Multilateralism essay

How can we account for the role of international institutionsin contemporary diplomatic practice? What functions do they perform? Is the legitimacy of diplomacy contingent apon sanction by multilateral institutions? How do we explain the exponential growth of international institutions and assess their effect on diplomatic practices? How far is diplomacy still purely a state-based theory?

International institutions: encompasses international organisations (the UN) supranational bodies (the EU) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This essay investigates the role international institutions such as the UN play in multilateral diplomacy since the mid 20th centry. NGOs play a role within institutions such as the UN and can influence diplomatic practice.

Since 1815 the architecture of the international community has developed, influencing what international institutions can do. Since Vienna 1815, staes made concerts to harmonise powers. 

1899 - Congress of the Hague to introduce more states to the Concert.

Mearsheimer defines institutions ad "a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other." Rules are formalised in international agreements and embodied in organisations.

Tensions between bilateralism and multilateralism - uNSC blessing to legitimise war in Iraq. Bilateral impulses and multilateral sanctions both govern international politics today. Staes are still the primary players.

Tension is embodied in major international relations theories: realism and institutionalist theories (liberal institutionalism, collective security, critical theory).

Issues: Rights of majority as opposed to rights of concert/coordinations, cooperation, harmonisation/bilateral, multilateral

Generic institutional forms of international system - crafted bilateralism, multilateralism and formal organisations. 

Robert Keohane: institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activities and shape expectations."

John Ruggie: multilateralism is "coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain princples" (1995).

Ruggie: multilateralism is an adjective of institutions - so institutions can't be bilateral.

Realism: the intenational system is a brutal arena where states seek to take advantage of each other and have little reason to trust each other

Mearsheimer 1994/5: realism's five assumptions about the international system 1, the system is anarchic; 2, staes inherently possess some offensive military capability; 3, states can never be certain about other staes' intentions; 4, states' most basic motive is survival; 5, states think strategically about how to survive in the international system.

Three main patterns of behaviour result: 1, states fear each other; 2, each state aims to guarantee its own survival (Waltz's self-help system); states aim to maximise their relative power positions over others.

Two factors inhibit cooperation: 1, relative gains considerations; 2, concerns about cheating (free riding).

If states cooperate, they do so along balance of power logic against common enemies. Institutions reflect the distribution of power in the world. They are biased toward self-interested calculations of the great powers and have no indpendent effect on state behaviour. powerful states create and shape institutions  so they can maintain their share in power or increase it. Insitutions are 'arenas for acting out power relationships". NATO was a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1994/5).

Liberal institutionalism: insitutions can discourage states from self-interestedness and can move states away from war. With the right factors, the international system provides opportunities for cooperation and interaction. Examples: integration of Europe through the EU, economic agreements such as ASEAN or NAFTA.

If stats cannot cooperate they should be limited in activity through eocnomic sanctions or military action. before the invasion of Iraq by the US and UK in 2003, claims that Iraq possessed WMD could be seen as claims that it is a bad state that should be curbed rather than an outright danger to US or EU security. Invasion = curbing a bad state under liberal institutionalism. This theory ignores security issues and concentrates on economic and environmental isses.

Increased economic and environmental cooperation is presumed to reduce the likelihood orf war. Cheating is the main inhibitor of cooperation. Institutions provide the key to resolving this problem by creating rules that constrain states without challenging the realist claim that states are self-interested actors. Rules increase the number of transactions between states over time and raise the cost of cheating, tie together interactions (issue linkages), increase the amount of available information (making it more likely cheaters will be caught, providing victims with an early warning of cheating) and rules reduce transaction costs of individual agreements

Flaws of liberal institutionalism: ignores relative-gains concerns - which pose an impediment to cooperation. There is a dearth of empirical record for liberal institutioanlism. Mearsheimer: instrumentalist theories are flawed and have minimal influence over state behaviour. Historical records supporting liberal institutionalist theories are scant and its ability to promote cooperation after the cold war is  unfounded.

