G. E. Moore
- Moore said that good is a simple, unanalysable property, just as a primary colour is.
- the right acts are those that produce the most good
- Goodness however, cannot be identified with some natural property such as pleasure: 'goodness cannot be defined'
- 'Good is good and that is the end of the matter... it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it' (Moore, Principa Ethica)
- Moore said we cannot use our senses to tell whether something is good but we can use our moral intuition
- we can still say whether a moral statement is true or false
- We recognise goodness when we see it - yet we cannot define it
- We have an innate sense of what is good which Moore calls a 'simple notion'
- e.g. 'we know what yellow is and can recognise it... but we cannot actually define yellow' (Moore, Principa Ethica)
H. A. Prichard
- No defintion can be given to the moral claim 'ought'
- like Moore's idea about 'good', we all recognise it's properties
- everyone recognises when we ought to do a certain action, so moral obligations are obvious
- Prichard thought there are two…