Mind and the Physical reality are (ontologically) distinct
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Physicalism
Mental states are reducible to physical states, or somehow grounded in them
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Substance Dualism
The Mind and Body are different substances, an immaterial and material one
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A Conceivability Argument
Conceivability entails possibility”. What can be conceived, can ultimately be possible
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Supervienience
If property A supervienes on a property B, then no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to B-properties
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Type-Identity Physicalism
mental types are identical to physical types
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Token-Identity Physicalism
mental particulars are identical to physical particulars
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Mind-Brain Correlation Thesis
For each type M of mental even that occurs to an organism S, there exists a brain stat of kind B, also called the neural substrate of M, such that M occurs to S at time T iff B occurs to S at T.
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Functionalism
mental state types are functional state types, i.e. states defined not in terms of what they are made of or what underpins them, but in terms of their causal profiles
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Role Functionalism
something like pain is not identical to any of the things which realize pain, but is the functional type which can be underpinned by any of those type
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Realizer functionalism
mental states such as pain are identical to whatever physical state realizes the functional type
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Strong AI
an appropriately programmed digital computer necessarily has mental states
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Weak AI
computers are merely useful tools for simulating and testing hypotheses about mental states
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Turing Model
a mathematical model of computation that defines an abstract machine which manipulates symbols on a ***** of tape according to pre-established rules
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Machine state Functionalism
ascribes mentality to such a machine, as any creature with a mind is ultimately not functionally different than a Turing machine
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Syntax
the formal structure, or physical arrangement, of strings of symbols
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Semantics
Relates to the meaning of symbols (intentionality)
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Searle's Anti-Functionalist Claim
Syntax alone is not sufficient for, not is not constitutive of, semantics
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Conscious Experience
there is something it is like for a subject to undergo it
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Qualia
phenomenal character or subjective character of an experience
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Easy Problem of Consciousness
those that can be dealt with by cognitive science
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Hard Problem of Consciousness
How is it possible that physical processes give rise to what appears to be a phenomenologically rich inner life?
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P is true
P is true in the actual world
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P is possible
P is true in some possible world
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P is impossible
P is true in no possible world
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Natural Possibility
something is consistent with the actual laws of nature it is to say that it is true in some possible world in which the laws of nature are exactly the same as the actual laws of nature
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Broad/Metaphysical Possibility
something is true in some possible world; it is a way things might have been (even in a possible world with very different laws of nature to those in the actual world)
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Supervenience Physicalism
Physicalism is true at a possible world W iff any world which is a physical duplicate of w is a duplicate of w simpliciter
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Other cards in this set
Card 2
Front
Mental states are reducible to physical states, or somehow grounded in them
Back
Physicalism
Card 3
Front
The Mind and Body are different substances, an immaterial and material one
Back
Card 4
Front
Conceivability entails possibility”. What can be conceived, can ultimately be possible
Back
Card 5
Front
If property A supervienes on a property B, then no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to B-properties
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