Thaw after death of Stalin 1924

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  • Created by: Becky
  • Created on: 20-05-15 15:11
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  • Thaw after 1953
    • 1 // death of Stalin: By 1924 Stalin had consolidated soviet domination over Eastern Europe and USSR's position in cold war, final years met with foreign policy failures 1) Failure of Berlin blockade 2)Yugoslavias defection from the cominform   3) Formation of NATO
    • 2 // de-stalinisation: Soviet Politburo set up collective government (molotov, malenkov, belganin and khrushchev) They 1) ended personality cult politics 2) reformed secret police (renamed KGB) 3) Arrested and executed Beria 4) Followed a 'new course' in economic policy - consumer goods
    • 3 // Khrushchev secret speech:The twentieth Party Congress (feb 1956) - highpoint of de-stalinisation. In a 6 hour speech Stalin attacked for 1) promoting cult of personality   2) using purges and persecution to consolidate his personal        rule           3) reducing communist party to compliant body that endorsed his absolute control - US saw this as sign of change in ussr
    • 4 // Role of Khrushchev in shaping relations: K successfully out-maneuvered rivals who saw him as O.R.C when in fact he was C&S. contrasted with R&S stalin Determined to present that 'human face of socialism' he cultivated a 'man of the people' image and travelled to share news of Soviet success (GB in 1956 &USA 1959) offered prospect of improves US-soviet relations. Geoffrey Roberts - K's approach to west was one of "peaceful coexistence with a definite competitive edge" K influenced by visits to Russian front during WW2 and prospect of Nuclear war so adopted softer tone than Stalin. Called for peaceful economic competition between cap and com. At the same time K was unpredictable and pursued competitive ideological and military policies. National strength = nuclear capability Khrushchev boasted falsely USSR making missiles 'like sausages'  to convey Sov. superiority when in fact they lagged behind. John Lewis Gaddis  he acted like a "petulant child playing with a loaded gun"
    • 5 // soviet motives for and moves towards peaceful coexistence: Beria tried to forge a better relationship between western powers by proposing reunified neutral Germany but initiative scuppered by Soviet repression of anti-com protest in E.Germany. Georgi Malenkov 'New Course' in foreign policy focused on P.C with west since he was convinced war was not inevitable between superpowers as Stalin had claimed in 1944 so more can be invested in improving living standards in Russia. Initially K opposed 'new course' but after Malenkov had been removed he pursued effectively the same policy under the banner of 'peaceful coexistence'
    • 6 // Why peaceful coexistence?: More important factors than Stalin's death & new progressive govt explains SU move to P.C - 1) As Marxists, SU believed in inevitable triumph of communism (soon overwhelmed by economic slump, could bide it's time and avoid nuclear war) "P.C between different systems of government is possible but P.C between different ideologies is not" 2) K pursued PC partly because he was confident that USSR's economic output would soon overtake the west.  Industrial production since 1929 increased by 1.949%, only 1.34% for USA - "the disintegration of the imperialist colonial system" 3)  By end of 1940's both sided already consolidated spheres of influence and tacitly recognised the other's area of influence - greater sense of security more willing to negotiate. 4) economic and military implications of nuclear war (which gathered pace in 1950's) had sobering effect on SP "There are only two ways - either PC or the most destructive war in history. there is no third way" Key measures of SU-PC 1 - End of korean War (July 1953) 2 - Cut's in Red Army (from the mid 1950's) 3 - Austrian state treaty (1955) 4- Soviet withdrawel from Finland (1956) 5 - Other initiatives [Settled border disputes with Turkey and Iran (1953), re-established diplomatic relations with Greece, Formal recognition of Isreal and (1953) and west Germany (1955) and restored relations with Tito's Yugoslavia.
    • 7 // internal  threats to soviet system: 1953-1956 there was expectation of change in the Eastern Bloc encouraged by khrushchev denunciation of Stalin, his acceptance that there are 'many roads to socialism' and better relations with West & Yugoslavia. Possibility of change limited due to fact that unity of Eastern bloc crucial to USSR's position in cold war. Any break & USA would use it as an opportunity to undermine Russia with claim that people were unhappy with communism. Berlin Rising June 1953, Poland 1956, Hungary 1956.
    • 8 // 'New Look' policy: (Eisenhower and Dulles) E's 1952 victory appeared to signal the start of a hard-line approact - during campaign, rejected containment as 'futile and immoral'. Dulles spoke about 'rolling back' communism and securing the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe from SU control so E's administration adopted 'New look' policy emphasised hard-line approach.
