Theory of Mind - Autism
- Created by: Brianna Fowlie
- Created on: 10-12-19 15:10
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- Theory of Mind
- Definition
- Individuals with autism fail to "impute mental states to themselves and others" and that this deficit manifests as an inability to mantalise, or failure to taking into account others' mental states
- Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p.515
- Individuals with autism fail to "impute mental states to themselves and others" and that this deficit manifests as an inability to mantalise, or failure to taking into account others' mental states
- The Unexpected Transfer Test of False Belief
- Wimmer & Perner, 1983
- 80% of children with autism failed the unexpected transfer task
- Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1885
- Concluded that children with autism had a deficit in their theory of mind
- Sally-Anne Task
- Problematic for the theory of mind hypothesis that 20% of autism individuals pass the test
- Happé, 1994
- The deficit does not seem to be universal
- Baron-Cohen (1989)
- Modified his theory by proposing that a theory of mind problem was in fact a delay rather than a deficit
- Bowler, 1992
- Challenged the idea that theory of mind development is delayed in autism
- Found that 73% of young adults with AS passed the second-order false belief task
- The finding that both first and second-order levels of belief attribution were being achieved by a subset of individuals with autism, was enough to convince some researchers that theory of mind deficits were not universal in autism
- Supported in a meta-analysis which showed a strong association between verbal mental age and false belief performance in children with autism
- Happé, 1995
- Bowler, 1992
- Used the more difficult second-order false belief task
- Found that 90% of TD children passed the test, as did 60% of the children with Down syndrome, but none of the children with autism passed
- Modified his theory by proposing that a theory of mind problem was in fact a delay rather than a deficit
- Baron-Cohen (1989)
- Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1885
- Perner et al. 1989
- Replicated the results using the deceptive box task
- 80% of children with autism failed the unexpected transfer task
- Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1885
- Concluded that children with autism had a deficit in their theory of mind
- Sally-Anne Task
- Problematic for the theory of mind hypothesis that 20% of autism individuals pass the test
- Happé, 1994
- The deficit does not seem to be universal
- Baron-Cohen (1989)
- Modified his theory by proposing that a theory of mind problem was in fact a delay rather than a deficit
- Bowler, 1992
- Challenged the idea that theory of mind development is delayed in autism
- Found that 73% of young adults with AS passed the second-order false belief task
- The finding that both first and second-order levels of belief attribution were being achieved by a subset of individuals with autism, was enough to convince some researchers that theory of mind deficits were not universal in autism
- Supported in a meta-analysis which showed a strong association between verbal mental age and false belief performance in children with autism
- Happé, 1995
- Bowler, 1992
- Used the more difficult second-order false belief task
- Found that 90% of TD children passed the test, as did 60% of the children with Down syndrome, but none of the children with autism passed
- Modified his theory by proposing that a theory of mind problem was in fact a delay rather than a deficit
- Baron-Cohen (1989)
- Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1885
- Smarties Task
- Only 4 year olds report the false belief 'Smarties'
- 80% of children with autism failed the unexpected transfer task
- Replicated the results using the deceptive box task
- William & Happé, 2009
- Plasters Task
- Participants with ASD found it significantly more difficult to report their own prior false belief than to predict the false belief of another person on the new plasters task
- A new unexpected contents task which allows the self test to only be passed with false belief competence
- In the original self test version it could be passed by remembering one's prior statement
- Plasters Task
- Advanced Tests of Theory of Mind
- The Eyes Test
- Baron-Cohen et al., 19997
- Showed participants photographs of the eye region of people's faces (from midway along the nose to just above the eyebrow
- Asked an adult group with AS/HFA, an adult group with Tourette syndrome, and a normal adult group if they could infer the mental states of people by looking at the photographs of their eye region
- Adults with autism performed significantly less well than companion groups (i.e. gave fewer correct responses)
- Individuals with autism performed at ceiling in the control emotion task, and so the experimenters ruled out any deficits in understanding basic emotional expressions as an explanation for poor performance on the Eyes Task
- Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, in press
- Challenge the claim that individuals with autism have difficulty imputing mrental states specifcially because they are impaired in reading information from the eys
- Participants viewed dynamic faces posing expressions associated with mental states
- When the eyes were frozen, the performance of those with autism deteriorated at least to the same degree as participants without autism
- The finding that participants with autism were significantly worse at recognizing mental states from faces with frozen eyes suggests that when the eyes were dynamic and informative they were reading information from this region
- Contrary to Baron-Cohen et al's (1997) claims
- Baron-Cohen et al., 19997
- Showed participants photographs of the eye region of people's faces (from midway along the nose to just above the eyebrow
- Asked an adult group with AS/HFA, an adult group with Tourette syndrome, and a normal adult group if they could infer the mental states of people by looking at the photographs of their eye region
- Adults with autism performed significantly less well than companion groups (i.e. gave fewer correct responses)
- Individuals with autism performed at ceiling in the control emotion task, and so the experimenters ruled out any deficits in understanding basic emotional expressions as an explanation for poor performance on the Eyes Task
- Baron-Cohen et al., 19997
- Contrary to Baron-Cohen et al's (1997) claims
- Baron-Cohen et al., 19997
- The Recognition Faux Pas Test
- Baron-Cohen et al., 1999
- The Strange Stories Test
- Happé, 1994
- Presented autistic participants with 24 short vignettes, about everyday situations, in which people say things they do not mean literally
- The stories were each accompanied by a picture and usually 2 task questionnaires
