An action is a free action only if one could have done otherwise in the very same circumstance, and our actions are not determined by the causal history of the world or prior psychological state
One is free if one is not subject to constraint or force, an action is free if one is able to do as one has chosen
One is free to the extent that one could have done otherwise had one so chosen
7. According to Frankfurt, what is freedom of the will?
The ability to fulfil your first order desires
When we have conflicting desires and we can’t act on all at the same time, the will is the desire that wins out, upon which you act
Having your will conform to your second-order volitions
Asking whether we really should desire to be the kind of person who has those first-order desires
8. Volitions:
Desires that we don’t want to be effective
They are about what I want to do
Asking whether we really should desire to be the kind of person who has those first-order desires
Internal constraints on the will
9. Hypothetical liberty:
One is free to the extent that one could have done otherwise had one so chosen
An action is a free action only if one could have done otherwise in the very same circumstance, and our actions are not determined by the causal history of the world or prior psychological state
One is free if one is not subject to constraint or force, an action is free if one is able to do as one has chosen
10. What is a problem with a Humean view on liberty?
Actions that fit the Humean schema are in fact never free choices
We can identify actions that fit the Humean schema but were plausibly not instances of liberty
It is incompatible with determinism
Free will is always incompatible with determinism and Hume was a determinist
11. The liberty of spontaneity:
An action is a free action only if one could have done otherwise in the very same circumstance, and our actions are not determined by the causal history of the world or prior psychological state
One is free if one is not subject to constraint or force, an action is free if one is able to do as one has chosen
One is free to the extent that one could have done otherwise had one so chosen
