The Nile Valley

• Appeared to be a complete u-turn in policy for Gladstone (PM), the champion of cheap government, low taxation- anti imperialist.

• Ottoman Empire captured Egypt in 1517 and expanded its hold along the North African coast. By the 19th century it was in decline.
  • Worried British ministers and PM
  • If the Ottoman Empire collapsed, other European powers would benefit and gain territory. 
  • Not to British advantage.

• The way the Ottoman Empire was governed was at the heart of the problem. 
• It was a huge empire, ruled on its periphery by princes and sultans.
• Like all empires without rapid communication, it devolved power to local rulers.
• Resulted in challenges as its satellie rulers sought autonomy.

Colonel Ahmed Urabi (Arabi Pasha) was a nationalist officer in the Egyptian army who led a group of army officers in protest against Tewfik and Britain + France. 

Dissatisfaction with dual control existed among all Egyptian bourgeoisie. Initial focus was the issue of army pay.

This widened into a nationalist platform- 'Egypt for the Egyptians' and the Egyptian Nationalist Party was formed in 1879. 

In 1879, Arabi led a coup following the attempt to dismiss 2,500 army officers and halve salaries of the remainder. He successfully forced Tewfik to appoint a nationalist ministry.

The British and French feared that he would next force Tewfik to repudiate the loans and ignore the financial measures the dual control had insisted on. 

Strategic:

Trade:

Financial:

People:

• 1882, British + French issued the Gambetta Note: stated that the two regarded the maintenance of the khedive's power as the best guarantee for order and prosperity.
• Intended to warn the nationalists who responded by forcing a nationalist cabinet on the khedive and threatened to dipose him. France + Britain fearing that Arabi would repudiate Egyptian debt payments and determined to protect bond-holders sent warships in May.

However, the French committment did not result in actual participation. When the bombardment of Alexandria began in July, French ships did not participate or offer support.

Reasons:

However- not a total withdrawal. They were frustrated by growing British control and saw themselves with strategic interest in North Africa.

Britain had followed the French lead to the joint expedition as they were unwilling for France to have more influence than Britain in the region. 

They then found themselves in an uneasy position of acting unilaterally when the French refused to sanction the bombardment of Alexandria.

• January 1882: Gambetta Note
• 20 May: Anglo-French fleet sails for Alexandria
• 11 June: Anti-Christian riots in Alexandria, Arabi Pasha fortifies it
• 11 July: Britain begin bombardment
• 12 September: Pasha defeated at Tel el-Kebir
• 3 December: Pasha exiled to Ceylon, Tewfik restored
• 1883: Evelyn Baring returns as Consul General

Robinson and Gallagher- 'Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism' 1961:

They argued that there was no period of anti-imperialism in the 19th century and that Britain pursued an imperialist policy through informal empire when possible, formal when necessary. They identified local crises as drawing Britain to Africa, Egypt being important due to the Suez Canal.

Cain and Hopkins 1993:

Placed the importance of bond-holders and captital investment by the City of London at the centre of the occupation.The national interest was determined by the City of London as the politicians defining national interest were investors in Egyptian loans. Therefore, the city's interests became national interests.

National historians of Egypt- Al Sayyid Marsot:

Explore the social and economic tensions caused by the modernisation of the khedives and the birth of nationalism in Egypt.

Never intened at the outset to be permanent and Gladstone reiterated constantly that as soon as financial stability was assured, Britain would withdraw. However, they remained there for 32 years.

Why?

• The defeat in November 1883 of an Egyptian army under William Hicks, who entered the khedives service 1882, by radical jihadist forces under the mahdi in Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad
• Nature of the British administrator Sir Evelyn Baring and his agenda
• The defeat of Gladstone over Irish home rule in 1886
• Dominance of Lord Salisbury

The Veiled Protectorate:

A term used for 1882-1914 in Egypt. 

It technically remained a province of the Ottoman Empire and the khedive's British advisers who effectively ran the country, had no legal authority. 

'Temporary occupation' -> maintained by the fact Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire.

However... the khedive was unable to make political decisions without the agreement of the British consul general, with increasingly large numbers of British appointees in Egyptian administration and army.

Sir Evelyn Baring was the British consul general in Egypt from 1883 until 1907.                     

A key factor to continuity- he believed that there needed to be fundamental changes made in the agricultural infrastructure and governmental institutions of the country. 

