Philosophy of Mind

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What is a mental state?
Our catch all term for the stuff that happens in mind, e.g. Perceptions, sensations, thoughts, emotions
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What are some features of mental states?
They are caused by states of the world, can cause actions, can cause other mental states, are conscious, are about things in the world, correlate with brain states
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What is the basic argument for dualism?
P1: minds can....... P2:no physical things can......... C1: minds are not physical things
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What are some options for the blanks in the basic argument for dualism?
Reason, use language, understand language, have a consciousness...
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Does reason work in the basic argument for dualism?
No, Computers can reason!
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Does use language work in the basic argument for dualism ?
No, computers can use language
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Does understand language work in the basic argument for dualism?
Yes, it seems that computers can't understand language...yet
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Does have consciousness work in the basic argument for dualism?
It's fuzzy... We can't even tell if other people have consciousness or properly understand our own...
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What is Descartes' doubt argument?
P1: I cannot doubt that I have a mind P2: I can doubt that I have a body P3: my mind is not my bidy
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How could you respond to the doubt argument?
It relies on Leibniz's law of the indisernablilty of identical, which does work if you use psychological premises because you could be wrong!
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What is Descartes' divisibility argument?
P1: my mind is indivisible P2: my body is divisible P3: my mind is not my body
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Assess the first premise of the divisibility argument
You can argue that the mind is functionally divisible, and that if the question is about spätzle divisibility then it is rigged because obviously something mental won't be spatially divisible!
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Assess the second premise of the divisibility argument
You can argue that physical things can be indivisible, for example the solubility of sugar. You can respond to this by claiming that solubility is a property not a substancd
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What is Descartes' conceivablilty argument?
P1: I clearly and distinctly perceive my mind to be essentially a thinking and unextended thing P2: I clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be essentially non thinking and extended thing C1: I can conceive of my mind being separate from my body
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(Continued from last card) C2: if my mind and body can be separated then they are different substances
...
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What is an issue with Descartes' conceivablilty argument?
It relies on Lebniz's law but uses psychological premises
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How does "mind without body is not conceivable" relate to the conceivablilty argument?
We cannot comprehend the mind surviving without the body. You can respond to this by saying that we're only talking about the mind and body being intellectually separate, not physically
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How does "logical possibility does not entail actual probability" relate to the conceivablilty argument?
The mind and body aren't Serpentes in our world so who cares! You can respond to this by saying that Descartes wasn't saying that they were! Just that they are different substances
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How does "what is conceivable might not be possible" relate to the conceivablilty argument?
You can conceive of a triangle that does not fit the Pythagorean theorem, but that doesn't mean it's true! You can respond to this by saying that this isn't true if you have a clear and distinct idea (according to Descartes)...
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What is Princess Elisabeth's raw argument?
Physical things can only move if they are pushed, only something that extended can push things, the mind is not extended, so the mind cannot touch the body
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What is the reformulation of Princess Elisabeth's argument?
Radically different substance cannot interact
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What is a response to Princess Elisabeth's argument?
Sunlight can burn skin, so radically different substances can react
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Define epiphenominalism
Mental states are caused by the brain but have no reciprocal causal power
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What is the response from introspection?
Introspection shows that the mind does have power: experience of the small of toast can make you think of your grandma. Libet's experiment contradicts this
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What is Libet's experiment?
An experiment that showed neural activity happened before a conscious decision was made
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What is the response from free will?
If the mind can't affect anything, we can't make choices so have no free will! The response for this is that, yeah. We don't. Sorry.
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What is the problem of other minds?
We cannot know if other people have minds if minds are private
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How does dualism respond to the problem of other minds?
Dualism cannot say other have minds as minds are private so we cannot access them. You can say that we can tell through their behaviour, though.
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How does epiphenominalism respond to the problem of other minds?
Mental states are private, and don't affect behaviours, so we cannot say that other people have minds
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How does behaviourism respond to the problem of other minds?
As mental states are shown in behaviours, we can say that others have minds
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How does identity theory respond to the problem of other minds?
As mind is the same as brain, we can just cut open people's head and see their brain!
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How does functionalism respond to the problem of other minds?
If someone is reacting appropriately to stimuli, we can say there is a functional role and that they have minds