Response: Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin said institutions matter and the task is to discover how and under what conditions. Accusing Mearsheimer of privileging realism, they said institutionalism could subsume realism by specifying the conditions where cooperation could occur.

Liberal instutitionalism does not provide a sound basis for uunderstanding international relations as it focuses on the task of explaining economic cooperation. The theory's logic is flawed as it overlooks the relative gains problem.

How can we account for the role of international institutionsin contemporary diplomatic practice? What functions do they perform? Is the legitimacy of diplomacy contingent apon sanction by multilateral institutions? How do we explain the exponential growth of international institutions and assess their effect on diplomatic practices? How far is diplomacy still purely a state-based theory?

International institutions: encompasses international organisations (the UN) supranational bodies (the EU) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This essay investigates the role international institutions such as the UN play in multilateral diplomacy since the mid 20th centry. NGOs play a role within institutions such as the UN and can influence diplomatic practice.

Since 1815 the architecture of the international community has developed, influencing what international institutions can do. Since Vienna 1815, staes made concerts to harmonise powers. 

1899 - Congress of the Hague to introduce more states to the Concert.

Mearsheimer defines institutions ad "a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other." Rules are formalised in international agreements and embodied in organisations.

Critical theory expands on institutionalism: ideas and discourse are the driving forces behind state behaviour so revolutionising international politics requires transforming the way people think and talk about politivs.

Critical theorists hope to creatte 'pluralistic security communitites' where states renounce the use of military force, where war is not acceptable. States must transform their relationships with others.

Flaws: critical theory maintains state behaviour changes along with discourse. But what determines how some discourses i.e. realism becme dominant and not others? Continuity of realist behaviour in critical theorists' explanations of the past. Institutions are needed to alter constitutive and regulatory norms of the international system to shift the focus away from realism.

Ruggie (1993) two requirements for durable multilateralism: indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. Institutional multilateralism has three roles: defining and stabilising international property rights (sea lanes navigation, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (extraterritoriality and property rights). Solving coordination problems (setting rules for electronic telegraphy - need to cut transaction costs and facilitate standard setting). Resolving collaboration problems (Concert of Europe, free trade and gold standard) Ruggie, 1997.

Tensions between bilateralism and multilateralism - UNSC blessing to legitimise war in Iraq. Bilateral impulses and multilateral sanctions both govern international politics today. Staes are still the primary players.

Tension is embodied in major international relations theories: realism and institutionalist theories (liberal institutionalism, collective security, critical theory).

Issues: Rights of majority as opposed to rights of concert/coordinations, cooperation, harmonisation/bilateral, multilateral

After WW1 states acknowledged the difficulties of dealing with issues in isolation. Woodrow Wilson: the League of Nations promoting multilateralism and open diplomacy. too much secret diplomacy led to WW1. Wilson's 14 Points became the basis of a peace ptogramme and on the back of this Germany and her allies agreed to an armsitice in Nov 1918. Institutions would lead to more transparency (Claude, 1984). Germany did not wat to enter the League, the USSR did not join until 1944, the US didn't join and Japan left in 1933 and Italy left in 1937. The League could not prevent WW2.

After World War 2 the Bretton woods instituttions were created and the UN discussions led to the UN being created in 1945. Attempts at San Francisco to make the uNSC more powerful failed. Post-Cold War: When the Cold War ended policy makers sought to create security arrangements based on international instutitions, rejecting balance of power politics. Barnett (1997) looks at international order that would succeed the cold war, hoping to move from realism toward an order secured without the threat of force. Focus on foundations of global politics - legitimacy, consent. Advocated strengthening the role of the UN.

Liberal order: promoting the spread of democracy, placing human rights as an issue of domestic and international governance, advocating a shift away from the state as principle actor in global politics. Reports emphasise the importance of legitimacy, how the UN can legitimise a particular order - all international political orders need a measure of legitimacy to prevent the threat of force. Reinforce Claude's observation that agents of letigimisation oare international political organsiations. Not all actors find this vision attractive.

