Chalmers' Zombie World Argument

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CHALMERS' ZOMBIE WORLD ARGUMENT
- PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIE
  - a system that's physically identical to humans (conscious beings) but lacks consciousness entirely
  - only difference is that it has no subjective awareness
- PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
  - what it's like to be in such a state or how they appear in my mind: the qualia
  - "There's something it is like to se a vivid green, to feel a sharp pain, to visualise the Eiffel Tower.."
- argument to prove that physicalism is false
- Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature
  - any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness
    - we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but that lacks conscious experience
      - therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible
        physicalism is false
      - zombie world
- nothing it is like to be a zombie
  - first person point of view would be different
- if it's metaphysically possible for a physically identical world to ours to lack consciousness
PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
- what it's like to be in such a state or how they appear in my mind: the qualia
- "There's something it is like to se a vivid green, to feel a sharp pain, to visualise the Eiffel Tower.."

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