MORAL REALISM - METAETHICS
- Created by: mlrabbitts
- Created on: 15-03-20 14:28
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- MORAL REALISM - METAETHICS
- Naturalism
- Moral properties are natural properties.
- So, "murder is wrong" expresses the BELIEF that murder is wrong. "Wrong" refers to a natural property.
- This is a reductionist theory. This means that moral properties can be reduced to natural properties.
- These properties exist and are mind independent. Hence, ethical naturalism is a moral realist theory.
- Example - Utilitarianism is a naturalist ethical theory. It says that "good" can be reduced to pleasure and "bad" can be reduced to pain.
- Natural properties are ordinary, physical properties. For example, pain and pleasure are natural properties of the brain - a physical thing.
- PROBLEMS
- The naturalistic fallacy - G.E. Moore
- Moral properties may be correlated with natural properties but not identical to them. For example, having a heart and kidneys are correlated, but they are not the same thing.
- Similarly, happiness may often accompany morally good actions, but they are not the same thing.
- Moore's Open Question argument - if goodness and pleasure were the same thing, we wouldn't ask "is pleasure good?" because it would be like asking, "is pleasure pleasure?"
- But because the question "is pleasure good?" makes sense, this proves that pleasure and good are not the same thing.
- Response to this argument - It makes sense to ask "is water H20?" even though they refer to the same thing. The fact that this question does make sense, does not prove that water and H20 are two separate things.
- He argues that moral properties cannot be reduced to anything simpler. They are basic.
- But because the question "is pleasure good?" makes sense, this proves that pleasure and good are not the same thing.
- Moral properties may be correlated with natural properties but not identical to them. For example, having a heart and kidneys are correlated, but they are not the same thing.
- The is-ought problem - David Hume
- You cannot logically derive ought statements from about what is.
- For example, to say "you shouldn't torture animals because it hurts them", derives a statement from what ought to be, from a statement about what is. Hume says this cannot follow.
- Closely related, is the fact/value distinction.
- Fact = Smith murdered Jones. Value = murder is wrong.
- Non-cognitivists argue that facts and values are two completely different things.
- Facts are true in virtue of how the world is whereas values express attitudes towards facts.
- Non-cognitivists argue that facts and values are two completely different things.
- Fact = Smith murdered Jones. Value = murder is wrong.
- You cannot logically derive ought statements from about what is.
- The verification problem - A.J. Ayer
- Ayer argues that moral judgements fail the verification problem.
- For example, "murder is wrong" is clearly not an analytical truth. It's not empirically verifiable, as observations cannot prove it right or wrong.
- We can prove the pain that murder causes but we cannot explicitly state that it is wrong.
- For example, "murder is wrong" is clearly not an analytical truth. It's not empirically verifiable, as observations cannot prove it right or wrong.
- Ayer argues that moral judgements fail the verification problem.
- The naturalistic fallacy - G.E. Moore
- Moral properties are natural properties.
- Non-naturalism
- Moral properties are non-natural properties
- So, "murder is wrong" expresses a BELIEF that murder is wrong. "Wrong" refers to a non-natural property
- Non-naturalist moral properties cannot be reduced to anything simpler. They are basic.
- However, these properties exist independent of minds. Hence, it is a moral realist theory.
- Intuitionism
- If moral properties are non-natural, how do we know about them?
- Moore's solution to this problem, is intuition. He says that via the faculty of ration intuition, we can directly reflect on the truth of moral judgement such as, "murder is wrong"
- The truth or falsehood of such moral judgments is said to be self evident.
- Moore's solution to this problem, is intuition. He says that via the faculty of ration intuition, we can directly reflect on the truth of moral judgement such as, "murder is wrong"
- If moral properties are non-natural, how do we know about them?
- PROBLEMS
- Argument from queerness - J.L. Mackie
- He argues that if moral properties are non-natural properties, they must be very queer.
- Epistemically queer - How do we know about these properties? Natural properties can be explained scientifically but non-natural cannot.
- Metaphysically queer - These non-natural properties must be metaphysically unlike anything we have ever experienced. If an action has a moral property of 'good', it must have some have to-be-doness to it.
- It can also be thought of as the claim that moral properties are unscientific. We can't see goodness or badness, or measure them,, so what evidence do we have that they exist.
- He argues that if moral properties are non-natural properties, they must be very queer.
- Argument from queerness - J.L. Mackie
- Moral properties are non-natural properties
- There are mind-independent, external moral properties and facts.
- Naturalism
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