Generic institutional forms of international system - crafted bilateralism, multilateralism and formal organisations. 

Robert Keohane: institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activities and shape expectations."

John Ruggie: multilateralism is "coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain princples" (1995).

Ruggie: multilateralism is an adjective of institutions - so institutions can't be bilateral.

The shift toward a stable, durable and legitimate international order did not occur. Barnett (1997) says this is because the reports are silent on the contradictions in international order and in liberalism. The pursuit of some goals might undermine others - growth v democracy, for example. They don't note that while international organisations may be above power politics, they are still highly political. They may become unaccountable to either member states or populations they are mandated to assist and may pursue policies at odds with their intersts.

Realists and institutionalists agree the UN was based on false promises. Neorealists: institutions are permissive and subsiervient to power politics. The UN doesn't have a role in international security because it lacks enforcement mechanisms independent of state interests. Neoliberal institutionalism leans toward a reailst view and doesn't see conditions today as being ripe for an effictive, vibrant role for the UN.

Arguments to support this: great powers rarely turned to the UN for dispute settlement during the cold war - preferred institutional arrangements they could control (Barnett 1997). Major powers turning to the UN after the Cold War showed they had converging interests. Ruggie: American Hegemony was the driving force toward multilateralism. Roosevelt was determined the US did not return to being 'fotress america'. Containment by integration to contain Russia in an organisation offering Russia a prominent role. American effort to overcome Nazi Germany's bilateral economic relationships, permissive domestic environment - US refused to form bilateral alliances with Europe. UN's recent decline suggests these interests have now diverged or the major powers have found other organisations to further security.

Realism: the intenational system is a brutal arena where states seek to take advantage of each other and have little reason to trust each other

Mearsheimer 1994/5: realism's five assumptions about the international system 1, the system is anarchic; 2, staes inherently possess some offensive military capability; 3, states can never be certain about other staes' intentions; 4, states' most basic motive is survival; 5, states think strategically about how to survive in the international system.

Three main patterns of behaviour result: 1, states fear each other; 2, each state aims to guarantee its own survival (Waltz's self-help system); states aim to maximise their relative power positions over others.

Two factors inhibit cooperation: 1, relative gains considerations; 2, concerns about cheating (free riding).

If states cooperate, they do so along balance of power logic against common enemies. Institutions reflect the distribution of power in the world. They are biased toward self-interested calculations of the great powers and have no indpendent effect on state behaviour. powerful states create and shape institutions  so they can maintain their share in power or increase it. Insitutions are 'arenas for acting out power relationships". NATO was a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1994/5).

Focus on how to prevent war. Recognising military power is a central fact in international politics - must be managed through institutjions (Claude, 1984). world government advocates attack collective security as inadequate substitute. Realists say it is uselsss. Internationalists treat it as a halfway house between the terminal points of intarnational anachy and world government. Collective security is intended to replace the balance of power and overcome the security dilemma by providing security guarantees through enforcement (Claude, 1984).

Instutituions must convince states to base their behaviour on three anti-realist norms: renouncing the use of military force to alter the status quo, dealing with states that violate the norm - choosing to equate their national interest with the internatinoal community's broader interests. States must trust each other to renounce aggression.

Flaws - no adequate explanation of how states overcome their fears and learn to trust each other. seems to overlook the issue of leadership, assuming responses to aggression must be spontaneous and automatic. Little historical support for collective securityn.

2 less ambitous forms: peacekeeping and concerts - both are or marginal value in promoting peace (Barnett 1997). But coalitions of the willing and resolutions have taken collective security's place.

Liberal institutionalism: insitutions can discourage states from self-interestedness and can move states away from war. With the right factors, the international system provides opportunities for cooperation and interaction. Examples: integration of Europe through the EU, economic agreements such as ASEAN or NAFTA.