- Asked participants a comprehension questions and a justification question
- Even individuals with autism who passed second-order theory of mind tasks gave incorrect mental state justifications for some of the stories, unlike the neurotypical adult participants who made no such errors
- Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999
- Replicated Happé's 1994 study with two adult autistic groups: one comprised of individuals with AS, the other with HFA individuals
- Both clinical groups failed to use context-appropriate mental state terms to explain the strange stories
- Results showed that even the very highest functioning end of the autistic spectrum had difficulty comprehending non literal language
- Even those without any early language delay (i.e., those with AS)
- Pretend and Irony stories
- Presented autistic participants with 24 short vignettes, about everyday situations, in which people say things they do not mean literally
- Performance on the eyes task was not correlated to strange stories score for either the typically developing or ASD children
- The Eyes Test
- Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, in press
- Challenge the claim that individuals with autism have difficulty imputing mrental states specifcially because they are impaired in reading information from the eys
- Participants viewed dynamic faces posing expressions associated with mental states
- When the eyes were frozen, the performance of those with autism deteriorated at least to the same degree as participants without autism
- The finding that participants with autism were significantly worse at recognizing mental states from faces with frozen eyes suggests that when the eyes were dynamic and informative they were reading information from this region
- Contrary to Baron-Cohen et al's (1997) claims
- Contrary to Baron-Cohen et al's (1997) claims
- Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, in press
- The Eyes Test
- Happé, 1994
- Reading the Mind in the Voice Test
- Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2012
- Found that participants with AS/HFA gave fewer correct answers that two adult control groups, suggesting difficulties drawing inferences about mental states from speech
- Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2012
- A post hoc response in finding data anamolous to the theory of mind hypothesis that some individuals with autism pass tests of false belie
- Brent et al., 2004
- Performance on the eyes task was not correlated to strange stories score for either the typically developing or ASD children
- Performance on the eyes task was not correlated to strange stories score for either the typically developing or ASD children
- The Eyes Test
- Alternate Methods to Passing a Theory of Mind Task
- Autistic passers of both first and second-order theory of mind tasks might have used non-theory of mind and non-mentalistic methods to solve the tasks by "hacking: other solutions
- Frithe, Happé, & Siddons, 1994
- Enactive Mind Hypothesis
- Klin et al., 2003
- From the very outset, the autistic mind is not attuned to the social world (e.g., the gaze and gaze following patterns of individuals with autism are different from neurotypicals and most notable in the eye region does not capture attention as strongly in those with autism
- "The framework presented in this paper is called EM in order to highlight the central role of motivational predispositions to respond to social stimuli and a developmental process in which social cognition results from social action"
- From the very outset, the autistic mind is not attuned to the social world (e.g., the gaze and gaze following patterns of individuals with autism are different from neurotypicals and most notable in the eye region does not capture attention as strongly in those with autism
- From the very outset, the autistic mind is not attuned to the social world (e.g., the gaze and gaze following patterns of individuals with autism are different from neurotypicals and most notable in the eye region does not capture attention as strongly in those with autism
- "The framework presented in this paper is called EM in order to highlight the central role of motivational predispositions to respond to social stimuli and a developmental process in which social cognition results from social action"
- The neurptypical mind seems to be constantly prepared to interpret social meaning, and arguable overextends this capacity to find social meaning even among non-living entities
- Klin, 2000
- Social Attribution Task
- Showed a group of HFA adolescents and adults, a group with AS, and neurotypicals a silent animation of geometric objects interacting with each other
- Heider & Simmel's (1994) silent animation
- Participants with HFA and AS tended to describe the animation in mainly geometric terms, whereas the neurotypical control group searched for social meaning
- Showed a group of HFA adolescents and adults, a group with AS, and neurotypicals a silent animation of geometric objects interacting with each other
- Social Attribution Task
- Klin et al., 2003
- Autistic passers of both first and second-order theory of mind tasks might have used non-theory of mind and non-mentalistic methods to solve the tasks by "hacking: other solutions
- Definition
- Mindblind Eyes
- Senju et al., 2009
- Adults with AS can understand mental states when explicitly prompted to do so, however, eye-tracking revealed that infants and neurotypical adults eye movement anticipated an actor's behaviour on the basis of her false belief
- Not the case for adults with AS
- Exploited the fact that children look longer at events that they do not expect to happen
- Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005
- Adults with AS can understand mental states when explicitly prompted to do so, however, eye-tracking revealed that infants and neurotypical adults eye movement anticipated an actor's behaviour on the basis of her false belief
- Enactive Mind Hypothesis
- Klin et al., 2003
- The neurptypical mind seems to be constantly prepared to interpret social meaning, and arguable overextends this capacity to find social meaning even among non-living entities
- Klin, 2000
- Social Attribution Task
- Showed a group of HFA adolescents and adults, a group with AS, and neurotypicals a silent animation of geometric objects interacting with each other
- Heider & Simmel's (1994) silent animation
- Participants with HFA and AS tended to describe the animation in mainly geometric terms, whereas the neurotypical control group searched for social meaning
- Showed a group of HFA adolescents and adults, a group with AS, and neurotypicals a silent animation of geometric objects interacting with each other
- Social Attribution Task
- Klin et al., 2003
- Senju et al., 2009
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