Philosophy of Mind. Reductionism & Cartesian Dualism.

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Created on: 12-06-13 10:53

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Philosophy of mind
- Substance/ Cartesian Dualism
  - The view that the MIND & BODY are 2 distinct LOGICAL SUBSTANCES that exist independently of one another.
  - DESCARTES. The mind is essentially CONSCIOUS and NON-PHYSICAL. Body is essentially PHYSICAL and NON-CONSCIOUS
    - ARGUMENT FROM DOUBT
      - 1. I can doubt that my body exists. 2. I cannot doubt that I exist. 3. Therefore, I am DISTINCT from my body.
        1. Body can be doubted using POWERFUL DEMON thought experiment. Dreaming. Illusion etc.
        
        2. Existence cannot be doubted as doubting it confirms it.
        
        3. PROBLEM WITH CONCLUSION. "Masked Man Fallacy"
        1. I know who my dad is. 2. I do not know who the masked man is. 3. Therefore the masked man cannot be my dad.
        Conclusion is false. Premise of the argument is about MY KNOWLEDGE not the masked man. Same way, premise of doubt argument is about my DOUBT not my body/mind.
    - ARGUMENT FROM CLEAR & DISTINCT PERCEPTION
      - 1. I have a clear & distinct understanding of my mind as a THINKING, NON-EXTENDED thing. 2. Clear&Distinct perception of my body as NON-THINKING, EXTENDED thing. 3. From 1+2 i am clearly & distinctly a thinking thing apart from my body and extended thing apart from myself. 4. Therefore i can clearly& distinctly conceive of my mind existing independantly of my body
      - 1. Essential properties, defining properties without which we'd not exist.
        Descartes doesn't allow for more than 1 essential property.
      - 2. Clear and distinct understanding: complete conception of a thing, guaranteed by benevolence of god
        When explaining clear and distinct perception he uses God and falls into the CARTESIAN CIRCLE
      - ARNAULD: can clearly & distinctly conceive of a TRIANGLE with a right angle WITHOUT conceiving it obeys PYTAHGORAS
        Descartes: failed to conceive the triangle clearly & distinctly as the two properties are logically linked
    - ARGUMENT FROM DIVISIBILITY
      - 1. Body is Divisible into parts. 2. Mind is not divisible into parts. 3. Therefore Mind and Body must be different distinct entities
        2. Statement that mind is not divisible is INCOHERENT. Consciousness is a STATE not an object.
        
        Mind if it is intimatley connected to the brain POSSIBLY COULD BE DIVISIBLE.
  - Further problems
    - SOLIPSISM
      - The idea that our mind is the only mind in existence. which is ofcourse wrong and leads to refutation of any theory
      - Descartes' idea of the mind is it is PRIVATE, this privacy if the mental realm cuts us off from the mental realm of others and implies solipsism
        ARGUMENT FROM INDUCTIVE REFERENCE
        can't argue deductively from behavior about mental states cos they don't always reflect mental/ so inductively we could just say: When i'm happy i smile so when others smile they're happy.
        BAD INDUCTIVE REASONING. only using one particular case to make a broad conclusion
        
        ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
        we observe a correltion between our BEHAVIOURand MENTAL STATES. given the biological similarities and behavioural similarities reasonable to conclude BY ANALOGY they have the same correlations
        Not a water tight reason for analogy cos there's no way of checking our analogy is true and that other people do have minds
        
        LUDWIG WITTGENSTIEN
        Argued Cartesian dualism implies a private mental language. we only have access to our mental states so meaning of our words will be specific to us. BEETLE IN A BOX ANALOGY
        so instead he argued we learn PUBLIC MEANING of words before we apply them to ourselves...
        well if we learn public meanings, then other people must have minds. SOLIPSISM CURED.
    - MIND-BODY RELATION
      - IF the MIND is NON-Physical and the body is essentially PHYSICAL. how do the two interact?
        DESCARTES: Soul substance resides in the PINEAL GLAND and gives it a tiny push WHICH CAUSES a physical chain reaction
        SOUL is essentially physical, how does it PUSH pineal gland?
        
