responses to the conceivability argument
- Created by: imyimss
- Created on: 03-12-18 15:36
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- RESPONSES TO THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT
- WHAT IS CONCEIVABLE MAY NOT BE METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE
- even though two things can be conceived of separately, it doesn't follow that they must be separate in reality
- i have a clear and distinct idea of heat, and i have a clear and distinct idea of motion
- MASKED MAN FALLACY
- Descartes argument relies on Leibniz's law
- theres an important exception to the law
- in 'intentional' contexts, it doesn't hold
- intentional contexts are those that involve the mind thinking about or being aware of something
- Descarte's argument involves the intentional state of being aware of his body and mind as well as having an idea of their properties
- he therefore can't apply Leibniz's law
- Descarte's argument involves the intentional state of being aware of his body and mind as well as having an idea of their properties
- intentional contexts are those that involve the mind thinking about or being aware of something
- in 'intentional' contexts, it doesn't hold
- theres an important exception to the law
- the awareness of his body and mind doesn't reveal their true nature
- Descartes argument relies on Leibniz's law
- MIND WITHOUT BODY IS NOT CONCEIVABLE
- out of body experiences
- can't verify them because they're private
- would need senses in order to experience out of your body
- AYRE
- verificationsim
- for an empirical claim to be meaningful it must be verifiable
- mind lies beyond any empirical test so it seems nonsense to talk about a non-physical substance beyond ones body
- HUME
- we can have no idea of mind or self
- genuine concepts have to originate in sense experience
- we are not aware of anything which is the owner of these conscious experiences
- if mind is immaterial and lacks extension then it wouldn't be a possible object of sense experience
- KANT
- mind must apply to some possible experience
- there must be criteria we can apply to identify and distinguish
- mind must apply to some possible experience
- MINDS ALONE CAN'T COMMUNICATE
- impossible to communicate without body
- communication involves the use of sense organs
- we can't peer into other peoples minds to see what they're feeling / thinking
- impossible to communicate without body
- MENTAL TWIN
- distinction between me and anyone else must be to do with differences in the mind
- if i was thinking the same thing as someone else then there's nothing to distinguish us
- they collapse into one mind
- must have a body in order to be differentiated
- they collapse into one mind
- if i was thinking the same thing as someone else then there's nothing to distinguish us
- distinction between me and anyone else must be to do with differences in the mind
- out of body experiences
- WHAT IS METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TELLS US NOTHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL WORLD
- we cannot use a priori reasoning to analyse our concepts of the mind and body
- can work out metaphysical possibilities but not physical ones
- we cannot use a priori reasoning to analyse our concepts of the mind and body
- WHAT IS CONCEIVABLE MAY NOT BE METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE
- metaphysical possibilities don't show us what is actually physically possible in our world
- WHAT IS METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TELLS US NOTHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL WORLD
- we cannot use a priori reasoning to analyse our concepts of the mind and body
- can work out metaphysical possibilities but not physical ones
- we cannot use a priori reasoning to analyse our concepts of the mind and body
- natural laws governing behaviour in our universe may prevent consciousness from appearing without a properly functioning brain to produce it
- WHAT IS METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TELLS US NOTHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL WORLD
- can i conclude from this that heat and motion are separate??
- i have a clear and distinct idea of heat, and i have a clear and distinct idea of motion
- heat turns out to be nothing but a vibration of particles
- heat is reducible to motion so in reality they're not actually different
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