.g. would be absurd to deny 'Godel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'.

Searle's Response: Cluster-theory... names associated w/ multiple descriptions, not just one.

Counter: but there are cases where names where most people only attach a single description. e.g. Guy Fawkes. If the person who in fact tried to blow up Parliament was Sir Walter Raleigh, does not follow that we're using GF to refer to WR.

Response: sense of a proper name conferred communally? Some people who know other descriptions; from fact I don't know them, it does not follow that they are not a part of the meaning.

But, there are cases where only one description - and in these cases, the name…