Thinking researchers

Duncker (1945)

problem arises when living organism has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached

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Thompson (1959)

Must devise tests or experiments to think and observe the factors involved in the situation isolated for scrutiny

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Thorndike (1898)

Behaviourist- concerned with problem solving/higher cog functions. Cat puzzle box problem solving incremental rather than insightful t&e

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Kohler (1925)

Gestalt- chimps incubation period provided insight rather than t&e

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Wallas (1926)

4 stages of creative thinking- preparation, incubation, illumination, verification

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Helmholtz

happy ideas come unexpectedly, without effort, like an inspiration= incubation

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Hadamard

Unconscious activity= decisive part in discovery, periods of ineffective effort often followed by sudden illumination

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Silveira (1971)

Cheap necklace problem- if had half an hour break 64% solved problem, 4 hour break 85% solved problem compared to 55% with no break- incubation useful as produces illumination

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Murray and Denny (1969)

Incubation only necessary on more difficult tasks- if high ability subject and easy task distractor tasks prevented them completing the problem at hand, low ability subjects who found it hard aided by distractor task as need incubation period

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Duncker (1945)

Functional fixedness- support candle on wall so doesnt drip on table- pp fixated on boxs normal function of holding nails cannot re-conceptualise it as candle holder- easier if drawing pins emptied before pp arrival

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Luchins (1942)

Functional fixedness/Einstellung, water jug problem- SET group who only had difficult solution consistently tried to apply that, control subjects readily applied easy method

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Scheerer (1963)

Overcoming fixedness- the 9 dot problem- connecting all dots without lifting pen from paper, cannot solve as fixated with staying within the square

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Weisberg and Alba (1981)

in the 9 dot problem- many require more than one hint to arrive at the solution

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Brown and McNeill (1966)

feeling of knowing give description and ask for word- when pp claim answer on tip-of-tongue 57% correct in first letter of word

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Metcalfe (1986)

compared feelings-of-knowing with feelings-of-warmth. Knowing predict subsequent recog of answers, warmth did not

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Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987)

Predict how close to sol you are- case when incremental solutions are required rather than insight solutions , incre- tower of hanoi, insight- reversing triangle

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Johnson-Laird (1993)

any process of thought yielding a conclusion that increases the semantic information in its initial observations or premises

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Bacon (1920)

outlined principles of inductive method- knowledge is power. Science= observing nature e.g. specific instances and coming up with general laws to describe it (induction)

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Bertrand Russell

Scientist turkey might make generalisation "each day I am fed" confirmed every day of his life, unless christmas day tomorrow where falsified , deduction requires falsification to be true, unlike induction

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Popper (1959)

falsification and empirical evidence in hypothetico deductive method

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Kuhn (1970)

if too much disobedient data then paradigm shift may occur- scientific revolution- change theories again

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Wason (1960)

2-4-6 task difficult because spend too much time trying to support their hypo instead of falsifying others

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Mahoney (1976)

Scientists no better at task, clergyman more willing to abandon hypotheses

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Wason (1966,68)

Card selection task- choose A and 4 or just A to falsify as dont have propositional calculus in mind like bayes suggested

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Wason and Shapiro (1971)

concrete/familiar task improves results 62% correctly answered compared to 12% in abstract stimuli cards- changing surface features means more likely to reason deductively

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Griggs and Cox (1982)

American students no dif between abstract and concrete version because not familiar with going to places by car/train, require specific experience to reason adequately about it- MEMORY CUEING HYP

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Explain what Griggs and Cox (1982) meant by the memory cueing hypothesis

If people can remember cases which would disconfirm the rule they are more likely to try to falsify it- not really logical but can be more logical when we are familiar with the situ

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Cheng and Holyoak (1985)

Dont have to have experienced the situ but need to be used to this type of pragmatic reasoning- Deontic reasoning- seeking permission e.g. if purchase exceeds $30 must be approved by manager

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Cheng and Holyoak (1985) study

if letter sealed then has a 5d stamp if the form says entering on one side the other side includes cholera among list of diseases- half pp given good reason for judgement e.g inoculation all subjects improved when reason/rationale explained

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Johnson-Laird (1983)

mental models- based on info in problem look at models to see whether conclusion is justified, more models required, more difficult the problem is

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Evans, Barston and Pollard (1983)

tend to select conclusions which are believable and reject those which arent- belief bias. Effect particularly strong in invalid syllogisms- accept conclusions that are incorrect if appear to be real-world- unbelievable info feel cant solve problem

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Newstead et al., (1992)

tested idea and found some evidence that coming up with believable model stops you generating further models which might invalidate the conclusion

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Bayes Theorem

Calculations provide normative answers to probabilistic questions

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Kahneman and Tversky (1972)

Representativeness heuristic, likelihood of event eval by degree to which it is rep of major characteristics of the process/pop from which it originated e.g. sequence of heads and tails

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Kahneman and Tversky (1973)

judging professions from character description box with descriptions of 100 people 30 engineers 70 lawyers - sometimes ignored base rate info due to rep heurisitc

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Tversky and Kahneman (1982) conjunction fallacy

Occurs because specific scenarios appear more likely than general ones- more representative of how we imagine them

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Kahneman and Tversky (1972)

proposed some sequences of events 'represent' our conception of randomness better than others- rep heuristic- gamblers fallacy- law of small numbers (bad outcome due to bad luck/better outcome will occur soon by chance)

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Lichtenstein et al., (1978)

looked at actual vs estimated deaths per year- overest the low death causes and underestimate the things that are most likely to kill you

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Combs and Slovic (1979)

Actually reporting of different forms of death in newspapers- disease killed 16x more than accidents, newspapers reported 7x more people dying through accidents

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Ross and Sicoly (1979)

idv tend to overest relative contributions to collaborative endeavours- sum of members goes above 100%, I- 84.5 supervisor 66%

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Tversky and Kahneman (1973)

which of following was more frequent- word in english has K as 1st/3rd letter 69% answer incorrectly twice as many with K as 3rd TIB lexicon organised by spelling/phonetically so K 1st letter more available for retrieval

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Tversky and Kahneman (1982) cab study

pp focus on witness' accuracy and neglect base rate info of 85% cabs green and 15% blue

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Casscells et al (1978)

disease prev 1/1000 false positive rate of 5% chance that person found to have positive result has disease only 18% answered correctly, 45% gave answer that ignores base rate- attrib to representativeness heuristic

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Cosmides and Tooby (1996)

if give redundant % info instead somehow makes it more understandable, more likely to use base rate info as higher proportion of pp giving another in the correct region of the graph

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Get Revising

Thinking researchers

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