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For D to use the defence of consent many elements need to be satisfied. Firstly the consent must be
genuine. This means V must have the capacity to make a consent. In Gillick v West Norfolk AHA, the
girls given contraception advice were considered Gillick Competent because they had a "... sufficient
understanding and intelligence to understand what was being proposed." V must base their consent
on sufficient and accurate information, unlike in Tabassum where women had only consented to
examination by a qualified doctor. Also a submission is not considered a true consent, like in Olugboja
where D intimidated women to take their clothes off.
The courts must also consider ensuring balance between individual freedoms and enforcing certain
standards of behaviour. The less society benefits from an act, the less likely the courts will allow the
act to be consented to. In Leach, V was happy to be nailed to a cross, but the courts would not allow
the defence of consent for such violent acts. Equally any act that lowers public morality cannot be
consented to, for example, in Brown violent acts of homosexuals was not allowed to be consented
to because it lowered public morality. However the branding of the wife's buttocks in Wilson, was
considered akin to getting a tattoo.
From the case Jones, the Court of Appeal held that consent could be a defence to an assault charge
where the activity the D and the victims engaged in was "rough and undisciplined horse play". It is
even a defence if the belief was unreasonable.
It is seen to be acceptable because people engaging in this behaviour do not usually intend to cause
injury. Where D genuinely, but mistakenly believes V is consenting then this is also a defence and it
was extended further to include drunken mistake. This was shown in Richardson and Irwin.