thinking researchers

Todd and Gigerenzer (2000)

Broad landscape in which all theories fall into demons vs bounded rationality

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Allais (1953)

Human decision making isnt perfectly rational- people do not maximize expected utility and violate Savage’s choice axiom – the sure thing principle- people risk 5mil for 0.1 compared to 1 mil for .89

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Tversky & Kahneman (1974)

most people prefer 1A (£100m for sure) and 2B (10% chance £500m).

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Kaheman, Knettsch & Thaler (1986)

dictator game- game proposers the option of offering a 50:50% split or a 90:10% with anonymous responder, and found that 76% chose to divide the money equally

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by Von Neumann and Morgenstern.

prisoners dilemma

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Krebs (1975

gambling exp where either received money or shock exhibited higher GSR & heart rate when the stooge was perceived as similar (on the basis of opinions given in a questionnaire) than dissimilar. When given an opportunity to share their own reward with

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...

stooges who had done badly more was shared with similar stooges- empathy?

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Hershey et al. (1994)

willingness to receive vaccines for hypothetical illnesses. that provides immunity (prevents transmission but not acquisition therefore everyone needs to be vaccinated) and one that provides immunity from symptoms only. Will based on fair

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Messick (1985)

** often choose to defect in order to (i) avoid falling too far behind others and (ii) to prevent the other from doing better than them. This occurs despite the ** awareness that they will perform worse than necessary. Envy.

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Dawes et al (1986)

gave ** a voucher that could be exchanged for $5 that could either be kept or donated to a pool. If a certain number donated their $5 then each would receive a $10 bonus

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Axelrod & Hamilton (81)

political relationships and reproductive strategies in nature - cooperation evolves as a stable strategy thus ensuring that gene level selection leads to group level selection *** for tat best method

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(McLintock & Liebrand, 1988

** with different social values behave differently – some players prefer to maximize the difference in outcomes between self and other players, other prefer to ‘redistribute’ the outcomes

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(Dawes et al, 1977).

more likely to cooperate if they are allowed to communicate

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Kramer & Brewer (1984)

more likely to cooperate if they are identified as being members of the same group as other players

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Enquist & Leimar (1993)

modelled a population of organisms who could only reproduce after an exchange of resources. Free rider successful when coalition and search time were low

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Tversky & Khaneman (1982)

the fallacy occurs because specific scenarios appear more likely than general ones. This is because they are more representative of how we imagine them

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Tversky & Khaneman (1971

law of small numbers- respond 100 assume that there would be some low IQ scores to balance out the high ones believe chance is self correcting

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Khaneman & Tversky (1972)

asked to write random sequences of numbers make look more random than should- local representativeness

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Gillovich, Vallone, & Tversky (1985)

hot hand/lucky streaks- pp thought that the higher probability of alternation sequences are more likely to be chance

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Tversky & Khaneman (1973)

69% answered incorrectly. In fact, there are twice as many words with K as the 3rd letter as there are with K as the 1st.- availability heuristic

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Caroll (1978)

reasoned that if easily imagined events are judged to be more probable then the very act of imagination might increase availability and consequently judgments of probability.

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Fischhoff (1975)

read info on battle between british and gurkhas- hindsight bias- if told outcome automatically assigned a higher prob to that party

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Fischhoff & Beyth (1975

asked (Israeli) ** to estimate the probability of 15 different outcomes of Nixon’s (1972) trips to China and the USSR. 75% of ** remembered assigning higher probabilities than they actually had to events they thought had occurred, lower if hadnt

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Tversky & Khaneman (1974)

estimate the values of sums with a 5sec time limit. anchor was determined by left-to-right calculation.

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Tversky & Khaneman (1974

random number gen number between 0-100, no of african nations in UN, number produced was sim to anchor, any variations also still close to anchor

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Khaneman & Tversky (1981)

Asian disease problem- decision framing is important People are risk averse for gains – lives saved are seen as gains. and risk seeking for losses – the current reference no-one has died, so any deaths are seen as losses i.e. Loss aversion

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Tversky & Khaneman (1981)

proposed a new value function that differs for gains and losses.

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Kahneman & Tversky (1979)

eval insurance policies consider a policy in which the premiums were halved but only paid out in 50% of claims

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Litchenstein et al., (1979)

percieved vs actual deaths from a certain cause each year

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Friedman, 1998

Folklore has it that contestants on the game show rarely switch and nearly always stuck with their original choice

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Granberg, 1999; Granberg, 1995

Laboratory studies of the task confirm the apparent difficulty of the dilemma with around 80 to 90% of participants who take the role of contestant sticking with their initial choice

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Aaron, 1998

Most researchers agree that the reason people stick with their original choice is because the dilemma presents a cognitive illusion in which participants believe that the odds of winning the grand prize by either switching or sticking are 50:50

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Gilovich, 1995

asked participants to rate the value of the booby prize. Participants who switched assigned a higher monetary value to the booby prize than participants who stayed with their initial choice. Thus, the subjective expected utility dep on com/omisssion

