Emotivism Exam Questions

• ethical language is emotive
• moral judgements express attitudes/feeling of approval + disapproval
• i.e "**** is wrong" = "I disapprove of ****"

• moral language expresses feelings in others to influence their actions
• naturalism - agrees with Moore's rejection on basis of naturalistic fallacy
• non-naturalism - empirically unverifiable
• verification principle: statements only have meaning if analytic or empirically verifiable
• moral judgements aren't analytic or empirically proven true/false
• ∴ moral judgements are meaningless + state neither truth nor falsehood

• verification principle is meaningless according to itself + ∴ cannot show that ethical language is meaningless

RESPONSE

• Ayer: principle intended as definition (reflecting understanding of meaningful words)
• whether it is right definition of "meaning" is established by arguments about implications

CRITICISM

• if we aren't convinced by implications, why should we accept definition?
• provides no independent support for thinking moral judgements are non-cognitive

• emotivism needn't rest solely on verification
• desires: world-to-mind fit (neither true/false = non-cognitive)
• beliefs: mind-to-world fit (true/false = cognitive)
• Stevenson: moral attitudes consider what should be done (world-to-mind fit)
• distinction between descriptive + emotive meanings of words; central moral words i.e good + bad have emotive meaning neither analytic/descriptive whereas other moral words i.e lie + honest have both descriptive + emotive meaning
• emotive meaning connected to use (purpose is to influence other's behaviour > state facts)

CRITICISM

• Warnock: much emotive language not about morality i.e advertising so what makes emotive language moral?

• Warnock: non-cognitivism doens't identify any limits to morality bc it just equates it to approval + disapproval + we could approve/disapprove of anything bc it isn't restricted by anything objectively valuable when ethical language is about what is good for people
  RESPONSE
• emotivists: purpose of ethical language is to influence others providing core meaning

MORAL ARGUMENT

• oversimplification to manipulative propaganda without reference to facts + reason (where does this leave morality?)
• if moral judgements are just expressions of attitude, attempts to influence others aren't rationalism
• Ayer: moral arguments are only ever about facts > values
• Stevenson: moral arguments are disagreements in attitudes which have implications for others so we must give up some to keep other attitudes

CRITICISM

• following this, emotivism doesn't adequately explain deliberation or how we rationally change attitudes
• Warnock: if purpose of moral judgements are to influence others, any effective argument = good argument HOWEVER arguments are valid if premises + conclusion are true but moral judgements are never true/false (non-cognitivist) ∴ no moral arguments are valid

• rejection of cognitivism based on Hume's form + is-ought gap

HUME'S FORK

• why can't reason motivate? Judgements of reason are either relations of ideas or matters of fact ∴ true or false; we are motivated by emotions + desires which aren't true or false + they have different directions of fit

P1 - moral judgements can motivate actions
P2 - reason cannot motivate actions
C - ∴ moral judgements aren't judgements of reason (cognitivism claims moral judgements express beliefs + reason is faculty for forming beliefs)

IS-OUGHT GAP
P1 - there are only two types of judgements of reason: relations of ideas + matters of facts
P2 - moral judgements aren't relations of ideas
P3 - moral judgements aren't matters of facts
C - ∴ moral judgements aren't judgements of reason

• any relation describing moral or immoral actions also applies to physical objects but these aren't moral or immoral i.e plants kill other plants but that isn't immoral

RESPONSE

• emotivists: murder goes beyond simply killing

RESPONSE

• Hume: all that means is actions have different causes but relation between cause + effect is the same - something is dead; if we are to argue morality is matter of fact, we need to demonstrate which fact; judgements of reason say what is the case + moral judgements jump to what ought to be the case (is-ought gap)
• Hume's ideas of moral judgements similar to primary + secondary properties
• object's primary qualities provoke subjective reactions within us + we perceive secondary qualities which don't exist in object
• qualities i.e good or bad don't exist within objects + people just within us (mind-dependent)

• judgements of reason not restricted to relations of ideas + matters of fact how Hume sees them - Kant argued moral judgements indicate if maxims can be universalised (is this relation of ideas or matter of fact?)
• Hume is right regarding is-ought gap but we can weigh up reasons natural facts give us
• secondary qualities (good + bad) aren't subjective i.e colour conceptually dependent on vision but not one particular's vision so one can argue colours are real + relational properties
• moral judgements conceptually dependent on people finding things rational + valuable but they are true/false depending on whether something is good/rational for us or not