Restraint of Trade - 34 Marker (3)
This approach shows how the judges haven't always 'relaxed' their approach and can still apply the rigid rule to stop people from interfering with transactions. This approach can be further seen in the case of "Lyne-Pirkis v Jones", (facts S5, L2-5) it was held to be unreasonable due to the fact imprecise language wasn't used and the phrase "engage in medical practice", was far too wide and vague and therfore the clause failed, as it wasn't meritting protection as it stopped the GP from working in a hospital or as a consultant. As source 5, lines 1-2 states a ROT clause can be reasonable so long as "precise language" has been used and it isn't too "wide". In "Fitch v Dewes", a solicitor's clerk was restrained from working within a 7 mile radius and was of unlimited duration. This was held to be reasonable as it protected a legitimate interest which was the client base. In the late case of "Marion White v Francis", a hairdresser wasn't allowed to work within a 1/2 mile radius for 12 months. It was held to be reasonable as it was protecting a legitimate interest which was the client base. A further case which illustrates a reasonable ROT clause is "Littlewoods v Harris", where an executive director couldn't work for a competitor and all its subsidiaries for 12 months. It was held to be reasonable as it protects a legitimate interest such as trade secrets and company knowledge. But judges have also been known to NOT imply an ROT condition, where the employers have failed to insert a clause. This was seen in the case of "Faccenda Chicken v Fowler". AO2: As seen in the cases of "Mason v PCI" etc the courts "do not hesitate to act paternalistically when they believe an important freedom is being curtailed" (as stated by the author in Source 3 at line 5). Therefore, the judges in the first 3 employer/employee cases all strove to create equality for those in an unequal bargaining position.