The Fischer Controversy - Historian Views

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'never wavered in its ultimate objective, the expansion of Germany's power.'
('planned war of aggression', A, Fritz Fischer, p27)
1 of 24
'there were ample opportunities for Germany to back down... British peace keeping initiatives were given ... insincere support by Germany'
('planned war of aggression', B, Niall Ferguson, p35)
2 of 24
'While the other powers could order mobilisation and wait what to do next, in the case of Germany mobilisation inevitably meant war.'
('escape forwards', C, James Joll, p35)
3 of 24
'Great powers throughout history have rarely, if ever, 'slithered' into major wars ... they undertake this ... only after carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages...'
('calculated risk', D, Holder H. Herwig, p35)
4 of 24
'Each one accused the other of aggressive intentions, and only saw a guarantee for security in an alliance system and continual armament increases.'
('calculated risk', E, Franco-German Historians' Commission 1951, p36)
5 of 24
'objectives in the east were not yet set out in detail... but this does not mean that they had not yet assumed concrete form.'
('planned war of aggression', F, Fritz Fischer, p38)
6 of 24
'fundamental flaw in Fischer's reasoning... the assumption that Germany's war aims as stated before the war were the same as German aims beforehand'
('calculated risk', G, Niall Ferguson, p38)
7 of 24
'German war aims not only exceeded that of any other combatant; they were aspirations to world power.'
('planned war of aggression', H, David Blackbourn, p39)
8 of 24
'to provoke a continental war against France and Russia in what appeared to be exceptionally favourable circumstances.'
('planned war of aggression', I, John Röhl, p39)
9 of 24
'the term preventative Abwehr [defence] fits better than preventative war, because Germany ... had hope of disrupting the entente without war.'
('calculated risk', J, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, p40)
10 of 24
'The Kaiser was under the assumption that any Austrian action could be localised in the Balkans'
('fell into war', K, William Young, p40)
11 of 24
'even those... who see... the July crisis... as the main cause... of the world war are reluctant to accept that this policy was formulated a year and a half earlier by the Kaiser and his faithful followers... in a hastily convened war council'
('planned war of aggression', M, John Röhl, p42)
12 of 24
'the hypothesis is gaining ground... that the decision was not taken in response to the Sarajevo assassination but some time before that... as a result of... Germany's perceive humiliation in the Second Morocco crisis.'
('planned war of aggression', O, John Röhl, p43)
13 of 24
'for many leading Germans the positive pursuit of world power or the negative securing of Germany's position in what was regarded as a hostile world was something to be undertaken for its own sake regardless of the domestic profit or loss.'
('escape forwards', 'calculated risk', P, James Joll, p43)
14 of 24
'the decision to build a large battle fleet represented an 'inner-political crisis strategy'
('escape forwards', Q, Volker Berghahn, p44)
15 of 24
'the monarchy wanted to overthrow the status quo internationally in order to preserve it at home'
('escape forwards', Q, Volker Berghahn, p44)
16 of 24
'In the two years before the July Crisis, Germany's leaders appear to have been gripped by a mood of desperation... Would Bathmann-Hollweg have to conquer Europe in order to rule Germany?'
('escape forwards', R, Norman Stone, p44)
17 of 24
'a fateful meshing of 'aggressive German Weltpolitik' with an even more aggressive, irresponsible 'Habsburg Balkanpolitik'.'
('planned war of aggression', 'Austro-Hungarian responsibility', S, Ruth Henig, p44)
18 of 24
'the Habsburg leaders desperately wanted to shape their future, rather than let events destroy them.'
('Austro-Hungarian responsibility', T, Samuel Williamson, p45)
19 of 24
'[the manner in which Austro-Hungarians] wished for and decided on war against their small neighbour made them guilty of providing the opportunity that the German military were seeking the wage the preventative war they had... [wanted] for years.'
('planned war of aggression', 'Austro-Hungarian responsibility', U, Fritz Fellner, p46
20 of 24
'Austria-Hungary bears the responsibility for planning a local third Balkan war... responsibility for the escalation of the conflict into a European war ... lies in Berlin.'
('planned war of aggression', 'Austro-Hungarian responsibility', U, p45)
21 of 24
'They felt encircled not merely by the Triple Entente, but also by the forces of change... The diplomatic isolation of Germany which started in 1904 had worsened... generals could only think of further rearmaments expenditure as a remedy.'
('escape forwards', V, Volker Berghahn, p47)
22 of 24
'Of course they would have preferred to get what they wanted without war.'
('calculated risk', W, David Blackbourn, p47)
23 of 24
'the German plan to unleash a continental war... was fully realised. Only the constellation of forces against the Central powers was unexpected.'
('planned war of aggression', X, John Moses, p47)
24 of 24

Other cards in this set

Card 2

Front

('planned war of aggression', B, Niall Ferguson, p35)

Back

'there were ample opportunities for Germany to back down... British peace keeping initiatives were given ... insincere support by Germany'

Card 3

Front

('escape forwards', C, James Joll, p35)

Back

Preview of the back of card 3

Card 4

Front

('calculated risk', D, Holder H. Herwig, p35)

Back

Preview of the back of card 4

Card 5

Front

('calculated risk', E, Franco-German Historians' Commission 1951, p36)

Back

Preview of the back of card 5
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