Crane on Causal account of Mental Representation

Tim Crane: Mental Representation

Conceptual and Naturalistic Definitions

To reduce intentionality, we need to give naturalistic necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to be representational. That, is, we must explain it via concepts that are not themselves representational.

1. Causal Theories of Mental Representation

Grice noticed that there can be natural meaning. 'Those spots mean measles' is an example of a natural sign: the spots 'mean' measles as something about their presence connects them to measles.

Natural meaning is causal correlation: spots the effects of measles; smoke the effect of fire.

Problem:

Can't just say that X represent Y when and only when Y causes X.

Counterexample a: not every thought I have about sheep is caused by the presence of a sheep.

Counterexample b: not every mental state caused by  a sheep is a a representation of a sheep.

What's missing is: the idea that there is a natural causal link between sheep and thoughts. The causal correlation must be one of natural regularity, not just causal connection.

Thus, the relation between X and Y, when X is a natural sign of Y, is reliable indication. Smoke reliaby indicates fire.

Problem:

1. Necessity: Representations will always represent something. How can they…