Theories of Names

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  • Created by: A. Person
  • Created on: 02-04-16 17:40

Frege and Russell's Model

  • Russell saw no difference between ordinary proper names, and definite descriptions.
  • The meanings of proper names are equivalent to the meanings of diescriptions associated with those names.
  • Three advantages:

1. How words can refer

'Hesperus' - this name refers to the planet Venus But how can a word become associated with a distant planet most of us haven't seen?

Russel can solve this - we associate definite descriptions with names; so we simply stipulate that we'll use Hespreus as a name associate with, eg. 'the second planet from the sun'.

2. How identity claims can be meaningful

i.e. associating two names with one description

3. Solving the 4 puzzles

Kripke's Theory of Names

Kripke's analysis of Russell's theory is as follows:

1. To every name 'x', there is a cluster of propstties, those the speaker belives x to have

2. One or more are believed to uniquely pick out some object y.

3. If most are satisfied by some object y, then y is the referent of x.

4. If no unique object is yielded, then x fails to refer.

5. The statement 'if x exists, x has most of the properties' is known a priori by the speaker.

6. The above statement is a necessary truth.

The picture given by the above implies that, if I want to name an object, I think of some way of describing it uniquely, and then go through a mental ceremony, eg. 'by Cicero, I shall mean the man who denounced Catiline'.

Sometimes names work this way, eg. Jack the ripper.

But for the most part, the picture is problematic:

Necessity and Contingency

If a cluster of properties is narrowly construed (eg. Just one property), then many philosophers are concerned that contingent truths come out as necessary.

For example --> Aristotle taught Alexander the Great is not a necessary truth. Instead, Searle claims that it is a necessary fact that the meaning of Aristotle consists in a disjunction of properties.

Kripke: it's contingent that Aristotle had any of the properties attributed to him. He uses Hitler to illustrate his point → If Hitler had lived a peaceful life, and someone else had carried out the heinous acts we attribute to Hitler, then the first man would still be Hitler. This is because the name Hitler is a rigid designator - it refers to the same entity across all possible worlds in which that entity exists.

Contrast with counterpart theory → supposedly, my counterpart in various worlds qualitatively resembles me; I'm identified with people

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