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6. Why is the election of independent directors ironic?
- Because they are appointed by the majority shareholders
- Because they are appointed by the CEO
- Because they are connected with the company
7. In the Transmile case, what happened to the independent directors for authorising the release of a misleading statement to Bursa Malaysia?
- Fined RM3,000,000 and sentenced to eleven-years in jail
- Fined RM300,000 and sentenced to one-year in jail
- Fined RM3,000 and sentenced to eleven-years in jail
- Fined RM30,000 and sentenced to one-year in jail
8. How have some public limited companies avoided having to call extraordinary general meetings?
- Overpricing their transactions so they fly under the radar of Bursa's listing requirements
- Negatively pricing their transactions so they fly under the radar of Bursa's listing requirements
- Creatively pricing their transactions so they fly under the radar of Bursa's listing requirements
- Underpricing their transactions so they fly under the radar of Bursa's listing requirements
9. Which of these is not required in order to ensure more transparency in corporations?
- Separating the position of CEO & Chairman
- Giving details of all employees remuneration
- Giving details of the top 5 senior management's remuneration
- Giving details of each individual director's remuneration
10. What happened in the Sime Darby case?
- Tun Musa Hitam (the former deputy PM) came under fire for failing to prevent a loss of RM484 million from delays & cost overruns
- Tun Musa Hitam (the former deputy PM) came under fire for failing to prevent a loss of RM488 million from delays & cost overruns
- Tun Musa Hitam (the former deputy PM) came under fire for failing to prevent a loss of RM44 million from delays & cost overruns
- Tun Musa Hitam (the former deputy PM) came under fire for failing to prevent a loss of RM4 million from delays & cost overruns
11. Which of these is not a reason for the MCCG being unsuitable for the Malaysian environment?
- Fails to consider political interests
- Code was derived from the British and ignores uniqueness of Malaysia's capital market, regulation, ownership & environmental structure
- The original code was to protect Western shareholders from powerful managers but in Malaysia companies are family-controlled
- Fails to protect the interests of minority shareholders
12. Why is there a problem in director's remuneration in family-controlled or State-owned enterprises?
- Because there is a tendency for bias when determining remuneration
- Because it is certain that there will be the occurrence of cronyism
- Because of the existence of nepotism and cronyism
- Because directors will receive excessive remuneration
13. What were Abdifatah's reason for the code being inappropriate?
- It fails to consider the cultural & environmental issues of Malaysia
- It was adopted from a country with different institutional settings
- It fails to take into consideration the interests of minority shareholders
14. Large companies must have what percentage of women directors on their board?
15. Approval from which of these people not required to retain a director who has already served their term of 12 years?
- Shareholder approval from the minority shareholders
- Support from shareholders other than the largest shareholder
- Support from the largest shareholder
- Support from those with more than 33% equity interest
16. What did Standards & Poor find?
- That even after the implementation of the MCCG, Malaysian companies still fall short of global disclosure practices
- Disclosure practices of Malaysian companies improved after the implementation of the MCCG
- Disclosure practices of Malaysian companies deteriorated after the implementation of the MCCG
- That after the implementation of the MCCG, Malaysian companies achieved global disclosure practices
17. The Bold 3.0 Future-Fluent Board Leadership Study found that how many percentage of Malaysian boards do not have an evaluation process?