Soviet Economy 1945-1953

Created by: Jacqueline Gomes
Created on: 04-12-13 00:41


	Soviet Economy 1945-1953
	Advantages Impact of the fourth year plan: Production of coal, oil and steel exceeded targets, often by significant amounts. Electricity production doubled that of 1945 whilst tractor manufacture was twice its targeted level. Industrial production in 1950 was almost 75 per cent up on 1940. There were big increases in the production of capital goods such as coal and steel. Some of the pre-second world war propaganda showpieces which had been destroyed, such as the great Dnepropatrovsk hydro-electric power station, were rebuilt. The reconstruction of the Soviet railway system was a notable achievement.Power stations which had been destroyed during the war were rebuilt, as were many miles of rail. In his last book, The Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR (1952), Stalin insisted that the priority must be to continue developing heavy industry, with consumer goods being very much a secondary concern. Most historians recognize the achievement of the industrial recovery. For example, Alex Nove commented that: ' The USSR could face the arms race, which in 1950 was again beginning, with a stronger industrial structure than before the war.' (An Economic History of the USSR, 1988). Peter Kenez agreed: 'Even if we take into consideration the exaggerations built into Soviet statistics, it is still indisputable that the Stalinist methods worked, and that the speed of reconstruction was impressive. ( A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, 1999)	Disadvantages Emphasis was placed upon quantitative, rather than qualitative, targets. Managers were more concerned with levels of production than standard of goods produced. Because the plan was based around government priorities, it failed to take into account actual consumer demand. Consumer goods were given a low priority and were often in short supply. Soviet industry was typically inefficient and labour intensive. It depended upon masses of workers, who were often not very productive, working with often obsolete machinery. This problem was worsened by the high loss of manpower following the second world war. Agriculture: Agriculture had suffered even more during the war than industry. Stalin saw it as more of a means to raise capital through the sale of grain than to feed the people of the USSR. After 1945, the state took between 60 and 70 percent of harvested grain. Though by 1950, grain production had increased greatly during the five post war years, it was still drastically below target. This was partially due to the low investment that farms received. Though there had been half hearted attempts to improve output, such as increased collectivisation, the formation of brigades and the planting of trees to reverse soil erosion, it was not until 1952 that the level of production reached levels even close to those of 1940. Historian Alex Nove stated that Soviet agriculture in Stalin's final years was characterized by "Ill judged interventions of authority, excessive centralization of decisions, extremely low prices, insufficient investment and lack of adequate incentives" The successes that were achieved were due above all to the hard work of men and, increasingly, women, who had to compensate for the loss of manpower during the war. Much of the effort after 1945 was made by workers who were tired and hungry. They were trying to avoid the penalties of lower wages or arrest if they were thought to be slacking, yet they had little prospect of better living and working conditions in their lifetime. 1947; currency reform, which drastically reduced the amount of money in circulation. Everyday products such as clothes and shoes were even scarcer than they had been before the war. In order to acquire basic necessities, people often had to pay much higher 'unofficial' prices in the black market. The Fifth Five Year Plan, which should have begun in 1951, was not drafted and approved until October 1952. It planned significant further increases in industrial and agricultural production, but it was difficult to see how this could have been achieved in agriculture since nothing was done to increase investment in rural areas. 1946 draught worsened agricultural matters.
	Evaluation Overall, in the economic areas that gained Stalin's interest, recovery cannot be doubted. As Peter Kenez sums up perfectly: 'It is indisputable that the stalinist methods worked, and the speed of reconstruction was impressive.' Despite this, general recovery in the agricultural aspect of Soviet economy was non-existent. Stalin himself inherits significant blame for this, due to his stern policy of collectivisation in the 30's. Through this policy, Stalin became unpopular with the Kulaks and other peasants, who began to kill their animals and destroy their grain so that it was not taken away by soldiers and the secret police. The continuation of collectivisation post-World War Two failed to contribute to any agricultural recovery; thus becoming the primal reason for the lack of recovery. However, other factors contributed to the downfall of agriculture. Though by 1950, grain production had increased greatly during the five post war years, it was still drastically below target. This was partially due to the low investment that farms received. Despite the clear lack of attention the Agricultural industry received, the 1946 draught, a factor out of the government's control, also caused significant damage to the peasantry, their food, and their soil – ultimately concluding that many conscious decisions made by the government, such as collectivisation and low investment, were the primary reasons for the lack of agricultural recovery. However, it must be acknowledged that the 1946 draught came at a vulnerable time for the Soviets, immediately after the war, and was a factor out of Stalin's control.