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Friedman (1998)

played 10 rounds of the game and received US$0.40 and .10 for booby. 10% switched at start compared to 30% at end humans more capable than KT suggests

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Part 2

incentives group received larger reward/penalties. track record group record outcome of everyplay compare group had to say which of first 40pp would win/lose steady increase in switch from 40-53%

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Tversky and Edwards (1966)

judges probability matched when they were asked to predict which of two lights was going to turn on next 70% of the time, judges would predict 70% for the left light and 30% suboptimal should just always guess blue- "best" strategy to use for this "

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...

to observe and then make predictions that match those frequencies

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Neimark and Shuford (1959)

Predict red or black- 7 red 3 black rapidly learn this and then stay there- asymptote- Red at certain probability but this is randomised without replacement will naturally change predictions eventually

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Herrnstein, 1990

A rise or fall in the reinforcement of a response causes the rate of occurrence of the response to change in the same direction. Should there be an inequality in unit returns from two alternatives, behavior ‘‘meliorates’’, redistributing itself towar

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T and K (1982)

base rate neglect cab problem

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Casscells et al (1978)

medical students 18% responded 2% the correct Bayesian inference 45% responded 95% the response that ignores the base rate when converted to frequencies did better

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Aaron & Spivey (1998) and Krauss & Wang (2003)

compared behavior on the Monty-Hall problem using frequency and probability formats. They found that frequency formats elicited a higher switch rate than did probability formats.

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Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971

pairs of monetary gambles, or ‘bets’ to win or gain certain amounts - small but almost certain bet or large but less likely participants prefer the P-bet over the $-bet in choice phase but value $ bet as worth more

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Angner, 2002).

monetary value of the bet reflects its utility, giving the $-bet a higher rating represents a reversal of participants preference. Such inconsistent behaviour appears to be a robust phenomenon and suggest human irrationality “systematic/widespread"

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Tunney (2006)

examined if reversals are diminished when presented as frequencies. People approach optimal outcome more easily with frequencies – proportion of reversal diminished to 50%

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Gigerenzer & Hoffrage

Bayesian computations are simpler (fewer steps) when presented in a frequency format. That, fewer pieces of information need be stored

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Sedlemeier & Gigerenzer (2001)

rule training, frequency grid, frequency format Initially all groups showed an improvement. After a retention interval the rule training group’s performance declined (ie they began to neglect base rates a again). frequency rep group 5 weeks

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Goodie & Fantino (2001)

show that base rate neglect disappears following exposure to outcomes (ie experiencing natural frequencies) but can return under time pressures.

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Samuelson (1937

Most people prefer option a. Which has a lower value than b, but has a higher utility because the utility of b is discounted by its delay- normative assumption is that the discount function is an exponential constant rate

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Mazur, 1987; Ainslie, 1992

dynamic inconsistency can be explained if we assume that the discount function is hyperbolic in form

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Loewenstein (1996

temporal and physical proximity of options that can reduce aversive states (e.g. hunger, withdrawal) leads to a disproportionate increase in the attractiveness of those options people with low discount rates rather than exhibiting self-control are in

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Ziegler & Tunney (2012)

estimating the discount rates for decisions made when we are the recipient compared to when other people who differ in social distance to ourselves are the recipient. discount rate varied as a function of the coefficient of relatedness (as a measure

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Stillwell & Tunney 2011

Tested 9454 Facebook users across the world to determine the relationship between discounting and smoking

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Arkes and Blumer (1985

sold the same season tickets at different promotional price levels $15 – watched 4.1 shows $13 – watched 3.3 shows $8 – watched 3.2 shows

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Thaler (1980)

explains sunk-costs in terms of prospect theory. Previous investments are treated as losses, and losses are to be avoided or recouped.

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Arkes & Ayton (1999)

sunk-costs occur because of a simple heuristic to avoid waste. Money invested is wasted unless a dividend is returned, even if that is on average less than an alternative.

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(Frederick, 2005

50% of people get the bat and ball problem wrong when it is included in an IQ test because dont bother to check answer- People who make the incorrect responses tend to be more impulsive (DRD), risk seeking

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Kahneman & Frederick (2005)

attribute substitution provides evidence for dual process theory. occurs when when people are confronted with a difficult question, and try to answer an easier one instead. They are often unaware that they have made the substitution.

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Strack, Martin & Schwarz (1988)

How happy are you with your life in general? How many dates did you have last month? The correlation between ratings made on the two answers was small when asked in that order. But when the order was reversed the correlation rose to .66

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...

dating became a heuristic attribute

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Finucane et al (2000)

participants to rate the risks and benefits (separately) of various products and technologies (nuclear power, alcohol, surfing etc) under either no time pressure or a 5 second deadline respond under time pressure their rating of risks and benefits...

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...

were made using the same affective heuristic scale.