• Lord Baring- descendent of the great banking dynasty.
• Had early imperial experience in India.
• He was convinced of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon and had little patience with what he believed to be the 'oriential' mind.
• He was convinced that the future of Egypt rested on developing its agriculture and a large proportion of his time in Egypt was devoted to improving drainage for agriculture.

• He was in many ways an example of the late Victorian imperialist.
• He was fair, hard working, paternalistic, patriotic- imperial and confident of Britain's place in the world. 
• He set out to reform the administrative and agricultural systems to place the economy on a firm footing. 
• He believed not only that Britain had the right to intervene in Egypt but that it was there to reform.

Through stringent financial controls and cuts in public spending, Baring restored the government of Egypt to solvency by 1887.

The London Convention of 1885 agreed a loan of £9 million to Egypt and £8 million was spent on stabilising the debt situation.

Baring spent the left over £1 milion on irrigation and cleaning the silted drainage canals of the Nile's flood plains to improve agriculture.

Between 1882 and 1902 8% of government revenue was devoted to agriculture and hydraulic improvements. 

Baring's budget was allocated to debt repayments, military, irrigation etc. so other spending was limited and progress was slow or non-existent. 

British land and tax officials argued that the tax system should be equalised to prevent rebellion and promote agricultural investment by farmers, improving output. However, Baring constrained by other budgetary demands and cautious of upsetting landowners, put off taxation reform. (Agriculture held back by inequal land tax system) 

Investment in education was also limited, 'not government responsibility'. Baring refused to fund secondary education and in 1901 raised tuition fees in primary schools to decrease enrolment.

Greatest weakness- his complete underestimation of the strength of nationalism in Egypt. Baring was hugely irritated by the plots and intrigues at the khedive's court and tended to lay the blame for any displayed nationalism at the door of the khedive.

Baring remained oblivious to the significance of the growth of fellahin nationalism. He believedhis reforms had brought warm gratitude.

Left for retirment in 1907.

The problems emerging in Sudan wre a result of changes within the relationship between the Egyptians and the Ottoman Empire.

From 1821, Egyptian control over the Sudan had changed from charging the Sudanese leader a tribute to formal occupation and administrative control.

In 1873, khedive Ismail, as part of his modernisation programme, appointed General Gordon as governor to end the slave trade.

Gordon made good progress but the impact of his work proved destabilising to the economy and the control of society through traditional groups. Gordon resigned in 1880.

The emergence of radical Islam convinced Baring and the British that it would be dangerous for Britain to withdraw, it became a further justification for their continuing presence. 

Egyptian control over Sudan faltered in the 1870s. In 1873 Khedive Ismail had appointed General Gordon as governor general of Sudan. He put down a series of revolts against the khedive and taken action to supress the slave trade. He resigned and returned to England when Ismail was deposed and his succesors failed to maintain order or prevent the slave trade.

As Egyptian control further weakened, Sudan complicated more in 1881 by the appearance of the radical jihadist leader, the mahdi, intent on driving out Eypt. 

Mahdist forces had victories- but the wiping out of all but 300 of 7,000 troops under William Hicks in Nov 1883 convinced London that Egypt no longer had control over Sudan. 

Sudan itself was of little interest to Britain. However, London had no intention of allowing similar forces to take control of Cairo and Alexandria, which mattered to British interest. 

As they had no confidence in the khedive, the chances of British withdrawal from Egypt were reduced by the emergence of the mahdi. 

• Gladstone's committment to Home Rule in Ireland resulted in the splitting of the Liberal Party and the dominance of the Conservatives. Their leader, Lord Salisbury, began his premiership frustrated by British presence in Egypt.
• However, he was not prepared to give the French any potential strategic advantage in North Africa by withdrawal from Egypt and was aware of the mahdi's patriotic sentiments.
• Salisbury was prepared to sacrifice building projects in Egypt in the interests of withdrawal if he could protect British interests.

Between 1887 and 1889 Salisbury worked with Turkey, France and Germany to hamemr out an agreement by which the British could re-enter Egypt.

Agreement for withdrawal was reached in Constantinople on 22 May 1887 with the Constantinople Convention, only to be blown out the water by the French and Russians who threatened the sultan with the invasion of Syria and America if the British were granted ongoing entry rights. 

Salisbury drew the conclusion that the French remained the greatest threat to the Empire. He concluded that Britain's strategic interests could only be guaranteed by maintaining Britain's presence in Egypt. 

