ISSUES WITH INTERACTIONIST DUALISM

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  • Created by: bluejo
  • Created on: 08-11-16 14:46
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  • WHAT ARE THE ISSUES WITH INTERACTIVE DUALISM?
    • SUMMARY OF DESCARTES' INT. DUALISM
      • The combination of PHYSICAL EXP. and MENTAL EXP. interact in this gland to create consciousness (aka "common sense")
        • VOLITION -> PHYSICAL MOVEMENT
        • PHYSICAL FEELING -> VOLITION
        • PHYSICAL FEELING = MENTAL EFFORT AND VICE VERSA
      • "The mind & the body communicate via the pineal gland, a tiny gland located in the centre of the brain."
    • ISSUE FROM CAUSUAL INTERACTION (PRINCESS ELIZABETH)
      • Descartes fails to explain how interaction between the mental & the physical through the pineal gland is possible.
        • For two substances to interact, they need a COMMON MEDIUM
          • According to his own reasoning, Descartes knows that:
            • the BODY is an EXTENDED and NON-THINKING substance
              • This would suggest that Descartes is wrong by his own flawed reasoning, as mind & body share no common medium and therefore cannot interact
            • the MIND is a THINKING substance WITHOUT EXTENSION
              • This would suggest that Descartes is wrong by his own flawed reasoning, as mind & body share no common medium and therefore cannot interact
          • EVEN IF Descartes is right, and a common medium is not necessary for two substances to interact, there are still TWO PROBLEMS as a result of this:
            • PROBLEM ONE: WHY CAN'T WE THEN MOVE OBJECTS WITH OUR MINDS?
              • Objects and the body are both always NON-THINKING + EXTENDED  -> if no common medium is necessary then there should be no difference between the mind's ability to move a body and the mind's ability to move objects
                • However, can you move objects with your mind? It's a cool idea, but no. Any well-conducted empirical evidence on the subject will tell you that THE MIND CAN'T MOVE OBJECTS.  This suggests strongly that Descartes' theory is not watertight even if there is no need for a common medium
            • PROBLEM TWO: WHY/HOW IS OUR MIND ATTACHED TO OUR BODY?
              • Minds are not SPACIAL, they are un extended, and Descartes suggests there is no link between them and their bodies, so the interaction with the pineal gland seems contradictory
                • Descartes talks about the mind being "inside" the body, but this is only a metaphor, as the mind is un extended and therefore nowhere in the physical world - what is to stop there from being two minds attached to one body, or one mind to several bodies, or to no body at all?
      • DESCARTES'RESPONSE
        • The relationship between the Mind & Body is a BASIC NOTION only understood directly through introspection
          • We can comprehend of its occurrence through our idea of "causation"
            • WEAKNESS: all we know about "causation" actually contradicts this idea, as it suggests that causation can only occur between physical forces or objects
          • It could not be possible that the mind & body interact in any other way than surface-to-surface contact
            • WEAKNESS: Descartes doesn't explain why this is the only way for Mind & Body to interact
    • SUGGESTIONFROM          EPIPHENOM-ENALISM
      • HUXLEY: "The Mind does not cause an effect within the Body, but the Physical can/does cause the Mental"
        • One-way connection, contradicts interactionalist dualism, seeks to prove that its theory avoids the problem that defeats Descartes' dualism - how the mental can cause a reaction in the physical
      • HUXLEY'S ANALOGY
        • In order for a factory to function properly, it has cooling towers which, as a by-product, cause large amounts of water vapour. The factory causes this water vapour through its cooling process, but in no way could the water vapour ever "cause" the factory, or produce more water vapour independently of the cooling towers
          • In the same way, each physical process of the body produces the mental as a side-effect. While physical processes can cause each other, mental events occur only as a by-product of physical ones, unable to cause other mental events.
      • RESPONSE: DECISION-MAKING, FREE WILL &  RESPONSIBILITY, EVOLUTION, OTHER MINDS
        • CRITICISM ONE: Epiphenom. suggests that decision-making is not a mental process, however...
          • If we make a decision (mentally) to perform a physical action, is this not an example of the mental affecting the physical?
            • Even if Huxley can prove that decision-making is, counter-intuitively, a physical process, this would leave little/no difference between Epiphenom. and some forms of Materialism
        • CRITICISM TWO: In a court of law, when faced with a murder charge a defendant tries to prove that they did not CHOOSE to kill the victim, (self-defence, accidental death etc.) These choices are commonly viewed as a mental process
          • But if epiphenomenalism is true, then an "intention" to murder is not what made the defendant kill the victim, if their DECISION to pull the trigger has no causal role in their actual physical pulling of the trigger, then it would seem the defendant is not responsible for the victim's death
            • IF OUR DECISIONS ARE PHYSICAL, HOW CAN WE COMPREHEND IDEAS OF INTENTION/MOTIVATION/MORAL RESPONSIBILITY?
              • RESPONSE: Epiphenomenalists don't accept that an argument is wrong simply because it contradicts our current criminal justice system
        • CRITICISM THREE: Evolutionary theory would suggest that mental processes have a survival purpose (e.g. of a polar bear's thick coat to help it survive cold conditions)
          • RESPONSE:  Jackson replies using the same analogy, a polar bear's thick winter coat. This coat is warm, but it is also heavy. Heaviness serves no evolutionary purpose, in fact it slows the bear down, but it is worth having a heavy coat for the warmth its thickness provides
            • IN THE SAME WAY, mental states can exist as an evolutionary by-product of physical ones with no evolutionary purpose at all
        • CRITICISM FOUR: Standard points out the problem of other minds that Epiphenomenalism creates. WITHOUT A LINK BETWEEN MENTAL PROCESSESAND BEHAVIOUR it is possible for behaviour to exist without mental events to cause them (aka Chalmer's "Zombies")
          • RESPONSE: Jackson provides the analogy with his own case. "I know in my case there is an association between mental states & physical behaviours, and so there is an indirect causal inference that I apply to other people."
            • WEAKNESS: This is a GENERALISED INFERENCE and potentially very dangerous

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