responses to the indivisibility argument
- Created by: imyimss
- Created on: 10-10-18 15:14
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- RESPONSES TO THE INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT
- THE MENTAL IS DIVISIBLE
- NEUROSCIENCE
- LOCALISED FUNCTIONS
- CLIVE WEARING
- extreme amnesia patient
- has no short-term memory but still retains his long-term memory
- suggests it's therefore divisible
- has no short-term memory but still retains his long-term memory
- extreme amnesia patient
- CLIVE WEARING
- SPLIT BRAIN PATIENTS
- treated for epilepsy
- two distinct consciousnesses occupying the same skull
- suggests a divided mind
- two distinct consciousnesses occupying the same skull
- treated for epilepsy
- LOCALISED FUNCTIONS
- HUME
- when introspecting, only aware of a series of conscious experiences
- no single thing which is having these experiences
- unlinked instance
- no single thing which is having these experiences
- we're not aware of the thing having the experiences (mind)
- mind isn't a singular entity but a multiplicity of experiences
- therefore it's divisible
- mind isn't a singular entity but a multiplicity of experiences
- when introspecting, only aware of a series of conscious experiences
- BUDDHISTS
- nothing is a singular owner of our experiences
- self is an illusion
- NEUROSCIENCE
- NOT EVERYTHING THOUGHT OF AS PHYSICAL IS DIVISIBLE
- humans talk about states which don't make sense to divide but are physical
- being too hot, wet and running are all physical but non sense talking about dividing them
- it may make no sense to talk about dividing the mind but this doesn't then means its a special kind of indivisible stuff
- could it be that divisibility doesn't apply to self?
- RYLE
- Ryle claims that Descartes hasn't recognised that mind isn't a thing or substance at all
- mind is a term used to talk about our behaviour
- seems senseless talking about dividing the mind such as it seems senseless talking about dividing our actions such as running
- mind is a term used to talk about our behaviour
- mind isn't a thing and has no extension
- therefore the application of Leibniz's law seen invalid as Descartes compares two completely different things
- like comparing a horse and a human - there would be many properties that the other lacks
- therefore the application of Leibniz's law seen invalid as Descartes compares two completely different things
- Ryle claims that Descartes hasn't recognised that mind isn't a thing or substance at all
- humans talk about states which don't make sense to divide but are physical
- what our imagination finds impossible isn't always a good representation what's actually possible
- can't imagine myself having two separate operating consciouses doesn't mean it can't happen
- split brain patients have two streams of consciousness
- THE MENTAL IS DIVISIBLE
- the brain is split into different localised functions
- LOCALISED FUNCTIONS
- CLIVE WEARING
- extreme amnesia patient
- has no short-term memory but still retains his long-term memory
- suggests it's therefore divisible
- has no short-term memory but still retains his long-term memory
- extreme amnesia patient
- CLIVE WEARING
- i.e. hypothalamus is associated with internal environment control (temp.)
- LOCALISED FUNCTIONS
- just a stream or conscious experiences
- nothing is a singular owner of our experiences
- selfish
- self is an illusion
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