Gladstone and Baring feared that the problems of the Sudan would destabilise their programme of financial consolidation in Egypt and they judged the Egyptians to be unable to rule the Sudan effectively.

They were prepared to cut Sudan loose in the interests of maintaining stability and control in Egypt. 

The British came to the conclusion that evacuation of Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan was necessary. 

Gladstone could see no reason for Britain to be drawn into the problems of the Sudan. 

Britain had no strategic or economic interests in the area.

In 1884, General Gordon, who had governed Sudan in the 1870s was dispatched to the Sudan to organise the evacuation. 

• Major General Charles Gordon was a notable example of the kind of imperialist that existed on the edge of the empire. 
• He spent most of his time on the fringe of the empire in China and Sudan. He mapped the Nile as far as Uganda and was hugely energetic in efforts to end the slave trade in the 1870s. 

• 1884-85: His dispatches and extracts from his time in Khartoum in many ways suggests that his intention was to try and generate enough publicity to change government policy but also- the orders themselves were impossible to carry out without adequate reinforcements, which Baring refused. 
• Instead of withdrawing the garrison, he spent time in the city writing plans for handing over authority to an anti-mahdist popular figure and asking for more troops.
• When the mahdi approached, Gordon refused to leave- more evacuations. 

The Siege of Khartoum:

Long term: the desire to avenge Gordon made a deep impact. Kitchener was sent to quell the mahdi in the 1890s.

Reconquest of Sudan 1896^

• In 1896, Lord Salisbury ordered a campaign in Sudan to secure the source of the Nile. The campaign, led by Kitchener, was to result in the annexation of Sudan snd the crushing of mahdist forces. 
• In the early 1880s, the partition of Africa had not yet taken place and British interests were served best by the occupation of Egypt only.

1890s: in order to protect British interests in Egypt, it was necessary to control the source of the Nile. Policy was dictated by two threats...

In 1896, an expedition was launched under Lord Kitchener to address the threats. The defeat of the Italians by mahdist forces at the Battle of Adowa in 1896 convinced Salisbury that the time was now to show force to the jihadists. 

Its scope and nature were cautious and the British objective was initially Dongola (between Egypt and Khartoum). The expedition was to proceed with care, ensuring supply lines remained intact. It was to culminate in the conquest of the Sudan and the defeat of the mahdi at Omdurman. 

• In 1890 Britain declared that the whole of the Nile Valley was its 'sphere of influence'
• London was successful in its diplomatic efforts with Italy, Germany and Belgium, not France.
• In 1894 Sir Edward Grey told the Commons that French interference in the Nile Valley would be intepreted by the British as an unfriendly act. 

• It became clear to Salisbury that at some point Britain's interests must move forward from declaring a sphere of influence to a more visible presence in the Sudan. This would thwart French expansion and protect water that irrigates cotton fields in Egypt, securing stability there.

Ultimate French ambition: link western colonies with Dijibouti- Blue Nile.                                  Ultimate British interest: the reverse (South Africa + British East Africa)- White Nile

• Kitchener was pure army and his personality exhibited the self-control that Gordon lacked. 
• Had an early career in the Middle East and Mediterranean- part of failed Gordon relief.

Kitchener's campaigns in the Sudan were methodical, equipped with modern weaponry, supported by light-gauge railways and gunboats. His initial objective was Dongola but the positive reports of the expedition and wiping out of the mahdists at Ferkeh in 1896 meant that Salisbury was happy to extend the objective to the whole of Sudan.

The campaign was successful and Kitchener won a further victory against the mahdi at Atbara, then Omdurman where his forces destroyed the mahdi's.

Kitchener's actions in the Sudan and his later use of concentration camps in the Boer War outraged anti-imperialists in Britain but he was hugely popular with the public. 

Salisbury had always held the destruction of the mahdi to be a desirable long term goal- 'our desire to extirpate from the earth one of the vilest despotisms ever seen'

Kitchener's careful advance and the advantage of the new British weapon, Maxim gun, meant that this objective was achieved at the Battle of Omdurman.

The behaviour of the British towards the French at Fashoda and towards the mahdi at Omdurman could hardly stand in starker contrast. 

The BrItish had effective control of the whole of the Nile Valley and Sudan became apart of the British Empire, although the fiction that Sudan was ruled by Egypt was maintained during the veiled protectorate.