        LEIBNIZ: propsed they don't INTERACT it only seems like they do cos they run parrallel to each other and correspond. God set the two parralells in motion
        This implies no free will. That our mental can't effect our actions and its all pre-determined
- Reductionism
  - The view that the MENTAL realm can be understood in PHYSICAL terms
    - FUNCTIONALISM
      - Mental process are PHYSICAL INPUTS which lead to BEHAVIOURAL OUTPUTS and other MENTAL STATES
        Mental states made up of SENSORY INPUTS into FUNCTIONAL MIND. like a record player.
        INPUT = Pain. OUTPUT = Behavior (attempts to reduce pain) and relationship to other mental state (relief).
        Functionalism doesn't map particular functions to particular processes so it focuses just on the function. it explains mental by functional role so sees mind ABOVE behavior.
        HAS BAD IMPLICATIONS. NED BLOCK "china mind" and SEARLE's "Chinese Room". seen as completing functions so a MIND
        
        Instantiating a series of functions IS NOT enough to posses the complexity of mental states
    - IDENTITY THEORY
      - MIND is PART of the MATERIAL world. both mind and body are PHYSICAL ENTITIES.
        Working of the human mind FULLY EXPLAINABLE in terms of physics. Pain = C-Fibres firing
        GOTTLIEB FREGE. Morning star and Evening star. 2 SENSES of the same REFERENCE. Pain + C-fibres both SENSES of the same REFERENCE
        TYPE-TYPE THEORY: EVERY mental state will CORRELATE with a PHYSICAL state and every 1-1 correlation will be the same
        implies no ANIMAL/ HUMAN can feel pain if C-fibers aren't firing
        
        TOKEN-TOKEN THEORY: each token instance of mental states must correspond to a TOKEN INSTANCE of a physical process
        Implies no systematic relationship between Mental and Physical state
        
        SEARLE; 2 people could be in same mental state but diff physical brain state. what makes them the same?
    - ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
      - Mental states DO NOT EXIST. we should rid ourselves of the entire mental vocab
        Mental vocab is "folk psychology".over the years we've believed in many strange mystical things. Science proved them wrong.
        Science indicates that feelings/ consciousness don't exist they're just physical brain processes. so they'll be next to go.
        Argument from failed past theories does not conclude that this time we are wrong too.
        
        existence of mental states is obvious to everyone on a personal level and we'd need a stronger argument to reject our own mental states
    - ANALYTIC BEHAVIOURISM
      - All statements of the MIND/ MENTAL STATES can be described as ACTUAL/ POTENTIAL BEHAVIOUR
        Analysis of the Mental language can be translated to BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTIONS.
        CARL HEMP: 1. Paul weeps and gestures. 2. replies I have a toothache. 3. closer examination reveals decay. 4. BP CNS Digestion show appropriate changes
        Fails to analyse properly. 1. weeps is not strictly behavioural. 2. answering implies mental state of understanding. 3. none of this is essential to THOOTACHE
        RYLE: SOFT BEHAVIOURISM. To have a belief/ Mental state is to be PREDISPOSED TO ACT A CERTAIN WAY
        Much more to mental states than dispositions. Disposition itself is due to mental states
        
        Many ways mental states can be realised and impossible to mention all of them in a description
        
        General problem is WE EXPLAIN BEHAVIOUR IN TERMS OF MENTAL STATES. so to explain behaviour you'd need other behaviour but the underlying cause will still be mental
  - Further problems
    - INTENTIONALITY
      - ABOUTNESS the way our mental states can be about something other than themselves
    - QUALIA
      - RAW FEELS of experience. INVERTED QUALIA: born with seeing RED and GREEN. however still call red - red. so only thing thats different is the QUALIA
        BEHAVIOURISM: call red red so by behaviour unable to explain inverted qualia. FUNCTIONALISM: fuction of calling red red is normal so cannot explain inverted qualia. IDENTITY THEORY; loads of ways brain coukd process green/red cannot tell them apart with physical states. ELIMATIVE: cannot explain qualia without mental vocab
All statements of the MIND/ MENTAL STATES can be described as ACTUAL/ POTENTIAL BEHAVIOUR
- Analysis of the Mental language can be translated to BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTIONS.
  - CARL HEMP: 1. Paul weeps and gestures. 2. replies I have a toothache. 3. closer examination reveals decay. 4. BP CNS Digestion show appropriate changes
    - Fails to analyse properly. 1. weeps is not strictly behavioural. 2. answering implies mental state of understanding. 3. none of this is essential to THOOTACHE
      - RYLE: SOFT BEHAVIOURISM. To have a belief/ Mental state is to be PREDISPOSED TO ACT A CERTAIN WAY
        Much more to mental states than dispositions. Disposition itself is due to mental states
      - Many ways mental states can be realised and impossible to mention all of them in a description
  - General problem is WE EXPLAIN BEHAVIOUR IN TERMS OF MENTAL STATES. so to explain behaviour you'd need other behaviour but the underlying cause will still be mental
LUDWIG WITTGENSTIEN
- Argued Cartesian dualism implies a private mental language. we only have access to our mental states so meaning of our words will be specific to us. BEETLE IN A BOX ANALOGY
  - so instead he argued we learn PUBLIC MEANING of words before we apply them to ourselves...
    - well if we learn public meanings, then other people must have minds. SOLIPSISM CURED.

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Philosophy of Mind. Reductionism & Cartesian Dualism.

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