If stats cannot cooperate they should be limited in activity through eocnomic sanctions or military action. before the invasion of Iraq by the US and UK in 2003, claims that Iraq possessed WMD could be seen as claims that it is a bad state that should be curbed rather than an outright danger to US or EU security. Invasion = curbing a bad state under liberal institutionalism. This theory ignores security issues and concentrates on economic and environmental isses.

Increased economic and environmental cooperation is presumed to reduce the likelihood orf war. Cheating is the main inhibitor of cooperation. Institutions provide the key to resolving this problem by creating rules that constrain states without challenging the realist claim that states are self-interested actors. Rules increase the number of transactions between states over time and raise the cost of cheating, tie together interactions (issue linkages), increase the amount of available information (making it more likely cheaters will be caught, providing victims with an early warning of cheating) and rules reduce transaction costs of individual agreements

The UN has difficulties in defining intarnational law. There was no second resolution on the war, which should have been vital. 

The war raised questions about multilateral diplomacy's abilities to achieve the objectives of prevention of war, attainment of fair economic growth for all through interdependency and globalisation and the poolign of resources by all states to combat global environmental concenrs.

Questions raised about the creidbility and effectiveness of the multilateral system as a result of the invasion and its ability to prevent unilateral military action. The invasion will enable other countries to more easily rationalise reasons for intervetntion i.e. Russia's invasion of goergia during the South Ossetia crisis. it is likely to hasten the rise of anarchy within the international staye system.

Multilateralism did, however, delay the start of the war - got weapons inspectors in etc until the US ended their mandate.

Flaws of liberal institutionalism: ignores relative-gains concerns - which pose an impediment to cooperation. There is a dearth of empirical record for liberal institutioanlism. Mearsheimer: instrumentalist theories are flawed and have minimal influence over state behaviour. Historical records supporting liberal institutionalist theories are scant and its ability to promote cooperation after the cold war is  unfounded.

Response: Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin said institutions matter and the task is to discover how and under what conditions. Accusing Mearsheimer of privileging realism, they said institutionalism could subsume realism by specifying the conditions where cooperation could occur.

Liberal instutitionalism does not provide a sound basis for uunderstanding international relations as it focuses on the task of explaining economic cooperation. The theory's logic is flawed as it overlooks the relative gains problem.

Critical theory expands on institutionalism: ideas and discourse are the driving forces behind state behaviour so revolutionising international politics requires transforming the way people think and talk about politivs.

Critical theorists hope to creatte 'pluralistic security communitites' where states renounce the use of military force, where war is not acceptable. States must transform their relationships with others.

Flaws: critical theory maintains state behaviour changes along with discourse. But what determines how some discourses i.e. realism becme dominant and not others? Continuity of realist behaviour in critical theorists' explanations of the past. Institutions are needed to alter constitutive and regulatory norms of the international system to shift the focus away from realism.

Ruggie (1993) two requirements for durable multilateralism: indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. Institutional multilateralism has three roles: defining and stabilising international property rights (sea lanes navigation, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (extraterritoriality and property rights). Solving coordination problems (setting rules for electronic telegraphy - need to cut transaction costs and facilitate standard setting). Resolving collaboration problems (Concert of Europe, free trade and gold standard) Ruggie, 1997.

After WW1 states acknowledged the difficulties of dealing with issues in isolation. Woodrow Wilson: the League of Nations promoting multilateralism and open diplomacy. too much secret diplomacy led to WW1. Wilson's 14 Points became the basis of a peace ptogramme and on the back of this Germany and her allies agreed to an armsitice in Nov 1918. Institutions would lead to more transparency (Claude, 1984). Germany did not wat to enter the League, the USSR did not join until 1944, the US didn't join and Japan left in 1933 and Italy left in 1937. The League could not prevent WW2.

After World War 2 the Bretton woods instituttions were created and the UN discussions led to the UN being created in 1945. Attempts at San Francisco to make the uNSC more powerful failed.