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How does eliminative materialism respond to the problem of other minds?
Mental states do not exist. It is impossible for others to have them.
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What is Mill's argument from analogy?
P1: there are law like relations between mental states and behaviour P2: in terms of observable characteristics, other people are like me. P3: if two things are similar in certain key aspects, they will be similar in others.
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(Continues from last card) C1: other people are like me C2: the law like relations between mental states and should be true of others C3: other people have mental states
...
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Define mind-brain identity theory.
Mental states are identical to brain states
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Define type identity
When two concepts are identical, all things that fall under one category will also be the other category
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Define token identity
When one thing can be referred to in two different ways
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What is the location problem with identity theory?
It is strange to say that beliefs and feelings have a location in the brain. You can respond to. This by saying that our language is just behind the times!
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What is the intentionality problem with identity theory?
Seems strange to say that chemicals can be about something... You can respond to this by saying that the connections create an image in your mind
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What is the chauvinism problem with identity theory?
It means that species without brains cannot have minds. You can respond to this by changing type-type identity to a species-type identity
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What is the multiple realisability problem with identity theory?
There will be more than just one brain state for every mental state. You can respond to this by changing it to token-token identity- each mental state will have a brain state that corresponds.
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Define behaviourism
Mental states are the dispositions to behave in certain ways sunder certain conditions
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Define analytical behaviourism
All language about the mental can be reduced to talk about behaviours without loss of meaning
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What is the problem of multiple realisability for behaviourism?
There could could hundred of different types of behaviour for one mental state. You
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What is the circular issue fir behaviourism?
It seems impossible to describe behaviours without mentioning a mental states
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What is the super Spartan argument against behaviourism?
Imagine a society of people who have been conditioned to never show pain. According to behaviourism they would never feel pain, but really they do they just don't show it
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Define Functionalism
All mental states can be reduced to functional roles
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What is the inverted qualia argument against functionalism?
People could have different quales that perform the same functional role (thirty/hungry)
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How could functionalism respond to the inverted qualia argument?
By saying either a) no they couldn't or b) those are the same mental states
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What is block's no qualia argument against functionalism?
Functionalism is too liberal, it would include things we wouldn't want to say are minds in the category as minds for example the China brain or homunculi head
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How could functionalism respond to blocks no qualia argument?
It's chauvinistic to not accept those things as minds
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Define eliminative materialism
Some or all mental states do not exist. Folk psychology is a false theory
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What is the problem of the success of folk pschology for eliminative materialism ?
Folk psychology as endured because of its successful explanatory and predictive power
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How could eliminative materialism respond to the success of folk psychology?
Folk psychology cannot explain sleep or memory or learning
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What is the problem of the intuitive certainty of mental states for eliminative materialism?
I can sense my own mental states, it's not in questions at all
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How could eliminative materialism respond to the initiative certainty of mental states?
People used to believe so strongly that the earth was flat...
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What is the problem with eliminative materialism being self refuting?
To say that you have no mental states,my out have to use your mental states: "I have"
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Name the four types of conciousness
Phenomenal conciousness, access conciousness, self conciousness, and monitoring conciousness
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What is a philosophical zombie?
Someone who has of conscious experiences but looks from the outside liKe they function liked normal people
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What is Chalmer's zombie argument?
Philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible, and if so it is true that conciousness cannot be reduced to the physical as the zombies have the same physical make up as us
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Other cards in this set

Card 2

Front

What are some features of mental states?

Back

They are caused by states of the world, can cause actions, can cause other mental states, are conscious, are about things in the world, correlate with brain states

Card 3

Front

What is the basic argument for dualism?

Back

Preview of the front of card 3

Card 4

Front

What are some options for the blanks in the basic argument for dualism?

Back

Preview of the front of card 4

Card 5

Front

Does reason work in the basic argument for dualism?

Back

Preview of the front of card 5
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Comments

Gakunin

I like the definitions and there are a decent number of cards (61!)... you might want to check the spelling of some of them, and I'm not sure about your definition of 'epiphenominalism' (I thought it was the phenomenon of out of body experiences...) but, yeah. I like it. :)

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