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  • Created by: esherwin
  • Created on: 28-03-19 16:59
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  • PHYICALISM - OVERVIEW
    • 1 OUT OF 4 PHYSICALISTTHEORIES
      • MORAL LANGUAGE IS EQUIVALENT TO BEHAVIOUR -AL STATES  (aka       philosophicalbehavourism)
        • This physicalism has 2 forms
          • 1. Hard Behaviourism
            • Hempel wanted to analytically reduce talk of mental states to talk of actually occurring physical states, as described by physics.
              • Criticism
                • Hempel’s analysis is circular
          • 2. soft Behaviourism
            • Ryle wanted to analytically reduce talk of mental states to talk of actual and possible behaviours.
        • dualist arguments AGANIST behaviourism
          • substance dualism arguments
            • Decartes' conceivability argument
        • More arguments against Philo-sophical behaviourism
          • Issues defining mental states satisfactorily 1 – Circularity when analyzing mental states
            • counter FOR Philosophical behaviourism
              • Ryle doesn’t wish to eliminate psychological language
          • Issues defining mental states satisfactorily 2 - multiple realisability
            • counter FOR Philosophical behaviourism
              • People with the same mental state behaviour in a similar way
          • Asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others mental states
            • counter FOR Philosophical behaviourism
              • There is no      asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others mental states
          • The conceivability of mental states without associated behaviour
            • counter FOR Philosophical behaviourism
              • But perfect actors are still disposed    towards pain behaviour
                • META CRITIQUE AGAINST     Philosophical behaviourism
                  • Putnam’s super-  Spartans and super-super-Spartan
    • 1 OUT OF 4 PHYSICALISTTHEORIES
      • MENTAL STATES ARE IDENTICAL WITH BRAIN STATES (aka mind -brain type identity theory)
        • reduces mental states to physical states of the brain. It holds that mental states like pain are identical with particular types of physical state in the brain, say, C- fibers firing.
        • CRITICISMS
          • substance dualism arguments
            • Decartes' conceivability argument
          • property dualism arguments
            • Chalmers’ philosophical zombies’ argu- ment
            • Jackson’s knowledge argument
          • Issues providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states)
        • A set of arguments
          • Criticism: the location problem
          • Counter (FOR) - it is odd (not wrong) to spatially locate mental states.

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