Post-Cold War: When the Cold War ended policy makers sought to create security arrangemnts based on international instutitions, rejecting balance of power politics. Barnett (1997) looks at international order that would succeed the cold war, hoping to move from realism toward an order secured without the threat of force. Focus on foundations of global politics - legitimacy, consent. Advocated strengthening the role of the UN.

Liberal order: promoting the spread of democracy, placing human rights as an issue of domestic and international governance, advocating a shift away from the state as principle actor in global politics. Reports emphasise the importance of legitimacy, how the UN can legitimise a particular order - all international political orders need a measure of legitimacy to prevent the threat of force. Reinforce Claude's observation that agents of letigimisation oare international political organsiations. Not all actors find this vision attractive.

The shift toward a stable, durable and legitimate international order did not occur. Barnett (1997) says this is because the reports are silent on the contradictions in international order and in liberalism. The pursuit of some goals might undermine others - growth v democracy, for example. They don't note that while international organisations may be above power politics, they are still highly political. They may become unaccountable to either member states or populations they are mandated to assist and may pursue policies at odds with their intersts.

Realists and institutionalists agree the UN was based on false promises. Neorealists: institutions are permissive and subsiervient to power politics. The UN doesn't have a role in international security because it lacks enforcement mechanisms independent of state interests. Neoliberal institutionalism leans toward a reailst view and doesn't see conditions today as being ripe for an effictive, vibrant role for the UN.

Arguments to support this: great powers rarely turned to the UN for dispute settlement during the cold war - preferred institutional arrangements they could control (Barnett 1997). Major powers turning to the UN after the Cold War showed they had converging interests. Ruggie: American Hegemony was the driving force toward multilateralism. Roosevelt was determined the US did not return to being 'fotress america'. Containment by integration to contain Russia in an organisation offering Russia a prominent role. American effort to overcome Nazi Germany's bilateral economic relationships, permissive domestic environment - US refused to form bilateral alliances with Europe. UN's recent decline suggests these interests have now diverged or the major powers have found other organisations to further security.

Focus on how to prevent war. Recognising military power is a central fact in international politics - must be managed through institutjions (Claude, 1984). world government advocates attack collective security as inadequate substitute. Realists say it is uselsss. Internationalists treat it as a halfway house between the terminal points of intarnational anachy and world government. Collective security is intended to replace the balance of power and overcome the security dilemma by providing security guarantees through enforcement (Claude, 1984).

Instutituions must convince states to base their behaviour on three anti-realist norms: renouncing the use of military force to alter the status quo, dealing with states that violate the norm - choosing to equate their national interest with the internatinoal community's broader interests. States must trust each other to renounce aggression.

Flaws - no adequate explanation of how states overcome their fears and learn to trust each other. seems to overlook the issue of leadership, assuming responses to aggression must be spontaneous and automatic. Little historical support for collective securityn.

2 less ambitous forms: peacekeeping and concerts - both are or marginal value in promoting peace (Barnett 1997). But coalitions of the willing and resolutions have taken collective security's place.

The UN has difficulties in defining intarnational law. There was no second resolution on the war, which should have been vital. 

The war raised questions about multilateral diplomacy's abilities to achieve the objectives of prevention of war, attainment of fair economic growth for all through interdependency and globalisation and the poolign of resources by all states to combat global environmental concenrs.

Questions raised about the creidbility and effectiveness of the multilateral system as a result of the invasion and its ability to prevent unilateral military action. The invasion will enable other countries to more easily rationalise reasons for intervetntion i.e. Russia's invasion of goergia during the South Ossetia crisis. it is likely to hasten the rise of anarchy within the international staye system.

Multilateralism did, however, delay the start of the war - got weapons inspectors in etc until the US ended their mandate.

Security versus economic questions.  The Iraq war was started on the pretext of security concerns but economic considerations are also important - multilateralism has an important role to play in settling trade disputes and forging lasting multilateral economic institutions. "Cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states" when economic relations are at stake while the prospects of cooperation are deemed "more impoverished ... in security affairs" (Mearsheimer, 1994).