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Greene et al 2001

trolley problem personal vs impersonal version observed significant differences in neural activity for personal and impersonal versions of the trolley problem. Impersonal versions elicited greater activation in areas assoc WM, personal areas of emo

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Osman (2004)

applied 4 criteria to test whether key paradigms in thinking were best explained by system 1 & 2.

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Sloman (1996

Criterion S Situations in which individuals are led to respond in a manner consistent with system 1 but generate a different (conflicting) response consistent with system 2

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(Stanovich & West, 2000

IDs Large differences in cognitive ability will be found only on problems that strongly engage both reasoning systems and in which the reasoning systems cue opposite responses

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Sloman (1996)

argued that the conjunction fallacy satisfies criterion S because even 85% of doctoral students in decision science who know the objective probabilities still commit the conjunction fallacy.

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Stanovich & West (1998)

pp hard&easy versions of conjunction prob mean SAT score for people who did not commit the conjunction fallacy was higher than those who did, but the effect was larger for the Linda problem compared with the job problem.

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why?

because overriding the initial system 1 response requires greater supervision of system 2, and therefore correct performance appears to correlate with intelligence

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Tienson (1988).

resemblance of general terms- System 1- initial response triangle with corner snipped off System 2- quadrilateral 4 sides not 3

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Medin & Shaffer (1978):

context theory- decide whether a given instance is a member of one of several categories you do it by retrieving from memory a category member that the target instance reminds you of. The member that you retrieve then determines cat of new instance

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Posner & Keele (1968, 1970

prototype abstraction- dot patterns in 1/3 cats studied the high distortions of the prototype. Test: prototype, high dist, low dist, random. Most likely to say protoype is member of category been though dissimilar to items memorised in study phase

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Squire and Knowlton (1995)

did P and K exp on case study EP Shows same prototype enahncement effect as matched control Likes less the high distortion and randoms Likes low distortion EP is bad at remembering original picture

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Palmeri & Flanery (1999)

induced profound amnesia in a sample of healthy undergraduate participants by eliminating pre-exposure to category exemplars.

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Rips (1989)

consider a circular object that was exactly halfway in size between two categories. One category was fixed (American quarters). One category was variable (pizzas). Cat knowl informed by theoretical knowl

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Reber (1967).

Discrimination approx 70% correct ** must have abstracted something about the grammar because they can apply their knowledge to previously unseen items and tell whether they are well-formed or not

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Knowlton, Ramus & Squire (1992

repeated the basic AGL experiment with amnesic patients and found preserved categorization but impaired recognition (of test items) relative to healthy controls. categorization and recognition were predicated on independent processes (b regions

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Vokey & Brooks (1992).

gram and ungram sim, and disim versions main effects of grammaticality and similarity suggesting the two processes were additive.

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Knowlton & Squire (1994)

repeated this experiment with amnesic patients. They showed no effect of similarity but preserved effect of grammaticality

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Johnstone and Shanks (2001)

Half the test items were similar and half were dissimilar. Two groups of ** Match (memory) versus Edit (Rules). EDIT group showed a clear effect of rule-based classification, but no effect of similarity. MATCH group no evidence of learning at all.

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Hampton (1982).

Some features are not inherited chairs- furniture, carseat- chair, carseat not furniture

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Rosch (1973)

Some instances are better examples of a concept than others: robin is a better bird than a canary

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Ryle (1951); Wittgenstein (1958):

football and soltaire are both a game- some concepts have no defining features

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Warrington and McCarthy (1983)

describe two stroke patients who were relatively more affected on artefacts than on natural kinds.

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Warrington and Shallice (1987)

four herpes encephalitis patients who were reliably more impaired on natural kinds than artefacts.

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Kripe (1972) and Putnam (1975

natural kinds cannot be defined in terms of clusters of features, or on the basis of similarity. Nominal essences are neither necessary nor sufficient for natural kinds.

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Keil’s (1989)

continuum of natural kinds

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Medin & Ortony (1989)

Often people act as if things have essences or underlying natures that make them the thing that they are. Concepts contain an essence placeholder composed of features and theories These theories provide causal linkage to superficial properties

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Rips (1989

story of a sorp- Sad incl pollution describe as bird, not sad as insect

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Carey (1985)

children aged between 4 and 10 years a mechanical toy monkey that could move its arms to bang a pair of symbols. All but 4 year olds denied that the monkey could breathe, eat, have babies.

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Keil (1986, 1989)

showed children pictures of a horse that is painted with stripes so that it looks like a zebra, or a tiger that lost its stripes and gained a mane. older than 8 remained horse, younger zebra-

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Funnel & Sheridan (1992

the Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures the artefacts tend to be low frequency objects (ie the words are uncommon) relative to the living things. Thus from any random sample artefacts will be relatively harder than living things.

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Farah (1994)

artefacts tend to be distinguishable on the basis of FUNCTION and living things on the basis of FORM. At least one of the patients studied by Warrington and colleagues was just as impaired at naming musical instruments (categorised by form not functi

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