Proprietary Estoppel

Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862)

‘imperfect gift’ cases – e.g. A gives over an interest in land to B without the necessary formalities, B undertakes work on the land based on the assurance that it is his, A will be estopped from demanding his ownership over the land

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Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria (1982)

‘common expectation’ cases – e.g. where A leads B to believe something is the case or that A will do something in the future, and B acts accordingly. A may then be estopped from refusing to do what they had promised

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Willmott v Barber (1880)

‘unilateral mistake’ cases – e.g. A mistakenly believes he owns a piece of land belonging to B. He improves the land with Bs knowledge. B will be estopped from insisting on his legal right to possession of the land

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Ramsden v Dyson and Thornton (1866)

‘if a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a Court of Equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the lan

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Willmott v Barber (1880)

o Five probanda: claimant's mistake as to legal rights;expenditure on faith of mistaken belief;owner knows of own inconsistent rights;owner knows of claimant's mistaken belief;owner encourages claimant in detriment whether directly or by not assertin

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Matharu v Matharu [1994]

o here, thought to be ‘dying gasp’ of five probanda; although, Lord Walker suggested may still be relevant, although ONLY re cases of unilateral mistake (Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe [2008])

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Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees (1982)

modern (more relaxed and clear approach) requires: Assurance; Reliance; Detriment

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Pascoe v Turner (1979)

passive and active assurance

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Crabb v Arun DC [1976]

Short of an actual promise, if he, by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead another to believe that he will not insist on his strict legal rights - knowing or intending that the other will act on that belief - and he does so act, that again wil

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Lissimore v Downing [2002]

here, D ‘on the rebound’ met a married woman, L; at some stage of relationship, took her to gates of his large house and gardens and said ‘how would you like to be lady of this estate?’; relationship broke up soon afterwards, and she claimed this wa

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Thorner v Major (2009)

subsequent remarks made by the deceased e.g. ‘you look after the farm and it will look after you’; HL: ‘the promise can be vague or even equivocal, and certainly less than is needed to enforce a contractual obligation, what however is essential is to

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Cobbe v Yeoman Row Management (2008)

here, a successful businessman who was well aware that there was no binding contract between parties; in this commercial arm’s length context, HL: estoppel not approp

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Wayling v Jones (1993)

The plaintiff had to establish a sufficient link between the promises relied upon and conduct which constituted a detriment to him, although the promises did not have to be the sole inducement for the conduct

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Gilett v Holt (2000)

Walker LJ: detriment is not a narrow or technical concept; the detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment as long as it is something substantial; unconscionable to go back on

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Matharu v Matharu (1994)

Held: wife acted to her detriment when she installed a new kitchen in house owned by her father-in-law in reliance upon assurance that it belonged to her husband and that she would have interest in it

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Thompson v Foy (2009)

Here, C acted to her detriment by building and paying for an extension to the family home

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Qayyum v Hameed (2009)

Here, incurring liability to repay mortgage held sufft detriment where C promised half share in property

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Rochdale Canal v King (1853)

Held: due to their acquiescence, they were not entitled to injunction restraining mill owner from drawing water from canal

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Salvation Army Trustees v West Yorkshire Met CC (1980)

Held: SA entitled to a claim on basis of prop estoppel

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Wayling v Jones (1993)

Here, claimant had helped homosexual partner run café and hotel in reliance upon an assurance regarding the testamentary gift; fact he received little more remuneration than pocket money was sufficient detriment

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Jones v Jones (1977)

Here, giving up job and moving to new area was held sufft change of position

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Coombes v Smith (1985)

leaving her husband was not sufficient detriment, nor was the decoration of the flat which was not done in reliance of an expectation of an interest

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Henry v Henry (2010)

Purely personal disadv held sufft, e.g. being deprived of the oppty of a better life elsewhere

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Greasley v Cooke (1980)

C moved into G’s house as maid-servant; lived with son K, throughout time, looked after son and mentally-disabled sister; K died, 37 years later; other family members inherited house and asked C to leave; CA: detriment sufft; not nec that change of p

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Re Basham (1986)

Importance of cumulative detriment; here, acts e.g. refraining from taking ob outside area, paying legal expenses for boundary disputes, and spending time and money on upkeep of prop, while indy not particularly sig, collectively demonstrated acts be

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Pettitt v Pettitt (1970)

The claimants had subordinated their own interests to the wishes of the deceased

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Plimmer v Wellington Corporation (1883)

The court must look at the circums in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied

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Pascoe v Turner (1979)

Expectation-based approach; here, Ms T had assured P, ‘the house is yours and everything in it’, and in the circums she got everything

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Campbell v Griffin (2001)

The sum payable to Mr C will not by itself enable him to buy a freehold house in Worthing, but it will assist him with rehousing himself (clean break)

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Jennings v Rice (2002)

Walker LJ: the essence of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result, and a disproportionate remedy cannot be the right way of going about that.’

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Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management (2008)

however, CA: its the least unsatisfactory of the various forms that relief might take to make a monetary award which bridged the difference between mere reimbursement of expenditure (‘too stingy’) and the vindication of the claimant’s expectation of

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Williams v Staite (1979)

Although, excessive user or bad behaviour towards the legal owner cannot bring the equity to an end or forfeit it. It may give rise to an action for damages for trespass or nuisance or to injunctions to restrain such behaviour, but I see no ground on

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Voyce v Voyce (1991)

Unreasonable delay in bringing an action under estoppel may bar a claim to a remedy

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Crabb v Arun DC (1976)

Lord Denning: when the plaintiff said that he put his case on an estoppel, it shook me a little: because it is commonly supposed that estoppel is not itself cause of action. But that is because there are estoppels and estoppels. Some do give rise to

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Classic Communications Ltd v Lascar (1986)

In its enlarged and elevated nature as proprietary estoppel, equity stands ready to strike or defend as and when conscience demands

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Oxley v Hiscock (2005)

Chadwick LJ: there is no difference in outcome, in cases of this nature [family homes], whether the true analysis lies in constructive trust or in proprietary estoppel

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Proprietary Estoppel

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