American "cheating [within the multilateral system has clearly become] a serious barrier to cooperation" and may well allow for "reciprocation, the ***-fort-tat strategy which works to punish cheaters (Mearsheimer, 1994).

Other international ins***utions 

Military organisations (NATO); economic organisations (OECD); multi-supra-national organisations (EU); less cohesive regional organisations (AU), others (Commonwealth).

As the UN's collective security functions have proven less effective than hoped, alternative/supplementary approaches have been sought.

NATO (selective security in the guise of collective security) - 20th Century form of ins***utionalised alliance (the Treaty refers to article 51 of the UN Charter - the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence). The UN proved unable to handle the threat of Soviet aggression, but was not reformed or abolished. NATO is a collaboration "by a selected group of states in response to the perception of a concrete threat ..., rather than a pattern for a permanent and general system of world order [Claude, 1984]. 

'Uniting for Peace' - UN General Assembly Resolution 377 - to circumvent the veto problem in the security council but not providing a guarantee (democratic vote, no commitment by states) or practicability (no standby arrangement). Serves the political purpose of the US so mostly confined to peacekeeping (Claude 1984).

In the end, Claude (1984) admits the system of collective security is far from perfect because:

1. collective security overlooks the issue of leadership, assuming the response to aggression must be spontaneous and automatic. 2. the imperfect system of collective security may induce states to "rely upon it when it is reliable... Yet, the point remains that the theory of collective security has inspired the growing recognition that war anywhere is a threat to order everywhere." (Claude, 1984).

Economic matters are different. Unlike coordination (central source, military organisations - NATO or the ambitions of the EU) and cooperation (enforcement), economic issues are more about harmonisation. Economic institutions harmonise economic policy (OECD), or policies around the marketing of commodities (OPEC) or ideas (non-aligned movement, Islamic organisations).

Harmonisation may become more important in future - see the EU and the theory of functional cooperation. Functionalism leads to political cooperation, then political union. Tensions arise between bilateral and multilateral action - Kagan proposes states move out of the international system and toward unilateralism - headed by the US. 

How will we see states' rights in the future? Will the rights of the majority overtake the rights of the concert or rights of coordination?

How will institutions evolve? Will more arise, or will time be spent on making the existing ones work better? Should institutions champion human rights? What is the diplomatic fall-out of institutions?

The current reforms of the UN: The Maurice Bertrand report - while the most comprehensive - did not work. The issue comes down to collective action - the UN will only be as good as member states want it to be. How do we encourage the UN to adapt pragmatically to today's world? The UNSC has all the powers and the General Assembly has none, but reform is difficult due to the community of five security council members who do not want reform. The UK and France would only come together at the UN if there is understanding within the EU. Who would represent Latin America, Africa? Should seats be allocated on a regional basis? These questions have paralysed the reform debate. 

The UN is also more active in some areas than others -  the International Labour Office and UN Development Programme are forces to be reckoned with on the international stage but UNESCO is a white elephant.

Questions for the future - how should the UN react to big issues such as Iran? It is important to bear in mind that both those who want the UN to play a greater role in world affairs and those who want its role to be confined to humanitarian work or reduce its role in other ways use the term "UN reform" to refer to their ideas. Opinions range from wanting to eliminate the UN entirely to making it into a full-fledged government.

Reform of the UNSC comprises five key issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council, and its working methods.

If the UN does not reform, what will happen? Another type of civil society (philanthropic groups) may emerge. But does more actors equal a better outcome? What could this mean for the efficiency of the international system? Surely one coordinating international institution is better, especially in the development sector. One area where there has been development is the International Criminal Court.

Conclusion

Institutionalist theories have important flaws, and will likely remain in realism's shadow. However, the reason why they continue to have influence in the study of international relations is that they reflect the world as we would like it to be.