An action is a free action only if one could have done otherwise in the very same circumstance, and our actions are not determined by the causal history of the world or prior psychological state
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The liberty of spontaneity:
One is free if one is not subject to constraint or force, an action is free if one is able to do as one has chosen
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Hypothetical liberty:
One is free to the extent that one could have done otherwise had one so chosen
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What kind of view on liberty does moral responsibility require?
A compatibilist view
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What is a problem with a Humean view on liberty?
We can identify actions that fit the Humean schema but were plausibly not instances of liberty
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What is the basis of Frankfurt’s hierarchal compatibilism?
A distinction between higher and lower-order desires
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What are second-order desires?
They are about the kind of person I want to be or the kind of behaviours I want to engage in
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What are higher-order desires?
Asking whether we really should desire to be the kind of person who has those first-order desires
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Volitions:
Desires that we don’t want to be effective
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According to Frankfurt, what is the will?
When we have conflicting desires and we can’t act on all at the same time, the will is the desire that wins out, upon which you act
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According to Frankfurt, what is freedom of the will?
Having your will conform to your second-order volitions
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Other cards in this set
Card 2
Front
The liberty of spontaneity:
Back
One is free if one is not subject to constraint or force, an action is free if one is able to do as one has chosen
Card 3
Front
Hypothetical liberty:
Back
Card 4
Front
What kind of view on liberty does moral responsibility require?
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