Soviet Economy 1945-1953

Advantages

Impact of the fourth year plan: Production of coal, oil and steel exceeded targets, often by significant amounts. Electricity production doubled that of 1945 whilst tractor manufacture was twice its targeted level. Industrial production in 1950 was almost 75 per cent up on 1940. There were big increases in the production of capital goods such as coal and steel.
Some of the pre-second world war propaganda showpieces which had been destroyed, such as the great Dnepropatrovsk hydro-electric power station, were rebuilt. The reconstruction of the Soviet railway system was a notable achievement.Power stations which had been destroyed during the war were rebuilt, as were many miles of rail.
In his last book, The Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR (1952), Stalin insisted that the priority must be to continue developing heavy industry, with consumer goods being very much a secondary concern.
Most historians recognize the achievement of the industrial recovery. For example, Alex Nove commented that: ' The USSR could face the arms race, which in 1950 was again beginning, with a stronger industrial structure than before the war.' (An Economic History of the USSR, 1988).
Peter Kenez agreed: 'Even if we take into consideration the exaggerations built into Soviet statistics, it is still indisputable that the Stalinist methods worked, and that the speed of reconstruction was impressive. ( A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, 1999)

Disadvantages

Emphasis was placed upon quantitative, rather than qualitative, targets. Managers were more concerned with levels of production than standard of goods produced. Because the plan was based around government priorities, it failed to take into account actual consumer demand. Consumer goods were given a low priority and were often in short supply.
Soviet industry was typically inefficient and labour intensive. It depended upon masses of workers, who were often not very productive, working with often obsolete machinery. This problem was worsened by the high loss of manpower following the second world war.
Agriculture: Agriculture had suffered even more during the war than industry. Stalin saw it as more of a means to raise capital through the sale of grain than to feed the people of the USSR. After 1945, the state took between 60 and 70 percent of harvested grain. Though by 1950, grain production had increased greatly during the five post war years, it was still drastically below target. This was partially due to the low investment that farms received.
Though there had been half hearted attempts to improve output, such as increased collectivisation, the formation of brigades and the planting of trees to reverse soil erosion, it was not until 1952 that the level of production reached levels even close to those of 1940. Historian Alex Nove stated that Soviet agriculture in Stalin's final years was characterized by "Ill judged interventions of authority, excessive centralization of decisions, extremely low prices, insufficient investment and lack of adequate incentives"
The successes that were achieved were due above all to the hard work of men and, increasingly, women, who had to compensate for the loss of manpower during the war. Much of the effort after 1945 was made by workers who were tired and hungry. They were trying to avoid the penalties of lower wages or arrest if they were thought to be slacking, yet they had little prospect of better living and working conditions in their lifetime.
1947; currency reform, which drastically reduced the amount of money in circulation. Everyday products such as clothes and shoes were even scarcer than they had been before the war. In order to acquire basic necessities, people often had to pay much higher 'unofficial' prices in the black market.
The Fifth Five Year Plan, which should have begun in 1951, was not drafted and approved until October 1952. It planned significant further increases in industrial and agricultural production, but it was difficult to see how this could have been achieved in agriculture since nothing was done to increase investment in rural areas.
1946 draught worsened agricultural matters.

Evaluation

Overall, in the economic areas that gained Stalin's interest, recovery cannot be doubted. As Peter Kenez sums up perfectly: 'It is indisputable that the stalinist methods worked, and the speed of reconstruction was impressive.' Despite this, general recovery in the agricultural aspect of Soviet economy was non-existent. Stalin himself inherits significant blame for this, due to his stern policy of collectivisation in the 30's. Through this policy, Stalin became unpopular with the Kulaks and other peasants, who began to kill their animals and destroy their grain so that it was not taken away by soldiers and the secret police. The continuation of collectivisation post-World War Two failed to contribute to any agricultural recovery; thus becoming the primal reason for the lack of recovery. However, other factors contributed to the downfall of agriculture. Though by 1950, grain production had increased greatly during the five post war years, it was still drastically below target. This was partially due to the low investment that farms received. Despite the clear lack of attention the Agricultural industry received, the 1946 draught, a factor out of the government's control, also caused significant damage to the peasantry, their food, and their soil – ultimately concluding that many conscious decisions made by the government, such as collectivisation and low investment, were the primary reasons for the lack of agricultural recovery. However, it must be acknowledged that the 1946 draught came at a vulnerable time for the Soviets, immediately after the war, and was a factor out of Stalin's control.

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Soviet Economy 1945-1953