    • 9 // Eisenhower's motives for better relations: military background, concern that military spending was too high, intelligence gathered by U-2 spy plane Key features = 1) Massive retaliation 2) Brinkmanship 3) increased use of covert operations 4) Domino theory (1954) 5) Eisenhower Doctrine
    • 10 // Geneva spirit, geneva conference, geneva summit: 1, spirit =  2, Conference (April-July 1954) = a settlement made on indochina war (1946-54) 3, Summit = restarted face-to-face diplomacy which had stopped after potsdam (1945) however agreement could not be reached on Germany, european security arrangements and 'open skies' initiatives
    • 11 // Khrushchev's US visit and Camp David  summit 1959: Camp David - significant, first summit only involving the USA and USSR and took place after death of very anti-communist Dulles meant K thought a deal was now possible, E also wanted an agreement before he left office - building on relationship established at Geneva, the two agreed to hold a full summit in 1960 and to settle differences peacefully. Unable to reach agreement on important matters such as Germany and disarmament
    • 12 // Paris summit, May 1960: Less successful due to K and E adopting a harder line. West - French and West German governments fearful USA would give ground to SU on key issues such as Germany. K - also under pressure from china - accused him of adopting 'soft policies towards the west' RESULT = neither side keen to negotiate but U-2 incident (May 1960) led to rapid collapse of summit
    • 13 // Vienna Summit June 1961: Marked new stage in superpower relations. Kennedy recently elected, K intended to use his lack of experience and humiliation over Bay of Pigs fiasco to his advantage by adopting an aggressive stance.  (SU support for 'war of national liberation', West should recognise sovereign status of E.Germany, Berlin question settled within 6 months) Only constructive result of this summit was agreement to endure a neutral independent Laos.
    • 14 // U-2 incident 1960: May 1 US U-2 sply plane shot down by Soviet missile over Russia. Pilot Gary Powers captured. initially US claimed it was a weather plane that had strayed off course. K exposed this cover story by displaying the spy plane's espionage equipment - K demanded an apology for spying and lying. 11 May E admitted the truth and announced the U-2 flights would end but refused to apologise. Paris summit was 3 days later and unable to secure a US apology, K stormed out and cancelled E's planned visit to Russia. incident boosted K's standing and made him more determined to exert Soviet influence.  K's tougher stance probably because of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations - Mao opposed peaceful coexistence - trying to reassure the chinese leader.
    • 15 // second Berlin crisis 1958-1959: Nov 1958, K attempted to impose a Soviet solution to the German problem.  (W.Berlin should become a de-militarised 'free city', east-west talks on German peace should start, Access routes to Berlin would be handed over to East Germany in 6 months) Trizonian countried rejected this and Dulles stated NAO would retaliate if western access to Berlin was denied.  K backed down and foreign ministers' conference in Geneva temporarily cooled tensions over Germany.
    • 16 // Third Berlin crisis, Berlin wall August 1961:  At Vienna conference kh insisted that ke recognise East Germany and withdraw from Berlin by the end of that year - Ke rejected this, arguing that Berlin was central to US security interests. 25 July Ke publicly pledged that the US would not be driven out of Berlin and announced increases in armed forces. Kj didnt want war but could not allow exodus over E.Berlin to continue. August 1961 Kj built a wall that prevented free movement between E and W Berlin. in response Ke  considered limited nuclear strike against USSR but this option was dropped when it became clear that there was no direct threat to W.Berlin . Wall symbolised East-West hostility.
    • 17 // Fourth Berlin Crisis: After Berlin wall crisis, Ke sent General Lucius Clay to Berlin as his representative - aim was to resist Soviet & E.german pressure - October 1961 US diplomat could not enter E.Berlin as he refused to show his passport. This contravened an agreement allowing free passage without passports for western & soviet personnel. Clay responded by providing US military patrol to escort the diplomat into E.Berlin. Armed US soldiers accompanied US citizens, US tanks were also stationed at check Charlie, the cheif crossing point between East and West Berlin. On 27 Oct 33 Soviet tanks entered E.Berlin, 23 at Brandenburg gate and 10 stopped at Checkpoint Charlie facing the US tanks. /tense stand-off meant NATO, US garrison in Berlin and strategic air command were put on alert. Kh authorised the soviet commander in Berlin to return fire if attacked. ken contacted Kh directly & proposed joint staged removal of forces - this broke deadlock - after 16hrs 'nose-to-nose' tanks on both sides withdrew one-by-one


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