Ethical Language - Ethical Terms and Emotivism
- Created by: Beth Millward
- Created on: 09-06-15 12:59
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- Ethical Terms and Emotivism
- meta-ethics
- examination of what we mean when we say that a thing or action is good, bad, right, wrong, moral or immoral
- asks whether ethical language can be said to have any meaning
- 'good'
- many meanings, not all relating to morality
- 'i have a good job'
- descriptive because it is factually based
- 'giving to charity is good'
- realist because it can be empirically tested
- 'a good train service'
- functional because it fulfills a purpose
- 'running makes me feel good'
- non-realist because it cannot be empirically verified
- Aristotle
- identified 'good' by claiming that something was good if it fulfilled its telos or purpose
- 'i have a good job'
- many meanings, not all relating to morality
- naturalistic fallacy
- committed whenever an attempt is made to prove a claim by using 'good' as natural property
- if a description / definition of good leads to a moral prescription telling us what we should do, it turns an 'is' into an 'ought'
- e.g. giving to charity is good, therefore we ought to give to charity
- G.E. Moore;wrong to do this because
- to identify morality with any other concept reduces meaning and significance
- if we say something is the case, we are making a descriptive statement of how things actually are
- must not then confuse it with a normative or prescriptive statement which says something ought to be done
- to move from 'ought' to 'is' means to oblige someone to do something without good reason
- may be good reason in some circumstances but that is not sufficient to make them a matter of moral obligation
- if a description / definition of good leads to a moral prescription telling us what we should do, it turns an 'is' into an 'ought'
- committed whenever an attempt is made to prove a claim by using 'good' as natural property
- Intiutitionism
- ethical terms cannot be defined
- can only be known through intuition
- good is not a matter of opinion
- something we can all ascertain through reason
- an inner sense directs humans to know what is right or wrong
- strengths
- allows for objective moral values to be identified
- e.g. giving to charity helps those in need
- does not propose subjective or emotive approach to ethics
- allows for moral duties and obligations to apply to all
- allows for objective moral values to be identified
- weaknesses
- people intuit and reason to different conclusions
- how can we be sure our intuitions are correct?
- intuition may be considered to be a meaningless concept since it is non-verifiable
- ethical terms cannot be defined
- Emotivism
- expression of feeling or opinion rather than fact
- rejected by verification principle
- meaningless as they cannot be empirically tested
- e.g. adultery is wrong
- rejected by verification principle
- ethical language can be used to convey what people feel about something
- Ayer disapproves - what is true for the speaker is different to being true for everyone
- Bertrand Russell - moral judgements express a wish
- R B Braithwaite - moral judgements serve to bind the community together
- strengths
- argues moral opinions often formed on the basis of gaining others approval
- acknowledges values and existence of moral diversity
- history reveals many examples of emotivist methods of expressing moral views e.g. hitler's condemnation of the Jews
- Weaknesses
- ethical claims should not change with emotion
- how can we judge between two people's moral opinions?
- everyone is free to do what they want irrespective of the opinion of others
- expression of feeling or opinion rather than fact
- Absolutism
- opposite to emotivism
- morality is following of law
- ethical claims are fact not opinion
- strengths
- moral statements are seen as fact
- true beyond human question
- true irrespective of situation and circumstance
- true beyond human question
- moral statements are seen as fact
- weaknesses
- cannot be empirically verified
- can become outdated
- cannot easily adapt to changing conditions
- meta-ethics
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