Chalmers' Zombie World Argument

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  • CHALMERS' ZOMBIE WORLD ARGUMENT
    • PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIE
      • a system that's physically identical to humans (conscious beings) but lacks consciousness entirely
      • only difference is that it has no subjective awareness
    • PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
      • what it's like to be in such a state or how they appear in my mind: the qualia
      • "There's something it is like to se a vivid green, to feel a sharp pain, to visualise the Eiffel Tower.."
    • argument to prove that physicalism is false
    • Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature
      • any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness
        • we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but that lacks conscious experience
          • therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible
            • physicalism is false
          • zombie world
    • nothing it is like to be a zombie
      • first person point of view would be different
    • if it's metaphysically possible for a physically identical world to ours to lack consciousness
  • PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
    • what it's like to be in such a state or how they appear in my mind: the qualia
    • "There's something it is like to se a vivid green, to feel a sharp pain, to visualise the Eiffel Tower.."

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